E Pluribus Europa?

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The search for the Holy Grail of a collective European identity goes on. Electoral defeats at the hands of French, Dutch and Irish heretics still in the thrall of nationalism have stalled the faith-based project of political integration; and forward movement may require a coordinated crusade for new converts.

The remarkable achievement of a European "market-state" rested on a permissive public consensus that increasing the purview of EU jurisdiction did not threaten core principles of national identity (Risse 2005). In the public mind, the dominant pattern of feeling was "Nation First, Europe Too" (Citrin and Sides 2004). The emergence of a legitimate European "nation-state" resembling the American federal system, however, may depend on a paradigmatic shift in which the people of Europe adopt a common collective identity and *favor* it over their national identity. A united crusade by the governments of member-states to coordinate education policies and shared communications through media and culture arguably could create European loyalists, as in the state first, nation second model of British and French nationalism (Gellner 1983). Alternatively, constraints of democratic politics might make it difficult to impose these Europeanizing policies without the development of a bloc of supporters, as in the nation first, state second model of German and French nationalism (Fligstein 2008).

This paper avoids the debate about the future trajectory of the European project. Prediction is a difficult business, especially about the distant future. My aim here is more modest and more empirical. I shall describe the current landscape of public attachments to Europe and nation, focusing on how people negotiate and prioritize their dual identities as Europeans and nationals. I take it as axiomatic that people have multiple political identities. What matters is whether and when these distinguishable identities are complementary or competitive, mutually reinforcing or exclusive in terms of their imperatives for behavior. The first section of the paper presents a conceptual analysis of the concept of collective identity. Then I turn to a synthesis of evidence from Eurobarometer and International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data to consider

trends in public attitudes and cross-national differences in the relative strength of European and national identities. Further, I examine the significance of differences in how citizens define what it means to be a Briton, Frenchman, German and so forth on their opinions about what Europe is and should become and whether the individual's patterning of collective identities matters for preferences about national and European policy-making.

Defining Collective Identity

The voluminous academic literature on "identity" resembles a quagmire rather than a tunnel ending in conceptual clarity. Because the term is used to mean both sameness and difference, both commonality and individuality, this should not be surprising. Still, the drawing power of "identity" makes it unlikely that the suggestion to consign it to the dustbin of scientific history will take hold (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), so the best one can do is to stipulate a definition that helps address the dominant theoretical and empirical issues concerning "identity politics." And although definitions of "identity" abound, there is a surprising consensus about the nature of these questions. Below I outline five main points of agreement.

First, supranational, national and ethnic identities are *social* identities. They have *relational content* in the sense that they refer to dimensions of one's self-concept defined by perceptions of similarity with some and difference from others. Social identities develop because people perceive themselves as belonging to groups and pursue their goals through membership in these groups. Social identities arise from a process of social comparison and their formation inevitably requires drawing boundaries between "us" and "them." Visible markers may define the relational content of identity, the aspect of one's self shared with a specified set of others. But group boundaries also may be socially constructed. Sometimes "we" draw the boundaries, sometimes "they." In Sartre's famous comment: anti-Semitism assures that Jews (and a Jewish identity) will endure. So one important question with implications for group conflict is whether there is agreement about the boundaries of group membership. The assimilated German Jews thought of themselves in national rather than ethnic terms; the Nazis viewed things differently. A European identity thus entails distinguishing an expansive set of "ins" from others—like Americans—whose defining attributes are visibly different.

Second, politics can be critical in the "social construction" of group identities. Members of the group are connected by common goals such as attaining political independence, securing representation, or obtaining symbolic recognition for prior achievements. Nation building is a process of inclusion and exclusion, and political decisions help determine the boundaries of the group and their permeability. The same processes clearly apply to defining the geographic and ideological boundaries of Europe and the dominant answer to the question "Who is a European?" may change over time, much as the answer to questions about the boundaries of particular nations has changed.

Third, in defining social identities, it is critical to distinguish between their cognitive aspects, and dimensions of their normative content (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Brewer 2000; Brubaker and Cooper 2000). The act of self-categorization answers the cognitive "who am I" question, but the *strength* of one's identification with a particular membership group – the emotional significance of a social identity – varies. One can support the existence and policies of the EU without a strong emotional attachment to Europe or a sense of solidarity with citizens of other member-states. Identifying *as* is not the same as identifying *with*.

Fourth, the content of a social identity gives concrete meaning to membership in a particular group. Identities may be defined by their purposes, but typically there are constitutive norms that define full membership in a group. The normative content of an idea spells out the physical features, values, and conduct represented by the prototypical member of the group. A standard expectation is that strong psychological identification with the group will engender conformity to the group's constitutive norms. The bases on which collective judgments of sameness or difference rest can vary across time and space (Horowitz 1985). In other words, the content of national identity can be contested as well as constructed. A common contrast in the European context is between the civic conception of French national identity, which rejects ethnic or religious criteria in favor of the norm of citizens as individuals committed to universal values of democracy and secularism, and an ethnic conception of German national identity as based on common descent (Brubaker 1992). Since Europe is by definition a multicultural entity, building a common identity on the idea of shared ancestry is a non-starter. And the presence of so many Muslims makes it difficult to sustain an image of Europe as fundamentally Christian. Hence those seeking to build a collective European identity take the idea of "constitutional

patriotism" as a starting-point, founding the idea of a European "nation" on shared political values and policies.

Fifth, social identities have political relevance because they channel feelings of mutuality, obligation, and antagonism, delineating the contours of one's willingness to help other people and the boundaries of support for policies allocating resources based on group membership. Indeed, the intimate connection between the personal and the social bases of self-regard becomes clear when one recalls how quickly an insult to the dignity of one's group can trigger ethnic violence (Horowitz 1985). Identities can be a matter of life and death. In the name of the nation, ethnic group, or religion, people are willing both to die for "our people" and to commit unspeakable crimes against the dehumanized "others." More generally, identity politics refers to the mobilization of group pride to advance perceived collective group interests, calling upon people to judge events, policies, and candidates primarily in terms of how they would affect the standing and heritage of one's group. Since people have multiple identities, belonging to Europe, to nations, and to sub-national units, they sometimes have to decide, when confronting a political choice such as whether to give up the nation's veto when the European Union makes policy, which identity has priority. Social identities are more likely to influence behavior as they acquire emotional significance (Tajfel 1981).

The Problem of Identity Choice

Nationalists insist on the priority of identity with the nation over all other foci of affiliation. If this is true, then nationalism is a threat to the emergence of a predominant European identity, much as the persistence of strong loyalties to the states were an obstacle to the emergence of an overarching American identity after the founding of that new nation in the late eighteenth century. Along these lines, the British politician Norman Tebbitt proposed the "cricket test" for national identity. He proclaimed that the failure of British citizens of South Asian or West Indian origin to cheer for the English team when it played India, Pakistan, or Jamaica meant that their strongest identification was with their country of origin and not their physical and political home.

In rebuttal, Amartya Sen (2000) argued that the "fan's test," does not prove that nationality and ethnicity were competing identities; one could root for the Pakistani cricket team

and still fulfill all the responsibilities of citizenship. If Sen is correct, then nationality and ethnicity do not always compete. Put another way, context helps determine the salience of group identities and their relevance for behavior. In the Premier League, the relevant identities are local, so fans of Manchester United embrace Christiano Ronaldo as "ours" when the team plays Liverpool. In the European Cup competition, national identities are dominant, and Ronaldo is condemned by English fans for provoking his United teammate, Wayne Rooney.

In some critical circumstances, political identities do tug in opposite directions. After Pearl Harbor, Japanese-Americans faced a choice between loyalty to their new country and support for their country of origin. Overwhelmingly, and despite internment by their own government, they demonstrated the primacy of their American national identity. In this regard, one might ask how Muslim Britons would react to the terrorist attacks by their coreligionists and whether distant EU countries would send troops to protect Estonia from a Russian invasion.

To summarize, European and national identities overlap but are not identical; national citizens share membership in a more encompassing group of Europeans with people from national "out-groups." There are several important psychological models for reconciling the tensions that may emanate from this circumstance. Of particular significance is what each mode of ordering one's multiple identities implies for deciding who belong to "us" and who to "them."

Dominance is the strategy of subordinating all potential group identities to one primary attachment. Nationalists insist that one's national loyalties always should take precedence over the claims of Europe when one is forced to choose. "Europe uber alles" reverses this ordering of identities and, if achieved in the public's mind, would signal the successful creation of the continental nation-state.

Compartmentalization is a solution in which the particular collective identity activated depends on the situation. Another way of characterizing this approach is that the individual's primary identity is heavily contextual, as in the example of football contests. Sometimes only one social identity is evoked by a situation; for example, local elections and environmental policies rarely activate nationalist sentiments. Of course, even in contexts with both national and European self-categorizations, as say in reactions to asylum seekers, the preferences dictated by group identities may not conflict. Indeed, a third model of managing multiple group identities, *merger*, widens the boundaries of the in-group of imagined community (Anderson 1991) to

include people who share any of one's important memberships. This merged collective identity is highly inclusive and diverse as in the maximalist case when ethnic, national and European identities are subordinated to the norms and values of a cosmopolitan, humanitarian ideology held by individuals who see themselves as "world citizens."

It is, of course, misleading to conceive of identity choices in purely individualistic terms. As noted, how to integrate national and European identities is a collective problem for which there are competing ideological and institutional solutions. Hence social norms and official policies toward coping with national diversity within Europe are likely to influence the distribution of identity choices, much as national policies differ in their approaches to integrating immigrants from different cultures.

Trends in Attachment to Nation and Europe

The Eurobarometer surveys include a potpourri of questions asking people whether they see themselves as European, whether they feel close to Europe (and their nationality), and whether they support their country's membership in the European Union. This paper extends an earlier analysis which considered the decade of the 1990s (Citrin and Sides 2004) from 1999— the year before the Treaty of Nice proposed changes in the decision-making procedures of the Council of Ministers reducing the veto powers of individual countries—to 2007 and concentrates on indicators of affective rather than utilitarian attachments. The set of countries surveyed in the later period include Sweden, Austria and Finland as well as France, the Benelux countries, Germany, Italy, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, but omit the Eastern European countries from the last wave of enlargement.

The question "In the future do you see yourself as (Nationality) only, as (Nationality) and European, as European and (Nationality) or as European only" is primarily an indicator of self-categorization and has the advantage of assessing both the extent of multiple identifications and identity choice or prioritization. Table 1 presents the responses of people in each of the fifteen countries surveyed. In the pooled sample, there is relatively little overall change. Those identifying solely as Europeans or thinking of themselves as Europeans first remain a small minority, but there is a six percent drop in the proportion thinking of themselves solely in terms of their nationality. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark register the largest

declines in a purely national self-identification, while Italy is the only country where attitudes moved in the opposite direction, with the proportion saying they saw themselves only as nationals doubling from 26 to 52 percent.

{Insert Table 1}

Figures 1a and 1b present this information in a slightly different manner, showing the changes between 1999 and 2007 in the proportions expressing dual identifications and prioritizing their national identities, respectively. The aggregate levels of change are small, but on balance there is some growth in the segment of European societies thinking of themselves as Europeans as well as nationals and slight erosion in the number choosing to prioritize their nationality.

{Insert Figures 1a and 1b}

One disadvantage of the identification variable described above is that it limits the opportunity of respondents to express an equally strong sense of attachment to multiple territorial foci, including both nation and Europe. To overcome this problem Citrin and Sides (2004) developed a measure based on a dichotomized cross-tabulation of answers to separate questions about how attached (very, fairly, not very or not at all) people felt to their country and Europe. Table 2 presents the distributions for the 1999 and 2007 surveys with respondents grouped into four categories: those closely attached to neither nation or Europe, those closely attached just to the nation, those closely attached to Europe alone, and those attached to both country and Europe.

{Insert Table 2}

The first and third categories are tiny and will be ignored. Table 2 does show a continued, albeit slowing trend toward a dual sense of attachment. Between 1991 and 1999, this outlook grew from 46 to 59 percent; in 2007 the dual mode of attachment had reached 64 percent, with the largest shifts occurring in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Greece (See Figure 2). In 2007, Greece was the only country surveyed with a majority saying they were attached only to their country; in Italy, where a majority in 2007 said

that in the future they expected to see themselves solely in terms of their nationality, fully 69 percent were very or fairly attached to both Europe and their country.

{Insert Figure 2}

Another way of looking at responses about attachment is to order responses in numerical form from those with the lowest to the strongest degree of closeness and then to "subtract" the European from the national answer. This yields three groups: those who feel closer to Europe, those who feel closer to their country and those who feel equally close to both. Between 1991 and 1999, those feeling equally close rose from 26 to 42 percent of the pooled sample and those feeling closer to their country dropped from 70 to 53%. Between 1999 and 2007 there was almost no aggregate change. There is, of course, variation across countries, including the somewhat unintuitive rise in the proportion of those saying that they felt equally close to Europe and their country in such Euroskeptical nations as the United Kingdom (23 to 35 percent and Denmark (39 to 48 percent). These changes seem largely due to declining feelings of attachment and pride in their national governments during this period.[1]

Overall, then, a variety of subjective indicators shows a continuing but relatively slow trend toward a dual mode of identification among Europeans. Increasingly they categorize themselves in both national and continental terms and feel equally close to both political units. When it comes to prioritization or identity choice, however, very few people put Europe first. When push comes to shove, the dominant view remains "Nation First and Europe Too." It is well-known (Citrin and Sides 2004; Fligstein 2008) that age is correlated with feelings of European identity, with younger citizens more likely to adopt a dual mode of attachment. Indeed, a recent paper by Lutz, Kritzinger, and Skirbekk (2006) predicts that cohort replacement will continue to increase the proportion of EU citizens with multiple identities. Using the identification variable discussed here in Table 1, they calculate that over the period from 1996 to 2004 for cohorts born one year later the proportion with some mention of a European identity is on average one half a percentage point higher. Aging does reduce the tendency to have a dual

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[1] Although the data are not included, virtually identical results emerge when one looks at questions about the respondent's level of pride in Europe and their country included in the 2000 and 2006 surveys. A large majority in every country expresses pride in both Europe and their own country, with this percentage rising from 68 to 72 percent over the six-year period.

mode of attachment beginning after one turns fifty, but this effect is less robust than the cohort effect. The implication is that cohort replacement will continue to reduce the number of Europeans with strictly national identities, assuming that socialization patterns sustain the current relationship between age and patterns of identification. The graying of European societies may slow the trend, but even so as of now death remains as inevitable as taxes.

To provide a more detailed look at the structure of attitudes toward Europe, Table 3 presents the inter-correlations (Pearson's r) among five indicators: the self-identification variable, indicators of relative attachment to and pride in Europe and one's nation, and questions asking whether membership in the European Union is good for one's country or not and has been beneficial or not. As Table 3 shows, all five questions are significantly related, with pro-European responses going together. Table 3 also shows that the affective items more closely correlate with each other than with the two utilitarian items. An exploratory factor analysis with an oblimin rotation extracts two underlying dimensions. The Self-Identification, Net Attachment and Net Pride measures comprise one factor, labeled Affective Identification, and the Good Thing and Benefits item comprise a second factor, labeled Utilitarian Identification. The factor scores based on the oblimin rotation have a correlation of .35.

{Insert Table 3}

To array respondents from each country on these two dimensions, I constructed scale scores based on the factor loadings for the defining items of each dimension and scored them from -1 (most pro-European) to +1 (most nationalist). Table 4 gives the mean score on each scale for each of the fifteen countries as well as its rank from most nationalist to most pro-European. The correlation between the two rank orders (Spearman's rho) is -0.043; at the aggregate rather than individual level, the two dimensions are unrelated. The mean scores do clearly show that the balance of affective attachments continues to tilt in the nationalist direction, even as the mean score of utilitarian evaluations of membership in the EU indicates that favorable assessments prevail in all countries. Looking at the place of individual countries in the two rank orders, the Euroskepticism of the United Kingdom stands out: Britain has the second highest nationalist score on both affective and utilitarian measures. By contrast, the strongly nationalist Greeks and Irish when it comes to identity choice (affective attachment) are among the most fervent

believers in the benefits of EU membership in their country, an interesting fact given the recent rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by Irish voters. Table 4 also shows a high level of European identification among Germans despite their relatively lower enthusiasm about the concrete benefits of EU membership for their country. Taken as a whole, these data underscore the value of distinguishing between affective and utilitarian support for Europe and warn that arguments based on economic rationality may be insufficient to push publics further down the road to support for further political integration.

{Table 4}

The Political Meaning of Identity Choice

The political relevance of multiple identities and how they are ordered at the psychological level depends on whether and how identity choice reflect people's hopes for and fears about the increased power of European institutions. Several Eurobarometer surveys addressed this issue by asking respondents whether they personally were currently afraid of a list of specific concerns sometimes associated with "the building of the European Union. Table 5 compares the answers of respondents who say they only feel attached to their country, those with a dual attachment to country and Europe, and the smaller group with a sense of closeness to Europe alone.[2]

{Insert Table 5}

The potential problems listed are an amalgam of economic and cultural concerns, and it is striking that in every specific potential outcome, those attached to the nation alone express the highest level of fear, followed by the group of respondents with a dual sense of attachment, with the European loyalists consistently the most sanguine group. Fear of increased crime, presumably due to more permeable borders, and economic losses sparked the highest levels on anxiety, but cultural threats such as the national language being used less, the loss of the nation's unique culture and the loss of a country's distinctive pattern of social benefits all were mentioned

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[2] The respondents who express no attachment to either Europe or their country are omitted from this analysis.

by a majority of those whose attachment was to the nation alone. About 40 percent of those with dual attachments also worried about the loss of their national culture and language. Since it is likely that the growing group of people who see themselves as both nationals and Europeans will cast the deciding vote on the future of political integration, this level of cultural threat is a warning sign.

European attitudes about shared sovereignty echo these concerns. For many years the Eurobarometer recorded beliefs about whether authority over particular policy domains should be shared jointly by the national government and the EU or controlled by the national government alone. Table 6 compares the preferences of Europeans in 1992 and 2004 for the allocation of jurisdiction in defense, currency, immigration, education, foreign, and cultural policies. Respondents are classified by the identification variable (see Table 1).

{Insert Table 6}

These data indicate clearly and consistently: (1) that whatever the policy domain one considers, prioritizing one's national identity reduces the willingness to share political authority with the European Union; (2) that those with a dual attachment, even if they place their national identity first, generally are closer in their policy preferences to the small group of "Europe-firsters" than to those with a purely national identification in their willingness to accept shared sovereignty; and (3) that whatever their self-identification or mode of attachment, all respondents are less willing to cede authority to Europe in the domains of education and cultural policy (areas that touch directly on the distinctive identity or soul of a nation) than in the foreign, defense, immigration and currency policies (areas in which the European role can readily be framed as helping to protect the nation's safety and welfare).

Worth noting also is that the trend between the early 1990s and 2004 is in the direction of diminished support for sharing political authority with Europe when it comes to education and cultural policy. This shift in outlook holds true among all four groups of identifiers, though it clearly is strongest among those who prioritize their national identity. For example, in 1992, 48 percent of the pooled sample was prepared to share control of cultural policy with the European Union; in 2004 the comparable figure was 32 percent and only 26 percent among those who said they saw themselves only in terms of their nationality. One interpretation of the overall trend

toward more reluctance about ceding power to European institutions, of course, is that the status quo in 2004 is one in which the authority of European institutions is substantially greater than a decade earlier. In other words, in 1992 people were willing for the EU to become stronger; now they are saying "enough" as the policy-makers in Brussels turn their attention to more sensitive domains and may be less constrained by the unanimity rule. Again, the political implications of current public opinion is the evidence that as many as two-thirds of those who identify themselves as both nationals and Europeans are unwilling to cede more authority over education, cultural (and welfare) policy to the Union.

The Imagined Community: Nation and Europe

Collective identities are by necessity exclusive; they divide "us" from "them," so there is always an "other," whose contrasting qualities help to define our own distinctiveness. This familiar point draws attention to what above I termed the normative content of an identity, that is, the criteria or attributes that make a group regard itself as unique. Viewed as "imagined community" (Anderson 1991), the nation refers to a body of individuals "who believe themselves to be united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them from 'outsiders' and who are striving to create or maintain their own state" (Haas 1964). The content of a national identity refers to the body of beliefs held by these individuals as legitimating their drive for uniqueness and autonomy. The nature of the criteria defining a nation's identity may vary over time or space. In a successful or stable nation, beliefs about its unique identity acquire the status of a collective myth; they are taken for granted and transmitted from one generation to the next as unexamined truths. The normative content of a nation's identity sets the boundaries for membership that usually are enforced by in-group policing (Laitin 2007). Minority group challenges to the dominant rules for inclusion and exclusion can become the bases of movements for secession. The problem of multiple identities, such as ethnicity versus nationality of nationality versus Europeanness, is the compatibility of their defining norms and rules for inclusion and exclusion.

Again, the most familiar and resonant distinction among nationalisms is the contrast between civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity. Civic nations—often characterized as liberal, voluntarist and inclusive—base membership on common citizenship; ethnic nations—

labeled as illiberal, ascriptive, and exclusive—decide who belongs on the basis of common ethnicity (Brubaker2004). The civic and ethnic conceptions of nationhood are analytical ideal-types, not accurate descriptions of historical cases. Brubaker (2004) points out that both categories rest on a conception of separate peoplehood, so whatever the contemporary normative prestige of the seemingly tolerant underpinnings of the civic nation, the dividing line between citizen and alien powerfully affects life chances. More to the point, the cases used to exemplify ethnic and civic nations—Germany and France, for example—turn out to share a cultural component in the content of their national identities. Common myths, memories, values, and symbols are involved in both cases, so in the end the distinction rests on how to code and classify these features of "culture" (Brubaker 2004: 138-139).

If the European Union is treated as a nation-state, what is the content of its collective identity? The controversy concerning the admission of Turkey into the EU illustrates that the meaning of Europe's geographic, religious, and ideological boundaries is not a settled matter. To be sure, if Europe is to be the first twenty-first century multinational state, it cannot define itself in purely ethnic or linguistic terms. Laitin (2008) argues that the European "nation" will combine the use of English as the principal means of international communication while national and regional languages remain the principal media of instruction and daily interaction. Habermas insists that given the cultural diversity of its member states, a collective European identity must rest on "constitutional patriotism," a thin form of civic nationhood in which people value democratic political principles and welfare state policies above more primordial bases of loyalty. Indeed, one conception of the EU is a league of democracies with a stringent list of institutional and political rules for entry.

The continuity of nation-states rests in part on the popular acceptance of symbols of nationhood as flags and anthems and agreement about the laws governing full membership in the community such as language and education policies and access to citizenship. In simpler terms, do governments and citizens agree about what it means to be truly European over and above one's particular nationality? Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer provides no evidence of public opinion on this matter. There are, however, data from other cross-national surveys about how people define their national identities and these can be studied to explore whether a strong sense of attachment to Europe is related to a more civic than ethnic conception of nationhood; how people balance their European and national identifications with their beliefs about

multiculturalism, defined as support for immigration and the policies that sustain cultural differences within nation-states.

A common European identity might well resemble what hopeful North American scholars have called "multiculturalist nationalism" (Kymlicka 1995; Aleinikoff 1998; Hollinger 2006). Hollinger, for example, yearns for a "post-ethnic" America, in which group identities would be fluid. People may opt to link their ethnic ancestry or not as they please, and others would respect either the emphasizing or discounting of one's ethnicity in response. A sense of national solidarity, in other words, would rest on mutual tolerance rather than a common culture. Aleinikoff (1998) tries to find a formula for nationalism congenial to multiculturalism. His conception of an American identity is one that "fosters a nation at peace with its constituent groups and groups that identify with the nation." He accepts that there must be a common allegiance to the nation as a whole in the context of persisting group identities and that this must be "paramount," just as a European identity would have to trump national loyalties. Commenting on the Canadian, Australian, and British efforts to redefine their national identities as multicultural (Joppke 2004), agrees that these amount to no more than acknowledging that the ethnic composition of society had changed and that democracy required acceptance of pluralism. What makes multicultural Britain, Canada, Australia and the United States distinguishable from each other (or a united Europe) vanishes in this formulation, which admittedly resonates well with Habermas's idea of "constitutional patriotism."

In measuring the content of collective identities, one should distinguish between classifications built on the study of laws, speeches, rituals, literature and song, on the one hand, and the prevailing beliefs and attitudes of living people on the other. For example, ethnic doctrine may coexist with civic public opinion or vice versa. When models derived from analyses of the historical record conflict with the predispositions of mass publics, even path dependent nationalizing policies may have to give way.

Concerns about the social and political integration of immigrants existed before but received new emphasis in the wake of 9/11. In the wake of these worries, the policy pendulum throughout much of Europe has swung back from multiculturalism to assimilation (Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004). The official outlook in Britain, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Denmark and Norway now emphasizes the need for minority groups to learn the national language and adapt to national values and customs. The implication is that there is a renewed emphasis on a

common culture as the appropriate foundation for membership in the imagined national community.

To get at public conceptions of their nation's identity, this paper relies on the 2003 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) core. This study asked national samples of most of the countries included in the Eurobarometer surveys analyzed above this question: "Some people say the following things are important for being truly British (German, Spanish etc.). Others say they are not important. How important to you think each of the following is for making someone truly…" The list of putative traits consists of: having been born in a country, having citizenship, having lived in a country most of one's life, being able to speak the country's language, being a Christian, respecting a country's political institutions and laws, and feeling as a member of the country. Attributes like nativity and Christian faith are on their face ethnic criteria whereas respecting a country's laws and simply feeling like a member of a country are inclusive and putatively civic norms.[3] The 2003 ISPP also asked respondents separate questions about their sense of closeness to their country and to Europe, enabling replication of the Eurobarometer classification of respondents as feeling close only to their nation, close to both their nation and Europe and close to Europe alone. Table 7 compares the answers of these three groups of identities to the question about the foundations of nationality in their country.

An earlier analysis (Citrin and Wright 2008) concluded that ordinary citizens retain a traditional, ethnic outlook about national identity despite official endorsements of cultural pluralism. It is true that there is a tendency for putatively "civic" traits such as feeling like a national, respecting a country's laws and being a citizen to be named more frequently than the ascriptive traits of religion or place of birth. However, speaking the country's language is, on balance, most commonly cited as a very important component of a nation's identity. Language clearly is central to any group's culture, but classifying this as purely ethnic or civic is difficult. After all, languages can be learned so one might regard this trait as inclusive in the long-run. Immigrant children learn the language of the receiving country as part of a process of integration

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[3] Underlying the use of this measure is the assumption, admittedly incompletely tested, that people are not simply identifying a negative cultural stereotype when they say how important something is to making one a "true" national. Rather, they are assumed to view the "true" national, the ideal-typical fellow countryman, in positive terms.

and acceptance. (Interestingly, Ireland, Spain, and Japan give less importance to language than the other countries surveyed. The Irish case is explained by the fact that English rather than Gaelic is the country's common language and the Spanish case may speak to a recognition that several important linguistic minorities are co-nationals). Citrin and Wright (2008) also found that between 1995 and 2003, there was an across-the-board shift in favor of ascriptive characteristics (such as being born in the country and being a member of the predominant national religion), and a fairly pronounced shift toward discounting the importance of some of the more civic items, such respect for institutions and laws as well as "feeling" like a national. An interesting sidebar that highlights the possible discrepancy between traditional characterizations of historians and current public opinion is that in Germany, supposedly an ethnic nation, ascriptive traits are mentioned less often than in the United Kingdom or in Ireland as very important for defining a "true' national.

[Insert Table 7}

Table 7 reports the results for the pooled sample of respondents, but the pattern that emerges here repeats itself in every individual country. Those who feel closer to their own country than to Europe generally are most likely to name the listed traits as very important for making one a true exemplar of their nation's identity. This holds whether the listed attribute is an "ethnic" trait like nativity or a "civic" quality such as respect for the country's laws. Differences between those who prioritize their national identity and those with a dual sense of attachment are not large, although statistically significant. The large gap in outlook is between those with a stronger sense of attachment to Europe than their nation-state and the rest. For example, only 14 percent of those prioritizing Europe compared to 43 percent of those prioritizing their national identity think it is very important to have been born in their country to be a "true" national. Only when it comes to speaking the national language and respecting the country's laws are the Europhiles close to the remaining group of citizens. There also is a consensus that national identities in contemporary Europe are defined in secular terms; in no country does the proportion of those saying that being a Christian is very important for nationhood reach the level of 30

percent. This helps explain the widespread resentment in Europe for demands that Muslim law and traditions receive official recognition.

In Europe as a whole, enlargement creates new forms of cultural and linguistic diversity. Within individual member-states, immigration from both inside and outside the EU is the main source of demographic multiculturalism. Economists argue that an aging Europe need immigrants, but the public's response tends to be hostile, in part because the largely Muslim and non-European immigrant streams are viewed as a cultural threat (Sides and Citrin 2007; Crepaz 2006; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004). There is a heated debate about whether or not policies that endorse multiculturalism in the sense of giving minority cultures official support and recognition diminish the integration of newcomers and erode national cohesion and solidarity. Critics call for policies to speed assimilation--actively through language training and civic education and passively by denying multiculturalist demands.

Previous research indicates that only a small minority in all European countries favor accepting many more immigrants; the modal view is to support admitting just "some" more, an ambiguous position without precise limits (Sides and Citrin 2007). Crepaz (2006, p.98) reports that in the 2000 World Values Survey an average of two-thirds of the publics in 11 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) said that immigrants should "take over the customs of their new country" rather than maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Similarly, the 2002 European Social Survey found that majorities in every country except Sweden said that "it would be better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions" (Crepaz 2006, Citrin and Sides 2008). Majorities everywhere also felt that knowing the receiving country's language should be a criterion in deciding which immigrants to admit (Sides and Citrin 2008).

The 2003 ISSP survey allows a look at several aspects of immigration and multiculturalism. One question asks whether immigration levels should be increased or decreased, which is measured by a single item.[4] Another battery of 4 items attempts to measure the respondent's opinion of the consequences of immigration on the economy, jobs, crime, and

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[4] Question wording: "The number of immigrants coming to [country] should: (Increase a lot, increase a little, stay the same, decrease a little, or decrease a lot)."

culture.[5] Generally speaking, these items tend to be highly inter-correlated, and we find similar results here. As a result, a single index based on all four items was created.

A third policy dimension could be loosely called "access to citizenship," and includes 3 items tapping agreement/disagreement with the following notions: that legal immigrants who are not citizens should be granted equal rights as those born in the country; that children born in the country should have citizenship even if their parents are not citizens, and; that children born abroad should have citizenship if at least one parent does. Yet again, these items are quite strongly inter-correlated, so we use a single index that averages them together into one "citizenship" index.

Finally, the ISSP includes several items meant to ascertain respondent attitudes on multiculturalism. The first of these is an item asking respondents whether they agree or disagree that "it is impossible for people who do not share [Country's] customs and traditions to become fully [Country's nationality]." Another item asks respondents whether they agree or disagree that "ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions." The third item asks respondents whether cultural minorities should maintain their own separate traditions, or try to blend into the larger culture.

Taken together these questions assess the extent of tolerance for sub-national identities within one's nation-state. This tolerant outlook is a criterion that elites have made a hallmark of European identity and is a featured criterion when applications for accession to the EU are considered. This paper therefore concludes by examining the effect of identity choice—the prioritization of a national versus a European identity on public attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism. Table 8 presents the results of a multiple regression analysis in which the standard measure of identity choice (the subtraction of closeness to Europe scores from closeness to the nation scores) is a predictor along with measures of a respondent's left-right orientation, religiosity, gender, age, level of education, employment status, urban-rural residence, and country.

[Insert Table 8}

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[5] These are measured by agreement/disagreement with the following: 1) immigrants are generally good for the [country's] economy; 2) immigrants take jobs away from people born in [country]; 3) Immigrants improve[Country Nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures; 4) Immigrants increase crime rates.

The results are straightforward and consistent. Identity choice matters for policy preferences in a predictable way. Those who prioritize their national identity are more hostile to immigration, more willing to restrict access to citizenship, and more insistent that cultural minorities adapt to the mainstream national culture. The relatively small group who prioritize their European identity are more willing to adopt an inclusive definition of national identity and to accept the maintenance of cultural diversity as acceptable policy at both the national and European levels. Multiple identifications have implications for domestic policy.

Table 8 shows the familiar pattern of greater support for immigration and multiculturalism among the political left, the relatively young, the better-educated, women, and city-dwellers. Not unexpectedly, people with some history of immigration in their family also are more in favor of liberal immigration and citizenship policies. To the extent that these groups become a larger segment of European populations, a more permissive outlook toward internal multiculturalism may grow.

Conclusion

In Mark Twain's words, news of the death of the nation-state in Europe is greatly exaggerated. Europeans continue to prioritize their national identity over their attachment to the European mega-state. At the same time, a dual sense of attachment—a sense of closeness to Europe as well as one's nation—has been growing. This is likely to continue with the replacement of older cohorts by more pro-European younger citizens, by increased travel within Europe and by more people learning a second language, usually English. Moreover, the data presented here show that the way people accommodate their two identities matters for public policy. Those for whom a European identity has a positive emotional value are more likely than those with a purely nationalist outlook to trust European institutions, to accept sharing sovereignty in significant policy domains, and to acquiesce in liberal immigration and asylum policies. A strong sense of European identity also is associated with greater tolerance for cultural minorities within one's own country.

From the nationalist's perspective, the problem of multiple identities is Janus-faced. On the one hand, a supranational European government may threaten the essence of a nation-state's sense of uniqueness by forcing conformity to continent-wide symbols, rules,

and policies. On the other hand, most European nations are becoming more internally heterogeneous due to immigration. In addition, some nation-states such as Britain and Spain have acceded to regional demands for self-determination and facilitated the development of quasi-autonomous sub-nations in Scotland and Catalonia. Ironically, the existence of the EU umbrella may make it easier for separatism to succeed. Czechoslovakia split up and both parts are in the European Union; it is not difficult to imagine Flanders, Walloonia and Scotland as members should Belgium and the United Kingdom break apart.

The staying power of national identity thus has obvious political relevance and it is fair to say that the European project is the single greatest challenge to Rupert Emerson's statement in his magisterial *From Empire to Nation* that the nation is "the largest community which, when, the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society." To the extent, then, that the nation legitimates the state, continuing the creep toward European statehood requires the growth of a more intense sense of European identity. The unresolved question is whether a stronger Europe comes to be perceived as a threat to the cultural identities of its member nations. The data reported here suggest that mass publics are ready to draw the line on EU authority when this touches on sacred elements of national myths and policies.

The current financial crisis points to the limits, if not irrelevance, of Europe's supranational institutions, despite decades of effort aimed at creating a united political policy. As the October 7 *Wall Street Journal* notes with a touch of schadenfreude, national governments have moved swiftly to protect the finances of their own citizens and have proved unwilling to take steps to support banks in other countries. Governments ignored the bloc's rules for a collective line of defense to take care of their own. And this example points to the crux of the problem of multiple identities. When push came to shove this time, national allegiance took precedence. What might one expect, therefore, if the EU ordered Britain to go to war to rescue French and Italian tourists kidnapped somewhere in Africa? At the psychological level, it is choices like these that define how multiple identities are balanced. At the political level, the stubborn defense of national economic interests suggests that European governments recognize the reluctance of citizens to yield control

over fundamental decisions. A referendum on giving up the unanimity rule in EU decision-making in favor of more qualified majority voting is a step fraught with political risks.

In his recent book, *Compound Democracies,* Sergio Fabbrini argues that governance in Europe and the United States are converging. The EU is 'nationalizing' and the United States is moving toward a looser set of rules that recognize limits on federal power and sovereignty. But is the American achievement of *e pluribus unum* a realistic prospect for Europe? In the American case, the creation of a dominant national identity first involved a century long struggle against state interests and identities, a struggle that was decided by a bloody civil war. The emergence of an inclusive American identity also involved both the absorption of waves of immigrants who shed, not always voluntarily, their native languages and customs and the belated shattering of the racial barrier to full citizenship.

If the United States is taken as a model, achieving *e pluribus Europa,* a circumstance in which a European identity dominates national attachments and EU institutions preempt the power of national governments, is not on the horizon. The supranational European state will continue to exercise important powers because the costs of exit for member-states are too great and because the demands placed on most individual citizens to sacrifice on behalf of their fellow Europeans are not great. As to the future status of minority cultures within nation-states, much depends on how immigrants and their children negotiate their own multiple identities as ethnics, nationals, and Europeans.

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Table 1

Self-Perception as National and European, 1999 – 2007

%	Nation Only		Nation and Then Europe		Europe and Then Nation		Europe Only	
	1999	2007	1999	2007	1999	2007	1999	2007
France	38	33	50	51	7	10	5	6
Belgium	42	30	43	51	9	10	7	6
Netherlands	45	29	48	55	6	12	1	3
Germany	51	35	39	49	7	11	3	6
Italy	26	52	59	38	10	8	6	2
Luxembourg	24	24	43	46	13	17	20	12
Denmark	55	38	38	51	3	8	3	2
Ireland	52	59	40	34	5	4	3	3
UK	67	59	25	32	5	6	3	4
Greece	59	51	39	44	2	4	1	1
Spain	33	37	57	52	7	6	4	6
Portugal	54	52	42	41	2	4	2	3
Finland	60	52	36	44	3	3	1	1
Sweden	60	45	34	49	4	5	1	2
Austria	46	45	44	47	6	7	4	1
Total	49	43	42	45	6	8	4	4

Notes: Question wording is "In the near future, do you see yourself as (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), or European only?"

Source: Eurobarometer Surveys

Figure 1

Change in Multiple Identities and Priority of National Identity


Notes: Question wording is "In the near future, do you see yourself as (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), or European only?" Cell entries represent (1) changes in dual identity (sum of those who agreed "nation and then Europe" and "Europe and then nation" for 2007 minus that sum for 1999); and (2) changes in national priority (sum of those who agreed "nation only" and "nation and then Europe" for 2007 minus that sum for 1999).

Source: Eurobarometer Surveys

Table 2

**Emotional Attachment to Nation and Europe, 1999 -2007**

%	Attached to Neither		Attached Only to Nation		Attached Only to Europe		Attached to Both	
	1999	2007	1999	2007	1999	2007	1999	2007
France	10	6	36	31	2	2	53	61
Belgium	14	8	21	17	9	8	57	68
Netherlands	10	11	38	30	4	6	39	53
Germany	11	8	30	22	3	4	56	65
Italy	7	7	25	23	2	2	66	69
Luxembourg	5	4	14	14	2	4	79	79
Denmark	2	2	25	16	1	1	72	81
Ireland	2	3	38	33	0	1	60	63
UK	6	12	55	36	2	5	37	47
Greece	2	2	59	51	0	1	39	47
Spain	7	6	22	24	3	3	69	67
Portugal	3	3	34	34	1	1	62	62
Finland	2	2	30	28	2	2	66	69
Sweden	7	3	19	18	4	2	70	77
Austria	5	5	32	35	1	1	62	60
Total	7	6	32	28	2	3	59	64

Notes: The 4-category attachment measure is constructed from responses to two separate items asking respondents to characterize their degree of "attachment" to their country and to Europe, respectively, on a 4-point scale (very, fairly, not very, not at all). Respondents are considered attached to neither if they answer not very or not at all to both items. They are considered attached to only to nation if they are very or fairly attached to the nation but not very or not at all to Europe (they are considered attached only to Europe if the opposite holds). Finally, they are considered attached to both if they are very or fairly attached to both their country and to Europe.

Source: Eurobarometer Surveys

Figure 2

Change in Priority to Nation and Dual Identities, 1999-2007

Notes: The attachment measure is constructed from responses to two separate items asking respondents to characterize their degree of "attachment" to their country and to Europe, respectively, on a 4-point scale (very, fairly, not very, not at all). Respondents are considered attached "only to nation" if they are very or fairly attached to the nation but not very or not at all to Europe (they are considered attached "only to Europe" if the opposite holds). Respondents are considered "attached to both" if they are very or fairly attached to both their country and to Europe. Figures show simple differences between 2007 and 1999.

Source: Eurobarometer Surveys

Table 3

Relationship between Affective and Utilitarian Support for Europe

	Feeling European v. Nationality	National Pride - European Pride	Attachment to Nation - Attachment to Europe	Membership: Good/Bad	Benefit: Yes/No
Feeling European v. Nationality	1.00				
National Pride - European Pride	0.41*	1.00			
Attachment to Nation - Attachment to Europe	0.39	0.54	1.00		
Membership: Good/Bad	0.27	0.30	0.27	1.00	
Benefit: Yes/No	0.23	0.25	0.22	0.63	1.00

Notes: *All correlations are significant at the .01 level, two-tailed.

Source: Eurobarometer Surveys

Table 4

Country Scores on Affective and Utilitarian Support Scales

Country	Affective Support		Utilitarian Support	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
France	0.62	6	0.37	5
Belgium	0.59	9	0.34	6
Netherlands	0.64	5	0.32	8
Germany	0.59	9	0.41	4
Italy	0.60	8	0.35	7
Luxembourg	0.58	10	0.27	11
Denmark	0.64	5	0.30	9
Ireland	0.66	4	0.20	13
UK	0.68	2	0.44	2
Greece	0.72	1	0.23	12
Spain	0.61	7	0.27	11
Portugal	0.66	4	0.28	10
Finland	0.67	3	0.43	3
Sweden	0.62	6	0.47	1
Austria	0.62	6	0.43	3

Notes: Both "Affective Support" and "Utilitarian Support" factor scores are scored from 0=least in favor of Europe/most in favor of nation to 1=most in favor of Europe/least in favor of nation.

Source: Eurobarometer Surveys, 2003 and 2004 merged

Table 5

Identity Choice and Fears about the European Union

% Current Afraid of:	Attached to Nation Only	Attached to Europe Only	Attached to Both
Smaller EU States Losing Power	60	39	49
Increased Drug Trafficking/Org. Crime	73	50	65
National Language Being Used Less	50	29	41
Loss of Social Benefits	67	47	53
Loss of National Culture	58	27	41
End of National Currency	47	20	33
Transfer of Jobs Outside Country	80	64	74
More Difficulty for Nation's Farmers	76	59	67
Economic Crisis	57	36	42
Country Paying More and More to EU	73	49	60

Notes: Question wording is "Some people may have fears about the building of the European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you, personally, are currently afraid of it, or not?"

Source: Eurobarometer Surveys, 1999, 2000, 2004-2006

Table 6

Identity Choice and Willingness to Share Authority with the EU

		Percent Favoring Joint National and European Authority in Selected Domains											
		Defense		Currency		Immigration		Education		Foreign Policy		Cultural Policy	
		1992	2004	1992	2004	1992	2004	1992	2004	1992	2004	1992	2004
Identification	Nation (N) Only	43	36	45	54	45	41	29	24	66	62	41	26
	N + EU	65	59	70	77	64	59	45	34	79	78	52	34
	EU + N	73	72	80	87	72	69	50	46	83	81	56	43
	EU Only	75	67	83	83	74	72	56	49	82	81	62	51
	Total	57	50	61	68	57	53	39	31	74	72	48	32

Notes: Question wording is "Should each of these areas be handled by national governments only or jointly with the European Union?"

Source: Eurobarometer Surveys

Table 7

Identity Choice and Conceptions of National Identity

% Answering it is "very important" to ..	More Attached to Europe	Equally Attached to Both	More Attached to Nation	Total
Be born in the country	14	33	43	38
Have the country's citizenship	25	45	55	50
Have lived in the country for most of one's life	15	31	35	33
Speak the country's main language	49	53	57	55
Be Christian	8	18	16	17
Respect country's political institutions and norms	47	49	56	53
Feel like a national	33	46	55	50

Notes: Identity choice is constructed by subtracting responses to the question about closeness to Europe from responses to the question about closeness to one's nation. The normative content of national identity is measured by the percentages of respondents in the 2003 ISPP saying that a particular quality is *very important* for making one truly a national.

Table 8

Identity Choice as a Predictor of Immigration and Multiculturalism Preferences

	Desired Level of Immigration	Immigration Consequences	Citizenship Rights	Impossible to be [National] W/O Sharing Traditions	Govt Support to Preserve Minority Culture	Maintain or Adapt
National-European Attachment	**.10***	**.10***	**.06***	**.08***	**.06***	**.08***
Party ID/Ideology	.17***	.15***	.12***	.18***	.19***	.23***
Gender	0.01	-.01*	-.02**	-.02***	-0.01	-0.01
Age	.04***	.04***	.02*	.10***	.06***	.15***
Education	-.17***	-.17***	-.08***	-.15***	-.07***	-.08***
Rural/Urban	.02**	.03***	.01*	.03**	0.01	-0.01
Unemployed	0.02	.04***	0.01	0	0	0.03
Religiosity	-.04***	-.03***	-.03***	0	-.04***	-.04*
Some History of Immigration in Family	-.09***	-.07***	-.05***	-.05***	-.05***	0
r²	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.1	0.23	0.09
n	7,341	7,036	7,327	7,620	7,499	6,628

Notes:

Each column is a separate OLS regression with the column variable as the dependent variable. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. In addition to variables listed above, country-dummies were also included in the equation though their coefficients are not reported. Bolded coefficients refer to the effects of the identity choice variable, coded in the pro-nation direction and constructed by subtracting the closeness to Europe score from the closeness to country score.

Immigration Level" refers to a single 5-category item asking respondents whether the country's immigration level should be increased or decreased.

"Immigration Consequences" represents the respondents' factor scores on a factor analysis of 4 items on the effects of immigration; the items themselves concern immigrants' effect on the country's economy, jobs for nationals, crime rates, and their contribution of new ideas into national culture.

"Citizenship Access" refers to respondents' factor scores on three items tapping willingness to grant equal rights to citizens not born in the country and nationals, willingness to extend citizenship to children born in the country even if parents are not citizens, and willingness to extend citizenship to children born abroad if at least one parent is a citizen. All variables and indices are scored from 0 = most favorable to immigrants/immigration to 1 = least favorable to immigration and immigrants.

"Cultures and Traditions" refers to a single item asking respondents if they agree or disagree with the notion that someone who does not share the nation's culture and traditions can never truly be considered a national, scored from 0=strongly disagree to 1=strongly agree.

"Government Aid for Minority Culture" refers to a single item tapping whether responds agree or disagree that the government should provide aid to help minorities preserve their culture, scored from 0=strongly agree to 1=strongly disagree.

"Minorities Should Maintain or Adapt" is a single item asking respondents whether minority groups should maintain their own separate cultures or try to adapt to the predominant national one, scored 0=Maintain and 1=Adapt.

"Gender" is a dummy variable coded 0=male and 1=female. "Age" is a 5-category variable coded from 0=youngest to 1=oldest. "Education" is a 5-category variable coded from 0=least educated to 1=most educated. "Rural/urban" is coded 1=Urban, 2=Suburban, 3=Rural. "Unemployed" is a dummy variable coded 0=other and 1=currently

unemployed, looking for work. "Religiosity" is a 6-category variable coded from 0=least religious to 1=most religious. "Some History of Immigration in Family" is a dummy variable coded 0=citizen, both parents citizens and 1=non-citizen or at least one parent is a non-citizen.

Source: 2003 ISSP Survey Countries included are Germany, UK, Austria, Ireland, Spain, France, Portugal, Denmark, and Finland. Countries included are Germany, UK, Austria, Ireland, Spain, France, Portugal, Denmark, and Finland.