

# Political Ideologies Among Muslim Elites

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## Abstract

This paper provides empirical evidence regarding the political belief systems among Muslim elites in Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. The evidence is drawn from in-depth interviews with twenty-one persons of Muslim faith or background who hold or have held elected or appointed office in national, regional, or civic organizations. Muslim elites interviewed during the research espouse a diverse array of belief systems, including universalist syntheses of Islam and liberalism, secular anti-clericalism, anti-modernist political Islamism, and classical Islamic thought. The political belief systems bear the imprint of European political contexts—notably the extent of national polarization vs. consensus regarding the proper model for the political regulation of religion--and the cultural, educational, and material resources available to Muslim communities.

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## **1. Introduction**

The research reported in this paper finds that there is a wide diversity in the political belief systems held by Muslim elites in Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. The range of views includes universalist syntheses of liberalism and Islam, secular anti-clericalism, anti-modernist political Islamism, and classical Islamic thought. Research on what Muslim leaders say they believe about religion and politics helps us to assess the relative success of efforts to promote political ideologies by organizations such as Muslim civic organizations in individual European localities, various pan-European networks of Muslim activists with divergent political ideologies, and European states and political parties. No single ideology and organization can claim complete success so far. Support for universalist syntheses of Islam and liberalism is more prevalent than critics of political Islamism in Europe contend. Yet the range of views also shows that the advocates for an overlapping consensus between liberalism and Islam have not established a consensus among Europe's Muslim leaders on these matters. The findings point to the areas where different ideologies have made progress and the conditions that have been associated with the greatest success of each broad family of ideologies, which is of political importance, not the least to Muslim organizers and European policy-makers.

As for disciplinary importance to political science, the research reported here tests two leading descriptions and theories of the interaction between European states and their Muslim communities. One line of scholarship emphasizes national differences and varied patterns of accommodation for Islam in European countries (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Aluffi-Beck Peccoz & Zincone 2004). For these scholars, the differences in the relations

between Muslims and various European countries are more significant than the similarities. Moreover, the causes of the different national patterns derive in large measure from varied national traditions for handling relations between religious and political institutions, as well as from other policies that shaped Muslim communities, notably those related to colonialism and decolonization. A second line of scholarship emphasizes pan-European trends and cross-national similarities (Klausen 2005; Laurence 2005; Laurence 2006). Klausen contends that the attitudes of Muslim civic leaders on political and religious matters exhibit general patterns that span rather than coincide with national boundaries. For Laurence, the policy responses of European states that emphasize increased monitoring by security services and outreach efforts by ministries of interior indicate a common state desire to assert control over transnational religious communities and organizations.

The research reported here provides new information about the relative weight of national differences vs. pan-European trends. The country-cases of Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have not been included in the previous analyses. The Muslim communities are comparatively small, but these cases permit one to observe Muslim communities in settings different from those that have spawned the greatest outpouring of research. The Irish and Iberian cases are societies in which there is strong religious belief and comparatively vibrant religious practice among the host societies, unlike in Scandinavia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. These are also overwhelmingly Catholic societies in which relations between political and religious institutions are the subject of much greater national and partisan consensus than in France. If national political and religious settings shape Muslim communities, as the national-difference scholarship contends, then

the effects of strong religious institutions in the host societies with favorable treatment of religion by national political institutions should be associated with Muslim political and religious elites who strongly favor integration of Muslim religious institutions into modified forms of the national models for the political regulation of religious institutions. If pan-European trends and common policy initiatives are the primary determinants of the developments within European Muslim communities, then the political and religious attitudes of Muslim elites in Ireland and Iberia should flow from the degree to which these similar policies have been followed and, accordingly, should largely resemble the attitudes of Muslim elites that have been observed in other cases.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 considers scholarship on political ideologies and on Muslims in Europe to develop the expectations that can be elaborated and tested with new research on Muslim elites. Section 3 reviews the methods for selecting countries and interview respondents and for the construction of the interview protocol. Section 4 presents some of the key results from the interviews, focusing in particular on the evidence regarding the characteristics and origins of the political belief systems that can be observed among Muslim leaders. Section 5 points the way to further research and concludes.

## **2. Making and Spreading Ideas**

This paper speaks to an emerging body of scholarship about the production, dissemination, and reception of ideas regarding Muslims and Islam in Europe, especially among Muslims themselves. European and Muslim self-understandings are changing in a context of rapid and significant transformations in European and Muslim interactions. Even as these developments are still underway, scholars are seeking to understand both

the origins of ideas and also the processes by which they come to be accepted (or rejected) over time and across different social groups. Indeed, the developments in Europe and among Europe's Muslim communities provide an exceptional opportunity for social scientists to observe whether and how leaders of a religious community are reinforcing and/or reformulating political and religious belief systems in the face of new challenges and opportunities. The research in this paper seeks to provide new evidence regarding key conjectures in the literature.

Scholars focusing on the making of ideas distinguish between different modes of intellectual production and different styles of reasoning among Muslim public intellectuals. On the one hand, according to John Bowen (2004), there are intellectuals who engage in jurisprudential reasoning, which seeks to draw guidance for European Muslims from the various traditions of legal scholarship in Islam, such as Hanafî, Hanbalî, and Mâlîki traditions. Jurisprudential approaches emphasize knowledge of existing rules as they are implemented in Muslim-majority countries. It then requires intellectual creativity to modify those rules as necessary for the European context while still retaining the authority that comes from a connection to traditional practices and reasoning. On the other hand, there are intellectuals who seek to provide guidance by looking first to the general ethical values in Islam. Reasoning from general values requires that new intellectual production begin from "the general meaning or intent of an Islamic rule rather than the social form that a rule has taken in what are considered as 'Muslim countries'" (Bowen 2004, p. 337). While the mode of intellectual production based in jurisprudence or in ethical reasoning does not determine the compatibility of an idea with a particular political ideology, Bowen suggests that ethical reasoning (rather

than jurisprudential reasoning) is more amenable to building bridges across cultural and religious divides.

The successful dissemination of political belief systems depends upon organization. Some scholars point the way to an optimistic scenario for the dissemination of a universalist synthesis of liberal principles with Islam. According to Peter Mandaville (2005), important pluralist and cosmopolitan trends within Muslim transnationalism are “compatible with civil, pluralist norms” and are key figures supporting these ideas are “socially positioned to scale up their influence over the next generation” (p. 303). Robert W. Heffner (2005) contends that pluralist and democratic Muslim politics will depend upon “the emergence of public intellectuals backed by mass organizations with the social and discursive resources to convince fellow Muslims of the compatibility of Islam with pluralism and democracy” (p. 6-7).

New bodies are seeking to become a recognized authority that can establish the proper set of ideas for European Muslim communities and that can promulgate a widely accepted set of rules to govern the interaction of religious and political institutions. Alexandre Caeiro (2003) examines the efforts of leading figures in the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), such as Al Qaradawi, to establish that body as a fiqh council with pan-European shari’atic authority. The Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UIOF) and the Federation of Islamic Organizations of Europe (FIOE) helped to found the ECFR in 1997 in London. Caeiro (2004) studies a 1999 fatwa of the ECFR permitting Muslims to take interest-bearing mortgages in the West and examines the production of this fatwa within the council, the debates surrounding the fatwa, and its reception in European Muslim communities. The FIOE sponsored a “Charter of Values”

that outlined the rights and responsibilities of European Muslims and their expectations from European states.<sup>1</sup> The FIOE claimed that 400 Muslim organizations from 28 states signed the charter when it was presented at the Parliament of the European Union in January 2008. The document emphasizes tolerance and contains articles compatible with liberalism, but it has been skeptically received. The EU Parliament official who welcomed the document in his public remarks disparaged the document and the FIOE as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” in a private conversation (September 2008). It is important to assess the degree to which Muslim leaders cite the FIOE and its initiatives as valuable.

The development of Islam in Europe cannot be fully understood without exploring the statements of Muslim leaders themselves. This is the approach taken in Klausen (2005) and in Nina Clara Tiesler’s research (2008 forthcoming). Tiesler finds a complex interplay between Muslim self-understandings and the development of scholarly understandings of these phenomena:

What makes this dynamic interesting is the fact that here representatives of a new generation of European-Muslim intellectuals are analysing the new social conditions and experiences of a culturally and ethno-linguistic heterogenic religious minority not through conventional Islamic-theological and –legal categories, but through a secular discourse language and its conceptual creations of transnationality and diasporicity (Tiesler 2008 forthcoming, p. 2).

In reviewing both her own interview data and the writings of leading Muslim public intellectuals (such as Tariq Ramadan and Salman Bobby Sayyid), Tiesler finds crucial roles for such concepts as ethnicity, diaspora, transnationality, self, and other, all of

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<sup>1</sup> The Charter of Values is available at [http://www.euro-islam.info/spip/article.php3?id\\_article=1993](http://www.euro-islam.info/spip/article.php3?id_article=1993).

which figure prominently in secular intellectual traditions. Gould (forthcoming 2009) also presents evidence from interviews regarding the distribution of political and religious beliefs among Muslim Elites in Portugal and Spain and finds diverse sets of intellectual influences that bear strong imprints of European influences.

Direct evidence regarding political and religious ideas among Muslims provides crucial tests for (dis)confirming competing claims about what Muslims believe. Many seek to influence, but who is succeeding so far? Many ideas have been put forward, but which ones are gaining adherents? Which modes of reasoning—jurisprudential or ethical—resonate among Muslim leaders? Which organizations that seek to provide guidance to European Muslims are indeed named by Muslim elites as influencing their thinking? These are questions this research aims to answer. With interview data from 2007 and 2008, the research reported in this paper provides early indications of which widely known public intellectuals and organizations are successfully reaching out to and finding support within the next stratum of Muslim elites. The research also points to several influences on Muslim leaders that have been largely overlooked in previous scholarship. In contrast to approaches that assume which public intellectuals and organization have been influential, my research emphasizes what can be learned by starting with the ideas articulated by the members of the Muslim elite. In this way, the research strategy provides new information about which ideas can actually be observed “on the ground” and which ideas indeed resonate among those who seek to provide leadership in Europe’s Muslim communities.

### 3. Interview Methods

The evidence regarding political belief systems emerges from interviews with Muslim elites in Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In particular, the data in this article are drawn from twenty-one interviews conducted in 2007 and 2008 by two student researchers and myself, using a fixed interview protocol with both closed-ended and open-ended items. Each interview lasted approximately two hours. In Ireland, one interview was conducted with the assistance of an Arabic translator and the rest were in English and were conducted by my student researcher Alice Ciciora; I conducted the interviews in Portugal in English, with Portuguese versions of the questionnaire also available; interviews in Spain were conducted in Spanish by my student researcher John Grothaus. At the beginning of each interview, the respondent was promised (and we have maintained) confidentiality in the reporting of results.

The respondents were selected as persons of Muslim faith or background who hold or held elected or appointed office in national, regional, or local political or civic organizations. The respondents include office-holders in political parties and deputies in national or regional parliaments (indeed the respondents include the only such persons in Ireland and in Spain—there are no Muslims serving as officials in political parties or as parliamentary deputies in Portugal). The respondents also include leaders of the main national and municipal institutions of representation for Muslims and Islamic religious institutions in all three countries. The interview methods were developed to maximize comparability with Jytte Klausen's (2005) pioneering interviews in Scandinavia, Britain, France, and Germany. I use Klausen's definition of Muslim elite and her networking procedures for selecting interview subjects. For each country, a goal of the research is to

identify every elected or appointed leader in a national or regional civic or political organization who is of Muslim faith or background and to interview as many of them as is possible. In-depth interviews permit the close examination of ideas, especially via responses to open-ended items, and the structured interview protocol, including closed-ended items, enhances comparability across interviews and national contexts.

I wrote new survey items that probe the intellectual influences on the views of Muslim elites and that help me to analyze the characteristics of the religious and political belief systems of Muslim elites. The novel method in these items is to ask respondents to place themselves with respect to ideologies by proxy, that is, by asking respondents to name the intellectuals or political figures who have influenced their thinking. Several of the questions in the interview protocol were drawn from Jytte Klausen's surveys (2005). Other questions were adapted from Gallup and Pew surveys of public opinion among Muslims in Europe and Muslim-majority countries. Questions that referred to specific national events and characteristics were modified to fit each country.

#### **4. Ideologies and Islam Among Muslim Leaders in Three Countries**

The interviews provide insight into the nature and diffusion of belief systems among European Muslims. I am using the term belief system as Philip E. Converse developed it: A belief system is a "configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (1964, p. 207). Converse defined belief system to capture what many mean by ideology, although without the negative associations of that label (I shall use the terms interchangeably). Belief systems impose consistency among the ideas and attitudes of those who hold them, and this consistency derives from the influence of the originators of

a given belief system. Those engaged in the creative process of developing a belief system work out the implications of a belief system's basic principles for diverse social, political, and religious questions. Consistency among opinions and attitudes among the followers of a belief system is due only partly to the logical requirements of a particular set of principles. Consistency is mainly due to other factors, in particular the common reference point of the originator and his or her decisions and also the social conformity of followers of the belief system who wish to conform to group norms.

Europe's Muslim elite constitute a set of people who should hold one or more belief systems. Converse himself contended that only a narrow slice of the American electorate in the 1950s held opinions that could be described as conforming to a belief system and a large literature has developed in American political science to come to terms with this finding. Yet, despite Converse's findings about the dearth of individuals whose beliefs conform to ideological patterns, there are reasons to use Converse's understanding in the search for the orienting belief systems among European Muslims. The research is conducted among atypical individuals: they are self-selected for involvement in social and political activism, they are highly educated, and they are organizational elites. As members and leaders in comparatively small communities, the survey respondents have the potential to be relatively focused in their beliefs.

Care is needed when interpreting statements about beliefs. Beliefs and tactics blend into each other at times, especially when a belief can also be a useful tactic in achieving a goal. For instance, the belief that Western and Islamic values are (not) compatible is a useful belief to promulgate if one wishes to achieve (forestall) full citizenship for Muslims in European societies. It is also difficult to distinguish between

public rhetoric and internalized beliefs, that is, whether or not a person really means what he or she says. One test is internal consistency, the extent to which a respondent's various comments jibe with one another; but a problem with a test of consistency is that it assumes that sincere beliefs are internally consistent, which—if Converse is correct—is not a tenable assumption. Another dubious test is repetition, which assumes that sincere beliefs are more likely than public rhetoric to be repeated in response to varied questions on the same or similar topics. I caution against privileging sincere beliefs over public rhetoric in all instances. Neither is immutable, as people change their minds as well as their discourse. It is more realistic to assume that internalized beliefs and public rhetoric are both malleable, but at some cost. With these caveats in mind, skeptical readers of survey research may use the phrase “respondents say they believe,” instead of the phrases such as “respondents believe,” without affecting the main findings, although I prefer the latter expression.

While we should expect to find belief systems among European Muslim elites, the main ideological systems in western countries are largely hostile to Islam. Europe's main ideologies--Liberalism, nationalism, and Marxism-Leninism—were not particularly favorable even to European religion or religious authorities. *A fortiori*, none of the three leading ideologies was developed by thinkers who placed a positive value on Islam; on balance, the leading ideologies have been interpreted in ways that place a negative value on Islam. Liberalism decries many of the practices historically associated with Islam and anti-clerical liberalism rejects the authority of religious figures in general. Nationalism has been a main competitor to religious identification in Muslim majority countries and no European nationalism has given positive value to Islam. Marxist-Leninist thought

interpreted religion in general as an obstacle to revolutionary organization and Soviet Marxism sought to combat separatist movements in its Muslim territories. European conservative movements that have developed in opposition to liberalism and Marxism-Leninism have sought to preserve traditional religious and cultural authorities; these conservative counter-ideologies have offered infertile ground for Muslim followers.

None of the main western ideologies has had much to offer in terms of guidance for how an individual, faithful Muslim should act in politics and social life, especially in the context of a predominantly Christian or secular society with a constitutional, democratic political regime. For some liberal and Catholic thinkers, the experiences of Jewish emancipation and Catholic political participation may provide positive models for Muslims today. Yet, the lessons to be drawn from the Jewish and Catholic experiences for Muslims today must be developed and elaborated by intellectuals. Learning from Jewish experiences is impeded by the many contrasts between the histories of European Muslims and European Jews and the Palestinian and Arab conflicts with Israel. Learning from Catholic experiences must overcome contrasts between Catholicism and Islam, the historic conflicts between the two religions, and, in the contemporary setting, anti-immigrant sentiments among Christian-Democratic parties. Unfortunately, even the useful cross-religious precedents do not provide a program for how individual Muslims should conduct their lives as faithful believers and full citizens of European societies.

Given the absence of ideological guidance, what remains to be done is to creatively synthesize a western ideology with an interpretation of Islam that places a positive value on Islam. There are two tasks for any such creative synthesis. The first task is to revise and reform the western ideology such that its principles can be made to

conform to a positive view of Islam, since none of the original western belief systems included positive affect for Islam. The second task is to interpret Islam such that it can be made to be compatible with a modern ideological system. Islam, like other great world religions, is not an ideology; most of the history of Islam predates the age of ideology and the religion is too large and diverse in its interpretations to constitute an ideology on its own.

It falls to creative individuals to work out new belief systems that place a positive value on Islam and that give sufficient attention to principles derived from Islam. For the purposes of this article, I shall assume that creative syntheses of Islam with western ideologies such as liberalism, nationalism, and/or communism are indeed possible. There is a scholarly consensus that Islamists drew on elements of nationalism and communism. There is as yet no scholarly or popular consensus regarding who has successfully developed a creative synthesis of liberalism and Islam, but there is no person with a greater claim to have done so than Tariq Ramadan. Notable (ex-)Muslims who have opposed religious authority such as Salman Rushdie, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and Irshad Manji (2003) are powerful voices for liberalism, but they do not place an equally important positive emphasis on religious, Islamic commitment. The interview responses allow us to trace the influence of various potentially important political thinkers and leaders.

The respondents in Ireland, Portugal, and Spain named intellectual influences that differ in important ways (see Tables 2-4, below). In Portugal and Spain, but to a lesser degree in Ireland, some respondents named intellectual influences within the universalist liberal tradition, with Tariq Ramadan being the only figure to be named in both Portugal and Spain. When respondents were asked what particular ideas they found to be

influential, many cited the ideas of how to be European and Muslim, thus echoing the title of Ramadan's best-known work, *To Be a European Muslim* (1999). One respondent in Spain also named John Esposito, who is Catholic, but who is one of the United States' leading scholars of Islam and politics and a voice for inter-religious and cross-cultural exchange. Several respondents in Portugal named Sheikh Imam Faisal Abdul Rauf, an imam in New York City, who is a founder of the Cordoba Initiative, which seeks to build understanding among Christianity, Judaism, and Islam and which looks to the multi-religious society under Islamic rule in Iberia as a positive model for the contemporary world. Several respondents also named Abdool Karim Vakil (King's College, London), who is a Muslim and Portuguese scholar who writes on Portuguese history and Portuguese-Muslim history. One respondent named Sheik David Munir (Imam of the Central Mosque of Lisbon) and the Prophet Mohammed.

The named intellectual influences in Portugal include Nelson Mandela and Mohandas K. Gandhi. Mandela and Gandhi lead movements for national self-determination and democracy in multi-cultural settings. Both leaders confronted non-democratic, colonial or apartheid regimes while advocating political rights for majorities and minority communities, which included Muslims in both India and South Africa. Both could be said to fit the somewhat anachronistic label "multicultural liberals," in that they both worked to establish liberal, democratic regimes that offered protections and rights to members of ethnic and religious minorities. Neither was Muslim himself, of course, and neither can be said to have independently explained how Islam and liberalism could be mutually reinforcing. While Gandhi and Mandela were not anti-religious or opposed to religious authority in the way that many 19<sup>th</sup> century European liberals were, neither can

be said to have placed a distinctively positive emphasis on Islam. Intellectual influences in Portugal did not include any representative of Islamist fundamentalism as a source of ideas about religion and politics. There were also no representatives of the certain traditions within liberalism, such as secular European liberalism or Middle-Eastern modernism.

The set of intellectual influences in Spain includes key figures not mentioned in Portugal and a more diverse set of ideologies. The set of influences includes leading figures of the Islamist ideology, namely Hassan Al Banna and Yusef Al Qaradawi. It also includes the leading figure of Pakistani-Islamic nationalism, Muhammad Iqbal, and the leading ideologue who attempted to synthesize Marxist and Shia Islam, Ali Shariati. Among these thinkers, only Al Qaradawi can be said to be closely associated with attempts to influence Muslims living in Europe. While several of the others spent time in Europe and North America, they oriented their work toward politics in Muslim-majority countries: Al Banna in Egypt, Iqbal in Pakistan, and Shariati in Iran.

The set of influences in Spain also includes liberal and modernist thinkers at odds with religious authority: Victor Hugo, Taha Hussein, and Naguib Mafouz. Victor Hugo had little to say about Islam, but he aroused the opposition of the Catholic Church in his later career as a strong supporter of the French Third Republic. Taha Hussein was an Egyptian modernist who stressed the linkages between Egyptian culture with other Mediterranean cultures rather than between Egypt and with Arab and Eastern cultures. Naguib Mafouz developed the novel in Arabic and in his work blended cultural influences from Europe and Egypt; he opposed the Ayotollah Khomeini's fatwa against

Salman Rushdie and was targeted for assassination by Islamist extremists—indeed, an unsuccessful attempt was made on his life.

The set of influences in Ireland includes a stronger set of contemporary Islamist thinkers, M. Sa'id Ramadan Al-Bouti (1929) and Hassan 'Abd Allah al-Turabi (1932). Irish-Muslim respondents also named figures from the historical development of Islam prior to the modern period, namely Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazālī (1058-1111), Malik ibn Anas ibn Malik ibn 'Amr al-Asbahi (715-796), and Umar ibn al-Khattāb (581/83–644). Several Irish politicians who have been most active in outreach to Muslims and other immigrant communities are named, including Conor Lenihan, Brian Joseph Lenihan, Bertie Ahern, and Philip Watt.

**Table 2: Ideological Influences in Portugal**

Negative attitude toward Islam	Positive attitude toward Islam
Multicultural Liberalism	Universalism
<b>Mohandas K. Gandhi</b> (1869-1948) <b>Nelson Mandela</b> (1918)	<b>Faisal Abdul Rauf</b> (1948) <b>Tariq Ramadan</b> (1962) <b>Abdool Karim Vakil</b>
Nationalism	<b>David Munir</b>
Communism	Islamist Fundamentalism

**Table 3: Ideological Influences in Spain**

Negative attitude toward Islam

Positive attitude toward Islam

Liberalism

Modernism

Universalism

**Victor Hugo (1802-1885)****Taha Hussein (1889-1973)****Naguib Mahfouz (1911-2006)****Gema Martín-Muñoz****John Esposito (1940)****Tariq Ramadan (1962)****Amin Maalouf (1949)**

Nationalism

Islamist Fundamentalism

**Hassan Al Banna (1906-1949)****Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938)****Yusuf Al Qaradawi (1926)****Ali Shariati (1933-1977)**

Communism

**Table 4: Ideological Influences in Ireland**

Negative attitude toward Islam	Positive attitude toward Islam
<p>Liberalism</p> <p><b>Samuel Huntington</b> (1927)</p> <p>Multicultural Liberalism</p> <p><b>Conor Lenihan</b> (1963)</p> <p><b>Brian Joseph Lenihan</b> (1959)</p> <p><b>Bertie Ahern</b> (1951)</p> <p><b>Philip Watt</b> ()</p> <p><b>Nelson Mandela</b> (1918)</p> <p><b>Francis Fukuyama</b> (1952)</p>	<p>Universalism</p> <p><b>Vali Nasr</b> (1960)</p> <p>Islamist Fundamentalism</p> <p><b>M. Sa'id Ramadan Al-Bouti</b> (1929)</p> <p><b>Hassan 'Abd Allah al-Turabi</b> (1932)</p> <p><b>Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi</b> (1903-1979)</p> <p>Historical Islam</p> <p><b>Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazālī</b> (1058-1111)</p> <p><b>Malik ibn Anas ibn Malik ibn 'Amr al-Asbahi</b> (715-796)</p> <p><b>Umar ibn al-Khattāb</b> (581/83–644)</p>
Nationalism	
Communism	

## **5. Conclusion**

[To be written.]

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