

Still Two Tiers of Ethnic Conflict? Implications for the Evolution of a European Identity and Polity

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Paper presented to the conference “European Identities? Regionalism, Nationalism, and Religion,” University of Notre Dame London Centre, October 17-18, 2008

“The way identity bears on European integration depends on how it is framed, and it is framed in domestic political conflict.”

(Hooghe and Marks 2008: 120)

“Giving up one’s loyalty to the nation is not required for a European demos. But we know little about those social and political contexts in which European and national identities might actually clash.”

(Risse 2004: 271)

## ***Introduction***

In an article published more than a decade a half ago I argued that the recent escalation of tensions between the “new” minority and so-called “native” populations had resulted in two distinct but interactive tiers of ethnic conflict in Western Europe (Messina 1992). On the first tier, I asserted, the aspirations, material interests, and often the cultural identities of Western Europe’s new ethnic and racial minorities are in conflict with those of the domestic majority population. On the second tier, the aspirations, interests, and identities of the new minorities collide with not only those of the majority population, or significant fractions thereof, but also directly or indirectly with those of the traditional minority groups. Although the latter had emerged too recently to discern a universal pattern of interaction between the two tiers, I nevertheless offered three observations inspired by evidence drawn from several country cases.

From the French case I concluded that even in the best of circumstances traditional and new ethnic minority groups do not automatically or easily find common cause; moreover, in less good circumstances, the two sides are locked into a competitive relationship, especially with regard to their respective access to state resources and their status within domestic cultural and social hierarchies (Safran 1987). On both these scores, I argued, the traditional ethnic minorities of France (e.g., Alsatians, Basques, Catalans) generally concur with the majority population’s perspective that the central government has an obligation to support and facilitate their cultural, linguistic, and religious traditions, but *not* those of the new ethnic minorities (e.g., Maghrebis).

In the case of Italy I observed that the emergence of a second tier of ethnic conflict tends to exacerbate tensions on the first. Although the north-south cleavage has been politically salient since Italy was unified more than a century ago, it was not until hundreds of thousands of illegals migrated to the country during the 1990s, primarily from Africa, Asia, and later from Albania,

that political conditions became propitious for a surge of electoral support for the separatist Lombard League (*Lega Lombarda*) and its sister-parties in Northern Italy (*Padania*). The basic message of the Lombard League, and its larger successor the Northern League (*Lega Nord*), was that the wealth of the hard working citizens of the industrialized north was being confiscated by the central state and redistributed to their less prosperous and un-industrious countrymen in the south (*Mezzogiorno*), as well as to illegal immigrants who were depriving unemployed Italians of employment. The Italian Leagues were thus simultaneously operating on both the first and second tiers of ethnic conflict and successfully exacerbating and exploiting the tensions on each.

Finally, from the Belgian case I concluded that conflict over immigration and immigrant settlement can revive the flagging fortunes of established political parties primarily organized around traditional ethnic cleavages. Founded in 1977, the Flemish Bloc (*Vlaams Blok* and, later, *Vlaams Belang*) had recently married the issue of repatriating immigrants to its core plank that Flanders be granted political independence (Mudde 2000: 97-98). Much like the Lombard League, the Flemish Bloc politically exploited the frictions between natives and the new ethnic minorities, especially in the dilapidated sections of Antwerp and other cities where North African immigrants had settled within predominantly Flemish communities. However, unlike its Italian counterpart, the Flemish Bloc was experiencing a surge of popularity while regional tensions were relatively quiescent in Belgium. In short, by fanning the flames of popular resentment toward the new ethnic and racial minorities the Party had compensated for the ebbing of Flemish ethnonationalist fervor.

On the basis of these and other observations, I concluded that the parameters of ethnic conflict in contemporary Western Europe were expanding and becoming increasingly complex. This led me to predict that ethnic conflict in Western Europe would indefinitely persist.

How well has this prediction held up? As we now know with the benefit of perfect hindsight, ethnic conflict in Western Europe did persist and become more complex from the early 1990s forward (Medda-Windischer 2004). Indeed, ethnic-related conflict across Western Europe now seems to have expanded well beyond its traditional parameters (Esman 1977; Rudolph and Thompson 1989; De Winter et al. 2006a) to include the social conflict between majority populations and the new ethnic, racial, and religious minorities (Sniderman and Hagendorn 2007; Thalhammar et al. 2001). In several countries in particular – most notably in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom – new cleavages springing from the aforementioned conflicts have been politically superimposed over the old. As a consequence, issues of ethnicity, multiculturalism, and identity are more politically salient in contemporary Western Europe than at any time since World War II (Brubaker 2004: 147; Martiniello 2001: 59-60; Putnam 2007: 137; Sniderman et al. 2000: 121; Zimmermann and Constant 2007).

In several other key respects, however, my earlier analysis could hardly have been less prescient. First, as subsequent empirical studies have demonstrated, traditional or “historical” ethnics are neither automatically nor especially intolerant of immigrants and/or asylum seekers (Billet et al. 2000; Billet et al. 2003; Kymlica 2001: 63-64; Muñoz 2007). Indeed, anti-immigrant/foreigner/Muslim popular sentiment is less virulent and widespread in several traditional-historical regions than it is in the metropole (Hussain and Miller 2004; Lewis 2006: 30); moreover, sub national governments are oftentimes more formally inclusive of immigrants than are central governments (Keating 2002). Second, the traditional minority populations of Western Europe frequently view foreign workers as valuable contributors to the regional economy. The latter group is particularly well received within regions that are simultaneously experiencing robust economic growth and demographic ageing (Barker 2006: 4; Benedikter

2005; González Pérez and Somaza Medina 2004: 159-160). Third, for instrumental, ideational, and other reasons, traditional and new minorities tend to harbor similar grievances against the central state (Zapata-Barrero 2006: 9); moreover, both populations are generally inclined to resent the subordination of their respective cultures to the dominant, majority culture (Hussain and Miller 2006). Perhaps as a consequence, many new minorities are motivated to embrace a regional over a national identity and, in at least two prominent cases (Catalonia and Scotland), vote for ethnonationalist parties in higher percentages than the majority regional population (Hussain and Miller 2004; Miley 2007: 24).

Finally, it is widely claimed that both traditional and newer ethnic identities have yielded to alternative identities. Many traditional minority nationalisms, it is asserted, have now become “post-ethnic”, that is, they have evolved so that ethnicity is no longer their signature feature (Kymlicka 2001: 71-72; Martiniello 2001).<sup>1</sup> It is also frequently argued that many newer ethnic identities have all along been confused for religious identities (Meer 2008; Wimmer 2004: 2). According to this viewpoint, religion *not* ethnicity or country of origin (e.g. Algeria, Pakistan, Turkey, etc.) is at the heart of the social identity of many of Western Europe’s Muslims (Nyiri 2007).

To what extent then is contemporary Western Europe afflicted with two distinct but interactive tiers of ethnic conflict (Messina 1992: 61-63)? The central observation of this essay is that while the aspirations, interests, and identities of the majorities and traditional minorities of Western Europe do not *automatically* conflict with those of the newer minority populations, or least to the degree to which my earlier essay had implied, there nevertheless remain ethnically-inspired and other tensions embedded in the *central state-traditional minority* and *traditional*

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<sup>1</sup> According to Hollinger (1995), post-ethnicism represents “the critical renewal of cosmopolitanism in the context of today’s greater sensitivity to roots.”

*minority-new minority* relationships that have negative reverberations for domestic politics and, in turn, the aspirations of those who seek a European “community of belonging of the kind experienced in nation states” (Duchesne and Frogner 1995: 223). Perhaps the most important of these tensions is aroused whenever ethnonational or immigrant communities aspire – and are sometimes permitted – to maintain and reproduce subcultures that fundamentally challenge the political authority of the central state and, concomitantly, the latter’s promotion of the core principles upon which the national identity is founded (Messina 1992; De Winter et al. 2006c: 14).

The central hypothesis of this essay is that the accelerating phenomenon of “super diversity”<sup>2</sup> across the national and regional communities of Western Europe (Goodhart 2004; Vertovec 2007) impedes the evolution of the intra- and inter-societal solidarity and cohesion required for a meaningful European polity and society to emerge (Hermann and Brewer 2004: 3). As defined here, super diversity is the proliferation of ethnic, religious, and/or racial cultures and identities beyond the point at which public policy can accommodate differences and successfully ameliorate the conflict springing from these differences within a particular society (Vertovec 2007: 1048). The “tipping point” of diversity – i.e., the point at which it becomes “super” – has an objective foundation in the unprecedented proliferation of subcultures and subnational identities (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2006: 124). As the home to more than 50 ethnic groups of 10,000 persons or greater communicating in more than 300 different languages, for example, contemporary London is the most diverse city in the history of world. However, the arrival of super diversity is ultimately not an objective event; rather, the point at which it arrives will vary

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<sup>2</sup> In the British context Vertovec (2005) more narrowly describes super diversity as a “condition distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants” who have migrated since the 1990s.

from one society to another and from one period to the next depending upon the intersection of historical, political, and social factors which either can increase or decrease a particular society's carrying capacity for diversity.

In this view, it is not the objective conditions of super diversity which directly imperil cohesion and solidarity, as Goodhart (2004) and Putnam (2007) seem to claim, but rather, as Figure 1 suggests, the broad field of opportunity that it ploughs for the political ascension of exclusionary nationalisms and nationalist groups and parties (Csergo and Goldgeier 2004). Specifically, super diversity feeds varieties of exclusionary nationalisms which tend to impede the adoption of an affective European identity among Europeans (Green 2007: 25) and, in turn, the emergence of cohesive European polity (Cinpoes 2008).<sup>3</sup> As such, conditions of super diversity are antithetical to the aspiration of the EU's founding fathers to have a European identity displace national ones among Europe's citizens (Duchesne and Frogner 1995: 193).

[Figure 1 about here]

### ***Territorial Identities: Fractures across and within European States***

As numerous studies have extensively documented (Turner et al. 1987), individuals have a propensity to embrace multiple political and social identities, or a shared representation of a collective self (Hermann and Brewer 2004). As a consequence, people can and often do identify with, and thus fairly comfortably perceive themselves as belonging to, several political communities (i.e. national, regional, local, and/or supranational) simultaneously (Diez Medrano 2003; Green 2007: 25; Smith 1991: 175). Indeed, if this were not so it would be difficult for a national identity to initially take root within a given population or a supranational identity to

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<sup>3</sup> As Green has persuasively argued (2007: 38), although "identities are not mutually exclusive...the pool of affective sentiment that any individual has to allocate to various recipients is probably zero-sum...."



proliferate and facilitate the emergence of a supranational entity like the European Union. Although not unanimous (Carey 2002; McLaren 2006), most scholars of European integration have therefore concluded that the relationships between European and national or regional identities are *not* zero-sum (Castano 2004; Duchesne and Frogner 1995: 202; Duchesne and Frogner 2008; Green 2007: 25). Citrin and Sides (2004: 175) in particular have persuasively characterized European identity as “supplementing” national identity, i.e. it is not dominated by national identity but rather established alongside it.

This said, it is also well documented that social and political identities tend to be hierarchically ordered. As data gathered from a series of World Value Surveys have revealed (Table 1), most Europeans primarily identify with their town (41%), and then in descending order with their nation (28%), region (19%), and Europe (13%). Recording somewhat different, but not necessarily contradictory findings, a recent Eurobarometer survey (2007: 70) discovered that 90% of EU citizens are attached to their country, 87% to their region, and 86% to their city, town or village. It also revealed that less than two thirds of EU citizens are psychologically attached to Europe and only half to the European Union to at least some degree.

[Table 1 about here]

Although, when pressed, most Europeans choose a national or subnational identity over a European one, how the various territorial identifiers are distributed significantly varies from one country to another across Western Europe. As the data in Table 2 indicate, Germans (36%) and Italians (30%) are especially inclined – and thus compared with Spaniards (18%), Frenchmen (15%), and Britons (14%) much more likely – to identify “most strongly” with Europe. On the other side of the coin, Frenchmen (52%), Spaniards (44%), and Britons (40%) are more inclined than Italians (35%) and Germans (22%) to strongly identify with the contemporary nation state.

[Table 2 about here]

Equally conspicuous are differences in the ratio of national to regional identifiers across countries. In Germany, for example, the percentage of strong regional identifiers is slightly greater than national identifiers (24/22%); in Britain the two groups too are fairly evenly represented, but in contrast to Germany the latter group is larger than the former (40/36%). In France (52/13%), Spain (44/22%), and Italy (35/19%) the percentage of citizens identifying most strongly with the nation state is much greater than those identifying with the region. Among the five countries, France has the highest and Germany the lowest number of national identifiers, while Germany has the greatest percentage of both regional *and* European identifiers (Diez Medrano 2003: 253).

Just as territorial identities are distributed differently across national populations, so too do countries diverge with respect to how similar the distributions of territorial identities are across their respective historical and administrative regions. Along these lines the five countries represented in Table 2 can be divided into two groups. In France (excluding the Mediterranean) and even more so in Italy, the percentage of strong national, regional, European, and international identifiers are fairly similarly distributed from one region to the next. National identifiers exceed regional identifiers by no less than three to one in *every* French region. In each of Italy's major regions approximately a third of persons primarily identify with the nation, a fifth with the region, and a third with Europe. In contrast, in Germany and particularly in Britain and Spain the distribution of territorial identifiers across regions is far less uniform. In Britain, for example, the various territorial identifiers are much more evenly split among northerners (including Scots) than southerners (including Londoners), with a modest plurality of the former population (37%) most strongly identifying with their region and, conversely, a larger

plurality of the latter population (44%) identifying with the nation state. In Spain, northeasterners (including Catalans) stand out for being evenly split between national and regional identifiers (37%). In doing so they diverge from the comparatively strong national and relatively weak regional proclivities of the populations of southern (including Andalusia) and central (including Madrid) Spain.

Do the aforementioned inter-country and inter-regional differences matter for Europe? It is now well known that persons holding a national identity exclusively are more likely than not to be hostile toward Europe and European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004). As research by McLaren (2007: 248) has discovered, for these EU citizens European integration poses “a threat to their key terminal identities.” The primary reason is clear. As Carey (2002: 391) observes, “the stronger the bond that an individual feels toward the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics. The growth of the scope of the European Union in the realm of economics, politics and culture, which have previously been under the sole control of the nation-state, impinges on this view of the nation.”

The ubiquity of and often robust electoral support for ethnonational political parties (De Winter et al. 2006a, 2006b) – several of which, as we will see below, are either ambivalent or hostile toward European integration – also suggest that differences of territorial identification within and across national populations have political consequences, although whether or not ethnonational political parties surpass a critical threshold of electoral support ultimately depends upon many variables, including the political and electoral competition strategies adopted by mainstream parties (Meguid 2008). While the pervasiveness and strength of regional identities within a given country is *not* perfectly correlated with the electoral fortunes of ethnonational

political parties, it is nevertheless self-evident that the most virulent political manifestations of ethnonationalism could never take root absent a critical mass of citizens who strongly identify with their region. Along these lines it is probably not a coincidence that of the six national populations represented in Table 2, Britons are the most inclined (36%) to identify most strongly with a region and regional minorities in the U.K. support two of the most electorally successful and long-lived ethnonational political parties in Western Europe (Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru).

In addition to the aforementioned inter-country and inter-regional differences of territorial identification, the survey data represented in Tables 3-5 indicate that there are significant differences of public opinion across countries – and within countries, across regions – on issues pertaining to national cohesion and solidarity, i.e. issues which underpin social and political identity. For example, with respect to the question of whether or not a citizenship and language test should be required of noncitizens (Table 3), a super majority of Germans (86%) and Britons (83%) agree that it should, while many fewer Italians (61%), Frenchmen (61%), and Spaniards (50%) concur. Spaniards and Frenchmen are the most divided and Britons least regionally conflicted on this question, with Germans and Italians falling between these two poles.

[Tables 3 about here]

Inter-country differences also are evident with respect to whether or not civics courses should be part of the standard school curriculum. As the data in Table 4 indicate, Italians are virtually unanimous (99%) in endorsing mandatory civics courses. At the other end of the spectrum fewer than three of four Britons (73%) embrace this position with Spaniards (84%), Frenchmen (86%), and Germans (92%) supporting it more widely. In every country the national

population is less internally divided on the question of mandatory civics courses than the issue of administering citizenship and language tests.

[Table 4 about here]

Yet a third pattern of public attitudes prevails on the question of whether or not “different communities should be allowed to abide by different laws according to their own cultural and religious identity.” Indeed, West Europeans are least unified on this question. As Table 5 reveals, almost half of Britons (49%) and Frenchmen (49%) and approximately two-fifths of Italians (42%) and Spaniards (44%) *disagree* that different communities should be allowed to abide by different laws, while only a third of Germans (33%) dissent. In Italy and Germany the percentage of those who agree and disagree are approximately the same; in France and Britain, and Spain the balance between the two is decidedly less equal. Even more interesting are the inter-regional differences of opinion on the question. It is universally true – and conspicuously so in Spain and Italy – that fairly wide inter-regional differences of opinion exist about whether or not different communities should be allowed to abide by different laws according to their own cultural and religious identity. Along these lines, near majorities *favoring* the proposition are present only in northern and central Italy (including Lombardy and Umbria respectively), southwestern France (including Aquitaine), and Spain’s Canary Islands. Conversely, majorities *dissenting* from the proposition that that different laws should apply to different communities are found within only one region in four of the five countries: southern Britain (including London), southern Italy (including Sicily), northwest France (including Basse-Normandie), and north central Spain (including Cantabria).

[Table 5 about here]

Why are West Europeans much more conflicted on the third question than the first two? One possibility is on the first two questions nationalists (or at least a large fraction of the majority population) and ethnonationalists potentially share a similar perspective (against immigrants?), while the third question possibly pits nationalists against ethnonationalists *and* immigrants and, depending upon the circumstances, ethnonationalists against immigrants *and* members of the majority population. The potential mix of group interests regarding the three questions are represented in Table 6.

[Table 6 about here]

Nationalists and ethnonationalists are potentially of a similar mind on the proposal for a mandatory citizenship and language test for new immigrants for the fairly obvious reason that both groups generally expect immigrants to integrate into and therefore embrace to some degree the larger social and political community to which they've migrated (i.e. Belgium or Flanders; Britain or Wales; Spain or Catalonia, etc.). Mandating citizenship and language tests for new immigrants is one means of achieving this goal.

With respect to the proposal to require civic courses, nationalists are likely to support it, but so too are ethnonationalists *if* the "civic" values promoted within these courses reflect those of the ethnonational rather than the national community; otherwise, they will likely oppose it. Put differently, ethnonationalists are likely to support making civic courses mandatory if these courses have a regional orientation (e.g. they focus on Basque, Corsican, or Welch culture and history) and oppose it if they primarily reinforce national founding myths and values. Thus, depending upon on their content and who is designing and administering them, civic courses can possibly enhance *either* a nationalist *or* an ethnonationalist social/political agenda by reinforcing an individual's attachments to either the national or regional political community.

Conversely, allowing different communities to abide by different laws according to their own cultural and religious identity potentially threatens the identity and interests of both nationalists and ethnonationalists by permitting on the one tier ethnonationalists *and/or* immigrants the freedom to undermine national political and social cohesion and, on a second tier, immigrants *and/or* members of the national majority population (a critical number of whom may permanently reside within the historical region)<sup>4</sup> the leverage to undermine regional political unity and cultural homogeneity. As Table 6 suggests, in every scenario nationalists “lose” and immigrants “win” if different communities are allowed to abide by different laws. On the other hand, and for perfectly rational and self-interested reasons, ethnonationalists are predisposed to deny immigrants and/or members of the national majority population residing within the traditional region the same cultural, legal, and/or political autonomy to which they aspire for themselves and their region within the legal and constitutional framework of the national political community. As Kymlica suggests (2001: 63), to do otherwise is to allow non-indigenous populations to challenge “the self conceptions and political aspirations of those [regional] groups which see themselves as distinct and self-governing nations within a larger state.”

### ***Entrepreneurs of Difference and Division: Ethnonational and Anti-Immigrant Parties***

#### Ethnonational Parties

Whatever the objective or subjective tensions among majority populations, ethnonationalists, and immigrants, these are unlikely to achieve a high degree of political salience within a particular country absent the intervention and influence of ethnic entrepreneurs

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<sup>4</sup> For example, according to the 2001 census the English make up more than eight percent and foreign born persons more than three percent of the population in Scotland.

(Messina and Fraga 1992: 11). As McCrone and Bechhofer (2008: 1262) argue, “cultural and social differences per se are not enough to create a conflagration.” Hooghe and Marks (2009: 13) make the similar point that “identity does not speak for itself in relation to most political objects, but must be politically constructed.” On this score, few political actors across Western Europe are more invested in issues of identity, social solidarity, and political community than ethnonational and anti-immigrant groups and political parties. Although on opposite sides of most public policy questions, ethnonational and anti-immigrant parties are simultaneously products, political instigators, and beneficiaries of the ethnic, cultural, and social differences that obtain within a particular society. Ethnonational and anti-immigrant groups share at least two characteristics in these roles. First, both groups tend to raise and politicize issues of identity, social solidarity, and political community that were previously outside of the parameters of mainstream political party competition (Meguid 2005: 347). Second, ethnonational and anti-immigrant groups are often arbiters of whether or not cultural and social differences are politically mobilized, how so, and for which purposes (McCrone and Bechhofer 2008: 1262). This said, each group politically mediates the tensions plaguing majority-minority group relations in line with their own objectives.

Ethnonationalism, according to Leslie (1989: 45), is a broad-based sentiment inspired by “a form of group solidarity or community feeling *based on ethnicity rather than territory*; it refers to subjective attachments that demarcate one particular group from other groups within a total population.” Examples of ethnonational groups in Europe include, among many others, the Scottish (SNP) and Welsh (PC) nationalist parties in the United Kingdom, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) in Spain, the Breton Democratic Union (UDB) in France, and the Northern League (LN) in Italy. The primary objective of most ethnonational groups is to precipitate a



redistribution of political authority and power away from central governments in favor of the traditional region or “periphery” (De Winter et al. 2006: 14). As political challengers of the integrity and authority of the traditional nation state, ethnonational parties must necessarily erect psychological walls between ethnonational communities and majority and/or other minority populations. As De Winter et al. (2006b: 16) observe:

As ethnic entrepreneurs ... ethnoregionalist parties play a central role in the (re-) construction of the regionalist “imagined community” and its subsequent claims for changing the existing centre/periphery power arrangements.... The widespread stereotypes of Catalans vis-à-vis Andalusians and of Flemish vis-à-vis Walloons, Lombards vis-à-vis Sicilians, do not seem to differ much from those of the extreme-right nationalist-populist parties vis-à-vis Turks and North-African “guest workers”.

Contemporary ethnonational political parties, however, are not exclusively preoccupied with demands for regional autonomy and/or broader claims for altering existing center-periphery relations (De Winter et al. 2006b: 15). As Tables 7-9 indicate, they are also very much concerned with Europe and, specifically, with recent trends and currents connected with the project for greater economic and political European integration (Tarchi 2007: 188). Consistent with patterns elsewhere (De Winter and Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002: 491; Marks et al. 2002: 587), the ethnonational parties of Belgium, Britain, and France, for example, are generally advocates of Europe and tend to support greater European economic, if not political, integration. This said, the preferences of these and other Ethnonationalist parties on Europe are far from fixed (Chari et al. 2004; Hoppe 2007). To the contrary, the historical record suggests that ethnonationalist parties tend to hold changing, often contradictory, and predominantly

instrumental views on European integration (Chari et al. 2004). For most of these parties, European integration primarily presents an opportunity to weaken the political authority of the traditional nation-state and make their region more economically viable in the event that it eventually gains greater political and legal/or autonomy (De Winter et al. 2006b: 16; Hasely 2001: 97; Paquin 2002: 71). They perceive Europe as providing a “home within which to assert ‘regional/national identities’ that had been undervalued or trapped inside existing national states.” As a consequence, whenever and wherever ethnonationalist parties come to the conclusion that the cause or direction of European integration are not compatible with these objectives or, alternatively, whenever they decide that European integration seriously threatens their region’s cultural autonomy, they do not hesitate to distance themselves from the European project (Hepburn 2007: 243; Swyngedouw et al. 2007: 84).

[Tables 7-9 about here]

Most contemporary ethnonational parties also focus on issues of immigration and immigrant settlement. Why they are increasingly attentive to these issues is no mystery; as the data in Tables 10-13 reveal, ethnonational groups are embedded within regions which are also home to an ever increasing number of Europe’s new ethnic, racial, and religious minorities. Seven of seventeen of Spain’s autonomous communities, for example, has a foreigner population greater than 10 percent; in the region of Valencia foreigners outnumber Spanish citizens in no fewer than 15 towns. Similarly, in eight of nine of Austria’s regions foreigners constitute more than five percent of the total population, including Vienna which has a foreigner population of 19 percent (Statistics Austria 2007). In France, 13 of 22 administrative regions have an immigrant population that exceeds five percent of the population, with Ile-de-France (16.7%), Alsace (10%), Provence (9.6%) having the highest immigrant to native ratio. Although Denmark has

fewer immigrants than either Austria or France, each of its five regions has an immigrant population of five percent or more including the city of Copenhagen which has one of the highest immigrant populations of any European region (14%). Moreover, while foreign born persons do not exceed four percent of the total population in either Scotland or Wales, both of these traditional regions in Britain are currently under considerable pressure to accommodate the needs and interests of their burgeoning ethnic and religious minority populations (Lewis 2006; Williams et al. 2003).

[Tables 10-13 about here]

Most ethnonational parties are understandably ambivalent about immigration. On the one hand, as we argued previously, foreign workers are often recruited by regional authorities to alleviate labor shortages, ameliorate declining birthrates, and spur greater economic growth and productivity (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2007). On the other hand, as the formal positions of Belgium's parties especially well demonstrate (Table 8), immigrants are frequently viewed by ethnonationalists as potential threats to their region's cultural homogeneity and social solidarity (Núñez 2002: 229; Tarchi 2007: 189). Recognition of this ambivalence has inspired Kymlica (2001: 75) to prescribe that regional minorities should exercise some control over both the volume of immigration and the terms of immigrant settlement, the former "to ensure that the numbers of immigrants are not so great as to overwhelm the ability of society to integrate them." Perhaps thus motivated, the Spanish central government has recently devolved competency over some immigration matters, including co-participation in establishing quotas for new migrant labor, to the Catalan government (Larralde Velten 2006: 1).

An important exception to the general rule of the ethnonational party ambivalence toward immigration is represented in the example of the ethnonational right, however. Although

numerous ethnonational groups operate across contemporary Western Europe, only Italy's Northern League (*Lega Nord*), Belgium's Flemish Interest (*Vlaams Belang*), France's Savoisian League (*Ligue Savoissienne*), and a handful of others properly belong to what might be labeled the ethnonational right. These groups uniquely marry traditional appeals for greater regional autonomy or self governance with a publicly-articulated animosity toward immigration and settled immigrants. Ethnonationalist right parties explicitly link the cultural, economic, and political "penetration" of the periphery (i.e. the traditional regions) by the metropole (i.e. central government) with its simultaneous human "invasion" by unwanted and undesirable immigrants.

### Anti-Immigrant Parties

In contrast to ethnonational parties, anti-immigrant parties put immigration-related issues at the top of their political agenda. Indeed, they are in the vanguard of the domestic actors in Western Europe attempting to politicize state immigration policies and issues related to the permanent settlement of the new ethnic, racial and religious minorities. Although the circumstances of their founding, organizational structure, ideological proclivities,, programmatic orientation, and core political strategies differ, all contemporary anti-immigrant groups in Western Europe share at least three characteristics. First, they are overtly hostile toward settled immigrants and strenuously opposed to new immigration. Second, these groups owe much, if not the greater part, of their modest political success during the past two decades to their exploitation of the social tensions that have accompanied the settlement of postwar immigrants (Betz 1994: 67; Bjørklund and Andersen 2002: 128-129). Finally, to varying degrees, the major anti-immigrant groups of Western Europe have successfully cultivated and fostered a climate of public hostility toward immigrants that has, in turn, created a more favorable political context for

themselves (Williams 2006). In accounting for the relatively recent surge of popular support for anti-immigrant groups in Western Europe, it is fair to conclude on the basis of the evidence (Messina 2007: 54-96) that it is less the product of “objective” conditions (e.g. the state of the economy or the objective economic burden of immigration) than a result of “subjective” perceptions and anxieties within the majority population (e.g. the fear that national identity and/or racial or cultural homogeneity are eroding). Along these lines most anti-immigrant groups propagate “the idea of nation and national belonging by radicalizing ethnic, religious, lingual, and other cultural and political criteria of exclusion in order to bring about a congruence between state and nation, and to condense the idea of nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity” (Minkenberg 2006: 263).

Like ethnonational groups, anti-immigrant actors in Western Europe are not single issue oriented; to the contrary, they also propagate controversial, if not extremist, views on many other major public policy questions, including as Table 14 clearly demonstrates, issues pertaining to European cooperation and integration. Indeed, Marks et al. (2006: 165) quite accurately categorize the political far right as the most Euroskeptical party family in Europe.

[Table 14 about here]

For most anti-immigrant groups fears about the loss of national sovereignty, the dilution of national cultures, and the prospects of increased immigration from within and outside of the European Union motivate them to be Europe’s most vocal opponents of the project for greater European integration. Much as they do with immigration-related questions, anti-immigrant groups articulate and amplify the general public’s doubts about the current course and pace of the ongoing project of ever closer European union. To date, the efforts to exploit anti-European public sentiment politically by anti-immigrant groups and far right parties in general have

yielded rather uneven political returns, however. Few anti-immigrant groups have directly profited politically by opposing the quickening pace of European integration, including the adoption and introduction of the single currency (Messina 2006). This is not to say that they do not influence the domestic politics of European integration, however.

### Role of Ethnonationalist and Anti-Immigrant Parties

How, if at all, do anti-immigrant and ethnonationalist parties influence popular support for Europe and European integration? Although the evidence is not entirely unambiguous, political parties organized around the cleavage of identity, as ethnonationalist and anti-immigrants parties are to a considerable and an increasing degree, do seem to influence negatively the public's perceptions of Europe. Netjes and Edwards (2009), for example, have empirically demonstrated that partisan cueing is essential to "understanding the conditions under which ... national identity considerations are mobilized against European integration." As a result of their cueing of the national electorate, Euroskeptical right wing parties – i.e., predominantly classic anti-immigrant parties including the ethnonational right – sway "popular opinion against Europe by mobilizing the growing uncertainties about the future of European integration amongst the mass public" (Netjes and Edwards 2009). Carey and Lebo (2001) too find evidence demonstrating that declining public support for European integration is explained by attachments to national identity. On the basis of their research they conclude (2001:3) that nationalism is "negatively related to support for the European project because of conflicts over sovereignty that developed in this era, such as the creation of a single European currency, the European central bank, and the increasing primacy of European law." Hooghe and Marks (2005: 437) offer the additional insight that "the extent to which national identity bites on support for

European integration depends on how divided national elites are. Where elites are united on Europe, national identity and European integration tend to coexist; where they are divided, national identity produces Euro-skepticism.”

Anti-immigrant and some ethnonational parties also seem to circumscribe, at least indirectly, the parameters of policy making. On this score, the influence of ethnonational and anti-immigrant parties on public policy outcomes pertaining to Europe and European integration appears to follow from their politicization of the aforementioned themes and, in turn, the effects that politicization has on policy choice. Along these lines vein Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that:

the mobilization of exclusive national identity among mass publics is likely to raise the heat of debate, narrow the substantive ground of possible agreement, and make key actors, including particularly national governments, less willing to compromise.... As European multi-level governance has become more closely coupled, so leaders have less room to maneuver.

More generally, they observe (2006: 248) that “as a result of politicization and populism territorial identities have come to play a decisive role in European integration.... Parties appealing to exclusive national identity have taken the initiative in public debate”. Flanked by vocal critics of the European project on their political right, national governments are thus constrained in pursuing policies to foster ever closer European Union.

### ***Discussion***

Issues of community, identity, and social solidarity are increasingly coming to the political fore across Europe (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). The reasons why are not difficult to fathom.

As the European integration project has progressed from the economic arena to the realms of community and culture, pockets of Europeans have become alarmed that their closed and exclusive notions of national identity are being incrementally undermined (Ivarsflaten 2005: 24). The quickening pace of European integration since the mid 1980s has raised the disquieting specter for many Europeans that their terminal identity may be being “redefined and [the] membership of their national political community expanded” (Laffan 1996: 89).

Also contributing to the perception that terminal identities are under siege are the tens of thousands waves of immigrants who have settled in Europe during the past several decades. In this context the project of ever closer European union further mass immigration potentially poses a two-pronged threat to traditional identities. First, greater European economic and political integration raises the prospect of individual states ceding ever more control over who can enter their territorial borders to EU institutions (Ivarsflaten 2005: 24). Second, the free circulation of EU citizens inevitably results in the greater penetration than previously of national and regional communities by “outsiders” (Ivarsflaten 2005: 24; Sniderman et al. 2006).

Given these circumstances we should not be surprised to discover two phenomena which are unfavorable to the cause of ever closer European union. The first is stasis in the propensity of Europeans to embrace a European identity (Green 2007: 68). As the survey data in Table 15 indicate, the number of Europeans privileging a European identity over a national one – approximately 11-12 percent of the EU population – has remained unchanged since the early 1990s. Relatively constant too is the 85 percent or so of EU citizens privileging a national identity over a European one.

[Table 15 about here]



A second and perhaps more disturbing phenomenon is the tendency of a critical number of Europeans to make few, if any, meaningful distinctions among the many ethnic, racial, and religious groups perceived as “them” rather than “us” (Sniderman et al. 2000: 148). Ivarsflaten (2005: 42), for example, has discovered that “driving force behind Western Europeans’ support for restrictive immigration and asylum policies is their concern about the unity of their national community.” In this regard, European opponents of new immigration and/or immigrant settlement are not any more favorably disposed toward economic migrants than asylum seekers or visa versa.

Moreover, the insecurity of Europeans precipitated by the penetration of their established communities by outsiders is not exclusively directed toward non EU migrants, nor is it peculiar to majority populations. As Table 16 reveals, when asked if Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims, blacks and Asians, or East Europeans came to settle in the region, Scots, quite remarkably, did not discriminate. Every outsider group irrespective of its predominant religious features, racial characteristics, and/or national origin was viewed as equally threatening to Scottish identity. Indeed, a sizeable plurality (49/46/45%) of respondents agreed that a greater number of settlers from every group would erode Scotland’s identity as a region. Moreover, reinforcing research findings from the Italian and Dutch cases that have suggested that threats to cultural identity matter more than threats to economic well being (Sniderman et al. 2000; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007), ethnic Scots were more likely to perceive the aforementioned outsider groups as more of a threat to Scottish identity than an economic challenge (Table 17). Again, they were not disposed to discriminate. Scots perceived that British ethnic minorities (27%) were about as equally likely as their fellow EU citizens from Eastern Europe (31%) to take “jobs away from other people in Scotland.”

[Tables 16 and 17 about here]

As has been well documented, Scots are not especially inclined toward ethnic, racial, or religious intolerance. To the contrary, there is persuasive evidence that Scots are *less* ethnically, racially, and religiously exclusionary than many, if not most, of the majority and regional minority populations in Western Europe (Hussain and Miller 2006: 73-75). Nevertheless, against this otherwise positive backdrop lies the disturbing reality that a large plurality of Scots perceives that the identity of their historic region is threatened by the prospect of greater cultural and social diversity. Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that Scots generally view *every* outsider group, including the English (Hussain and Miller 2006), as the “other”. The bad news for Europe is that like their fellow Britons and Europeans as a whole relatively few Scots primarily see themselves as Europeans; moreover, the approximately twelve percent of the Scottish population who does has not expanded since the late 1990s (Mahendran and McIver 2007: 12). The further bad news is that 80 percent of Scots see themselves as having no more in common with people who see themselves as European as they do with anyone else.

The good news, of course, is unlike much of Western Europe, Scotland does not now support a significant anti-immigrant or ethnonational right political party. The further good news is that the Scottish Nationalist Party, like most regional minority parties across Western Europe, is positively inclined toward Europe and European integration (Lynch 2006: 241; Table 9). This said, one might reasonably ask: Under which circumstances and for how long will the aforementioned conditions persist? Specifically, can a Scottish identity and an increasingly politically assertive Scottish nationalism coexist with greater cultural and social diversity – an inevitable outcome given current conditions – and without eroding the relatively supportive posture toward Europe which most Scots currently hold?

If, as Hooghe and Marks (2007: 26) argue, a strong territorial identity is compatible with support for greater regional integration only in circumstances in which national or subnational identity is non-exclusive and it is *not* cued by a Euroskeptical party or parties then the answers to the above questions are highly conditional. Specifically, so long as Scottish identity does not become more exclusive as a result of the continuing struggle in political center-periphery relations within the U.K. and the SNP does not find cause to play the anti-immigration card as a reaction to increasing migration to Scotland and/or the anti-Europe card as a result of its concerns about a loss of regional cultural or political autonomy – the latter of which it has done in the not too distant past (Lynch 2006: 241) – then most Scots are likely to remain supportive of European integration. If, on the other hand, the SNP chooses an opposite and negative course, i.e., one similar to several of its ethnonational counterparts elsewhere in Western Europe, then the prospects for European integration in Scotland will most likely be different. In either event, one outcome result will likely be the same: Scots, like most other Europeans, will continue to privilege a national identity over a supranational one and, in so doing, deny Europe the “affection” they willingly and so much more easily extend to their nation.

Figure 1

**SUPER DIVERSITY**



**NATIONALIST POLITICAL MOBILIZATION**



**POLITICIZATION OF IDENTITY ISSUES**



**EUROSKEPTICISM**



**LACK OF AFFECTIVE EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

Table 1  
Primary Territorial Identity among Europeans, 1981-1997

COUNTRY	NATION	TOWN	REGION	EUROPE/ OTHER
Poland	<b>47.3</b>	29.7	13.3	9.6
Slovenia	39.3	<b>44.8</b>	8.6	7.3
Finland	<b>39.2</b>	35.7	12.3	12.7
Czech Republic	<b>36.0</b>	28.8	20.2	14.9
Ireland	31.4	<b>47.4</b>	13.6	7.5
Britain	31.3	<b>37.7</b>	16.6	14.5
Netherlands	31.0	<b>44.2</b>	7.7	17.2
Denmark	29.2	<b>45.7</b>	16.4	8.7
Spain	29.1	<b>45.2</b>	16.1	9.5
France	28.1	<b>37.7</b>	15.6	18.5
Austria	27.3	<b>34.5</b>	31.4	6.9
Hungary	26.8	<b>56.8</b>	5.7	10.7
Latvia	26.2	30.0	<b>30.7</b>	13.2
Portugal	25.9	<b>39.2</b>	18.5	16.4
Italy	25.5	<b>41.1</b>	9.6	23.9
Sweden	24.8	<b>57.0</b>	11.7	6.4
Slovakia	23.0	<b>36.9</b>	30.7	9.4
Lithuania	22.1	32.5	<b>36.2</b>	9.2
West Germany	20.9	<b>39.7</b>	20.4	18.9
Belgium	19.9	<b>52.8</b>	9.5	17.7
Northern Ireland	19.4	<b>44.5</b>	29.1	7.0
East Germany	15.8	<b>36.6</b>	24.0	23.6
Estonia	14.8	<b>36.6</b>	36.0	12.6
<b>EU AVERAGE</b>	27.6	<b>40.7</b>	18.9	12.9

- *Figures are computed from the World Value Surveys 1981-1997*
- *Countries are ranked by the proportion of respondents quoting the nation as their dominant community of reference*
- *Europe/Other is the sum of Europe, world, and other communities*
- *Figures in bold represent the primary community of reference for each country*

Source: Bruter undated: 4.

Table 2  
Identity Most Strongly Describing Oneself, 2007 (in percent)

<b>Great Britain</b>					<b>Italy</b>			
Identity	North	Midlands	South	<i>Total</i>	North	Central	South	<i>Total</i>
National	33	40	44	<i>40</i>	37	36	31	<i>35</i>
Regional	37	27	17	<i>36</i>	20	17	20	<i>19</i>
European	10	16	15	<i>14</i>	29	30	32	<i>30</i>
International	4	3	6	<i>4</i>	5	8	7	<i>6</i>
None	2	4	1	<i>4</i>	3	4	3	<i>4</i>
Not Sure	15	10	11	<i>12</i>	7	5	6	<i>6</i>

<b>Germany</b>						
Identity	North	Central	South	East	West	<i>Total</i>
National	23	18	28	20	18	<i>22</i>
Regional	23	21	21	30	22	<i>24</i>
European	36	37	40	33	36	<i>36</i>
International	6	11	5	10	6	<i>7</i>
None	3	2	2	2	5	<i>3</i>
Not Sure	8	10	3	5	14	<i>8</i>

<b>France</b>								
Identity	Paris	N.E.	N.W.	Central	S.E.	S.W.	Med.	<i>Total</i>
National	57	55	49	52	50	47	8	<i>52</i>
Regional	7	19	16	13	10	14	-	<i>13</i>
European	13	8	17	21	24	14	-	<i>15</i>
International	7	2	6	-	5	14	-	<i>5</i>
None	10	8	5	13	3	8	92	<i>8</i>
Not Sure	6	7	7	1	8	3	-	<i>6</i>

<b>Spain</b>								
Identity	N.W.	N. Central	N.E.	Central	C. Coast	South	Islands	<i>Total</i>
National	42	40	37	46	41	57	48	<i>44</i>
Regional	33	23	37	10	19	15	11	<i>22</i>
European	14	16	17	24	18	16	30	<i>18</i>
International	7	3	4	4	8	3	4	<i>4</i>
None	3	11	2	8	7	8	6	<i>7</i>
Not Sure	1	8	3	8	8	2	2	<i>5</i>

Source: Harris 2007.

Table 3  
 Citizenship and Language Test Should Be Required for Continued Residence in  
 Country, 2007 (in percent)

Great Britain				Italy			
Region	Yes	No	Not Sure	Region	Yes	No	Not Sure
North	81	8	11	North	66	24	11
Midlands	83	9	8	Central	57	32	11
South	84	8	10	South	54	36	9
<i>Total</i>	83	8	10	<i>Total</i>	61	29	10

Germany				France				Spain			
Region	Y	N	NS	Region	Y	N	NS	Region	Y	N	NS
North	87	8	5	Paris	57	28	15	N. West	38	49	13
Central	89	8	3	N. East	70	13	17	N. Central	47	36	17
South	82	9	9	N. West	53	22	25	N. East	58	26	17
East	90	5	5	Central	67	22	11	Central	52	34	14
West	73	21	6	S. East	66	15	18	Central Coast	41	39	21
				S. West	41	44	15	South	52	33	15
				Mediterranean	8	-	92	Islands	55	40	6
<i>Total</i>	86	9	5	<i>Total</i>	61	21	18	<i>Total</i>	50	35	15

Source: Harris 2007.

Table 4  
Civics Courses Should Be Part of Standard School Curriculum, 2007  
(in percent)

Great Britain				Italy			
Region	Yes	No	Not Sure	Region	Yes	No	Not Sure
North	77	8	15	North	98	1	2
Midlands	68	16	16	Central	100	-	-
South	74	9	17	South	99	-	-
<i>Total</i>	<i>73</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>99</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>

Germany				France				Spain			
Region	Y	N	NS	Region	Y	N	NS	Region	Y	N	NS
North	93	2	6	Paris	83	9	8	N. West	83	12	4
Central	90	6	5	N. East	85	7	8	N. Central	89	6	4
South	85	10	5	N. West	84	5	10	N. East	89	7	4
East	94	5	2	Central	92	7	1	Central	82	14	4
West	90	6	4	S. East	86	7	7	C. Coast	82	12	5
				S. West	89	11	-	South	80	11	9
				Mediterranean	100	-	-	Islands	79	15	7
<i>Total</i>	<i>92</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>86</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>84</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>5</i>

Source: Harris 2007.



Table 5  
Different Communities Allowed to Abide by Different Laws, 2007 (in percent)

Great Britain			Italy		
Region	Agree	Disagree	Region	Agree	Disagree
North	38	50	North	49	38
Midlands	40	44	Central	48	38
South	32	54	South	23	52
<i>Total</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>49</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>42</i>

Germany			France			Spain		
Region	Agree	Dis.	Region	Agree	Dis.	Region	Agree	Dis.
North	37	31	Paris	34	48	N. West	39	38
Central	33	39	N. East	30	50	N. Central	23	58
South	31	29	N. West	22	52	N. East	44	40
East	33	40	Central	45	47	Central	34	49
West	36	36	S. East	44	48	C. Coast	29	43
			S. West	48	40	South	36	45
			Mediterranean	-	-	Islands	61	20
<i>Total</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>49</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>44</i>

Source: Harris 2007.

Table 6  
Anticipated Distribution of Group Policy Preferences

Issues	Support	Oppose
Mandatory Citizenship and Language Test	Nationalists Ethnonationalists	Immigrants
Mandatory Civics Courses	Nationalists Ethnonationalists	Immigrants Ethnonationalists
Different Communities/ Different Laws	Immigrants Ethnonationalists	Nationalists Ethnonationalists

Table 10  
 Foreigners in Autonomous Communities and Spain, 2005

<b>Community</b>	<b>% of Community Population</b>	<b>% Distribution in Country</b>	<b>Incidence*</b>
Andalucía	5.6	12.7	.56
Aragón	7.2	3.7	.72
Asturias	2.7	.82	.27
Islas Baleares	16.3	4.2	1.6
País Vasco	3.5	2.1	.35
Islas Canarias	11.5	5.2	1.2
Cantabria	3.8	.67	.38
Castilla-La Mancha	6.1	4.1	.61
Castilla y León	3.5	3.7	.35
Cataluña	11.3	21.7	1.1
Extremadura	1.9	0.9	.19
Galicia	2.6	1.9	.26
La Rioja	10.4	.98	1.0
Madrid	13.2	17.9	1.3
Murcia	12.5	4.7	1.3
Navarra	7.8	1.4	.78
Comunidad Valenciana	12.6	13.0	1.3
<i>Spain</i>	<i>10.0</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>1.0</i>

\* Represents the ratio between the numbers of foreigners/immigrants living in the region (percent of total regional population) to the total number of foreigners in the country (percent of the total national population).

*Sources:* Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica 2008: 23; and

Table 11  
Immigrants in Region and France, 2005

<b>Region</b>	<b>% of Regional Population</b>	<b>% Distribution in Country</b>	<b>Incidence</b>
Alsace	10.0	3.7	1.2
Aquitaine	5.8	3.6	.71
Auvergne	4.6	1.2	.57
Bourgogne	5.7	1.9	.70
Bretagne	2.2	1.4	.27
Centre	5.5	2.8	.68
Champagne-Ardenne	5.4	1.5	.67
Corse	9.1	0.5	1.1
Franche-Comté	6.5	1.5	.80
Ile-de-France	16.7	38.6	2.1
Languedoc-Roussillon	9.1	4.6	1.1
Limousin	4.6	0.7	.57
Lorraine	7.7	3.6	.95
Midi-Pyrénées	7.1	4.0	.88
Nord-Pas-de-Calais	4.5	3.6	.56
Basse-Normandie	2.4	0.7	.30
Haute-Normandie	4.0	1.5	.49
Pays de la Loire	2.6	1.7	.32
Picardie	4.7	1.8	.58
Poitou-Charentes	3.2	1.1	.40
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	9.6	9.2	1.2
Rhône-Alpes	9.0	10.8	1.1
<i>Metropolitan France</i>	<i>8.1</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>1.0</i>

Source:

<http://www.insee.fr/fr/ppp/bases-de-donnees/recensement/resultats/chiffres-cles/autres/donnees-socio-demo-etranagers-immigres.xls>

Table 12  
Immigrants and Descendents in Region and Denmark, 2007

<b>Region</b>	<b>% of Regional Population</b>	<b>% Distribution in Country</b>	<b>Incidence</b>
Copenhagen	14.0	47.9	1.6
Southern Denmark	7.2	18.0	.82
Central Jutland	6.9	17.8	.78
Zealand	6.2	10.5	.70
Northern Jutland	4.8	5.8	.55
<i>Denmark</i>	8.8	100	1.0

*Source:*

Table 13  
Foreign Born Population in Region and Britain, 2007

<b>Region</b>	<b>% of Regional Population</b>	<b>% Distribution in Country</b>	<b>Incidence</b>
England	8.0	94.3	1.1
Scotland	3.3	3.9	.44
Wales	2.7	1.8	.36
<i>Britain</i>	7.5	100	1.0

*Sources:*

Table 15  
 Identity Choice among EU Citizens, 1992-2004 (in percent)

<b>Identity</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2004</b>
Nationality Only	38	46	41	37
Nationality and European	48	40	45	48
European and Nationality	7	6	8	4
European Only	4	5	4	3
Don't Know/Other	3	3	2	8

*Source:* Eurobarometer 37; 44.2; 53; 62.

Table 16  
 Scottish Attitudes about Whether or Not Scotland Would Lose Its Identity if More  
 “Outsiders” Settle in the Region, 2006 (in percent)

	<b>Muslims</b>	<b>Blacks and Asians</b>	<b>East Europeans</b>
Agree strongly	14	11	11
Agree	35	35	34
Neither agree nor disagree	19	18	20
Disagree	27	31	30
Disagree strongly	4	4	4
Don't know	1	1	1

*Source:*

Table 17  
 Scottish Attitudes about Whether or Not “Outsiders” Take Jobs Away from Other  
 People in Scotland, 2006 (in percent)

	Ethnic Minorities		East Europeans
	2002	2006	2006
Agree strongly	5	7	7
Agree	15	20	24
Neither agree nor disagree	32	32	28
Disagree	34	30	28
Disagree strongly	9	7	8
Can't choose	4	2	2
Not answered	1	2	3

*Source:*

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Table 7  
French Ethnonational Political Parties' Views towards Europe and Immigration

<b>Party</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>General Views on Europe</b>	<b>Specific Views on Europe</b>	<b>Immigration</b>
<i>Union du Peuple Alsacien</i>	Alsace	Pro-Europe	Recognizes that Alsace is in the heart of Europe and has been enriched by its past relations with the continent.	
<i>Alsace d'Abord</i>	Alsace	Pro-Europe	Opposed to a "technocratic Europe" that embodies what it sees as the errors of centralized states, and favors the construction of a political Europe.  Opposes extending the right to vote to non-European citizens.  Opposes Turkey, an "Islamic power," joining the EU.	Opposed to the immigration of non-Europeans into Europe.
<i>Union Démocratique Bretonne</i>	Brittany, Pays de la Loire	Pro-Europe	Wants a "federal and interconnected" Europe.	
<i>Emgann</i>	Brittany, Pays de la Loire	Pro-Europe, but not in its current form	Wants a Europe that serves its people, not one composed of nation-states that serves the privileged.  Promotes a social Europe based on the federalism of the peoples that compose it.  Believes that Europe cannot benefit the people of Brittany until the region is free to act as it wants on the international scene.	
<i>Bloc Català</i>	Eastern Pyrenees	Pro-Europe	Wants to construct a stronger Catalonia within a European context, and promotes social democrat European policies.	
<i>Unitat Catalana</i>	Eastern Pyrenees	Pro-Europe	Since 1991 has been in favor of the construction of a Europe of solidarity.	
<i>Corsica Nazione</i>	Corsica	Pro-Europe	Wants Corsican independence in a European context.	Welcomes into Corsica anyone willing to learn the Corsican language and culture.
<i>Accolta Naziunale Corsa</i>	Corsica	Pro-Europe	Promotes a strategy of Corsican autodetermination in partnership with Europe.	Anyone who has lived in the country for ten years and shows a willingness to integrate into Corsican life is welcomed into the new electoral body.

<i>Partit Occitan</i>	Southern France	Pro-Europe	<p>Supports the construction of a federal Europe comprising different peoples and regions.</p> <p>Desires the recognition of the Occitan community by the European Union.</p> <p>Wants direct representation of the Occitan community in European institutions.</p>	
<i>Ligue Savoisienne</i>	Savoy	Pro-Europe	<p>Recognizes that Savoy is in the heart of Europe and has always been European.</p> <p>Believes that a stronger Europe does not exclude their right to a sovereign Savoy.</p>	<p>Recognizes the right of the Savoyards to decide, through referendum, questions concerning immigration, such as whether to give citizenship to the Savoy-born children of foreign parents.</p> <p>Believes annexation by France led to uncontrolled immigration into Savoy, with negative social consequences.</p>
<i>La Région Savoie, j'y crois!</i>	Savoy	Skeptical	<p>Remains wary of the European tendency towards supranationality.</p> <p>However, prefers a European regional equalization to a French one.</p>	

*Sources:* Union du Peuple Alsacien: <http://fers.elsass.free.fr>; Alsace d'Abord : <http://www.alsacedabord.org>; Union Démocratique Bretonne : <http://www.udb-bzh.net>; Emgann : <http://www.chez.com/emgann>; Bloc Català : <http://www.bloc-catala.com>; Unitat Catalana : <http://www.galeon.com/unitatcatalana>; Corsica Nazione : <http://www.corsica-nazione.com> ; Accolta Naziunale Corsa: <http://www.anc-corsica.com/index2.htm>; Partit Occitan : <http://partitoccitan.free.fr>; Ligue Savoisienne : <http://www.ligue.savoie.com>; La Région Savoie, j'y crois! : <http://www.regionsavoie.com>.



Table 8  
Belgium Ethnonational Political Parties' Views towards Europe and Immigration

<b>Party</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>General Views on Europe</b>	<b>Specific Views on Europe</b>	<b>Immigration</b>
<i>Lijst Dedecker</i>	Flanders	Pro-Europe, but critical	<p>Believes structural reforms of the European Union should be implemented before it is expanded further east.</p> <p>Against a Turkish membership of the EU.</p> <p>Promotes strong respect for the principle of subsidiarity.</p>	
<i>Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie</i>	Flanders	Pro-Europe	<p>Envisions an independent Flanders that participates fully in all European institutions as a member state of a democratic and confederate Europe.</p> <p>Supports European integration so long as the European Union respects the individuality and cultural identity of each of its member states.</p> <p>Wants Flanders to have a more visible presence in Europe.</p>	<p>Proposes integrating immigrants by teaching them the Flemish language and cultural traditions.</p> <p>Believes that being Flemish is not based on ethnicity, but on participation in the Flemish community and acceptance of the Flemish culture.</p> <p>Will only grant political asylum to those who are truly needy, according to the pertinent international agreements.</p> <p>Illegal immigration is condemned; however, legal immigration is permitted without regard to intellect or economic or social status.</p> <p>Favors general European immigration quotas and criteria, to facilitate entry into Europe.</p>
<i>Vlaams Belang</i>	Flanders	Critical	<p>Believes the European Union is too bureaucratic and involved in areas where the sovereignty of the people should prevail.</p> <p>Opposes the extension of the European Union beyond the geographical boundaries of Europe.</p> <p>Wants the EU to respect the right of self-determination of each of its member states.</p> <p>Supports a clear division of responsibilities and a</p>	<p>Supports preserving Flemish cultural identity, and opposed to multiculturalism.</p> <p>Foreigners expected to adapt to the Flemish culture, values and lifestyle, and to respect certain European principles such as the separation of church and state, democracy, free speech, and equality between the sexes.</p> <p>Proposes a citizenship test, to include the Dutch language and European values, for all non-EU members</p>

		<p>separation of power between the Union and its members.</p> <p>Considers Europe a poorly functioning and cumbersome bureaucracy, and out of touch with its citizens. Does not believe that the growing transfer of power to Brussels leads to more efficiency.</p> <p>Besides the Euro currency, does not know what the value of Europe really is.</p> <p>Rejects a European superstate and favors instead a confederal grouping of sovereign states that can leave the EU at any time.</p> <p>Believes only European countries should be allowed to join the Union, and rejects Turkish EU membership because Turkey is not a European country.</p> <p>Proposes limiting the power of the European Commission, and wants the Council of Ministers to be more open in their decision-making process. Supports the veto right of member states.</p> <p>Opposes a European citizenship and a European constitution.</p> <p>Considers the establishment of European institutions in Brussels a disaster for the livability of the city and a threat to Flemish identity, and wants a wider distribution of European institutions in more cities.</p> <p>Advocates creating a European defense force, and close cooperation between the EU member states in matters relating to security.</p> <p>Believes a strong Europe is the best defense against international terrorism.</p>	<p>who want to settle permanently in Flanders.</p> <p>Believes illegal immigrants should be repatriated, and reserves the right to vote for citizens.</p> <p>Opposes a Flemish immigration policy that attracts immigrants.</p> <p>However, supports immigration.</p> <p>The slow institutionalization of Islam must be undone, and in certain situations Islamic headscarves must be prohibited.</p> <p>The system of family reunification has gotten completely out of hand, and it was a mistake for the government to regularize tens of thousands of illegal immigrants.</p>
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<i>Vlaams Progressieven</i>	Flanders	Pro-Europe, but critical	<p>Considers Europe to be the first political defense against the alienation created by globalization.</p> <p>Believes in a Europe that respects the rights of its regions and the identity of each nation.</p> <p>Favors a Europe with a senate of the regions, and a government based on a political majority and constitutional pluralism.</p> <p>Promotes respect for the principle of subsidiarity.</p> <p>Proposes a European defense force to replace national armies. The force should be modern, efficient, and quickly deployable, and focus on conflict prevention and management.</p> <p>Supports creation of a European group to promote renewable energy.</p> <p>Advocates the enlargement of the EU to include the states created from the former Yugoslavia.</p> <p>Opposes Turkish membership in EU because it does not satisfy the conditions of the Copenhagen treaty.</p>	<p>Supports economic migration to Europe through quotas, in partnership with the countries of origin, so as not to create a brain drain.</p>
<i>VLOTT</i>	Flanders	Pro-Europe, but wary.	<p>In favor of the European Union as long as it is not overbearing and permits the free market to run its course.</p> <p>Against the accession of Turkey into the Union, because it believes the country does not hold European standards and values.</p>	<p>Believes in open-mindedness and condemns intolerance.</p> <p>Expects immigrants to respect the region's cultural ideals and add value to the society in exchange for seeking a new life in the area.</p>

Sources: Lijst Dedecker: <http://www2.lijstdedecker.com>; Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie: <http://www.n-va.be>; Vlaams Belang: <http://www.vlaamsbelang.be>; Vlaams Progressieven: <http://www.vlaamsprogressieven.be>; VLOTT: <http://www.vlott.be>; Google Translate: <http://translate.google.com>; Yahoo! Babel Fish: <http://babelfish.yahoo.com>

Table 9  
British Ethnonational Parties' Views towards Europe and Immigration

Party	Region	General Views on Europe	Specific Views on Europe	Immigration
<i>Scottish National Party</i>	Scotland	Pro-Europe, but critical	<p>Believes that having a stronger voice in European affairs would be one of the greatest benefits of Scottish independence.</p> <p>Promotes European Union as a “confederation of sovereign states,” and recognizes the right of nations to protect their sovereignty.</p> <p>Opposed to “unnecessary centralization”.</p> <p>Critical of Europe’s handling of Scottish fisheries and wants their control to be handed back to Scotland.</p> <p>Promotes a common European security policy to support peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.</p> <p>Believes the euro would be more beneficial to Scotland than the pound.</p> <p>Recognizes EU membership has greatly benefitted the economies of small nations such as Finland, and believes Scotland could reap these same benefits as an independent EU member.</p> <p>Believes that all EU member states should meet their commitments to international development aid, which few are currently doing.</p>	
<i>Plaid Cymru</i>	Wales	Pro-Europe, but critical	<p>Wants full European Union membership for Wales.</p> <p>Supports creating a more democratic EU through a written constitution and a Charter of Fundamental Rights incorporated into the Treaty.</p>	<p>Considers every person living in Wales, no matter what, a Welsh citizen, and invites everyone to commit to building a better Wales.</p> <p>Believes that every asylum seeker and refugee should be treated according to the United Nations Refugee Charter.</p>

			Wants the decision-making process of the Council of Ministers to become more “accountable and transparent”.  Advocates strengthening the powers of the European Parliament.	
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*Sources:* Scottish National Party: <http://snp.org>; Plaid Cymru: <http://plaidcymru.org>

Table 14.  
Positions of Select Extreme Right Parties on Key Issues of European Cooperation and Integration, 2002

Country	Party	Borders	Turkey	Democratic Deficit	EU in General
Austria	Freedom Party (FPÖ)			The decision making process of the EU should be more transparent. Any kind of "Franco-German directorate@ hi-jacking the European project to the disadvantage of small states should be opposed.	A confederation rather than a European federal state. European cooperation must respect principle of subsidiarity.
	National Democratic Party (NPÖ)	Amend Schengen so foreign criminals and illegal immigrants can be rejected at Austrian borders. Austria should withdraw from Schengen if not amended.		EU for driven by the political elites and capital interests in the absence of democratic debate or discussion.	A community of free European states which preserves national cultural identity and independence.
Belgium	Front Nouveau de Belgique (FNB)	Immigration the primary threat to European demography. Resuming national border controls would increase birthrates.	Opposes Turkey=s membership in EU.		Supports the idea of Europe as a space for democracy and peace and as a geopolitical counterweight to other large powers and as an economic power. EU has become a "technocratic monster" and a Servant to the United States.
	Vlaams Blok (VB)	Free movement of persons across national borders allows escape routes for criminals and diminishes capacity for immigration control.	Opposes Turkey's membership in EU.		An independent Flanders would remain within the EU. The EU should be a confederation (a "Europe of Ethnic Communities" whose members cooperate on economic matters, the fight against international crime, defense, foreign policy and other matters of common interest.
France	National Front (FN)	The control of the entry into the territory of a State is responsibility of the State. The treaty of Amsterdam should be repealed and France should have fully control its national borders.			France must leave the EU. Inter-govern mental cooperation (but not "mondialism") is desirable without the bureaucracy and institutions of the EU – i.e., it could support a "Europe of homelands."
	National Republican Movement (MNR)	Internal borders should be restored for the safety of the member states, to control immigration, and to maintain national preferences.	Opposes Turkey's membership in EU.		Opposed to the EU as it has evolved since Maastricht. Proposes instead a "Europe of nations", guided by subsidiarity, in which popular and national sovereignty are retained to defend national interests and identity. Cooperation (not integration) is sought, borders are protected enforced.
Germany	German People's Union (DVU)				Opposes the EU mainly on nationalist grounds. Though the party claims to support cooperation between European countries, it does not want this to be at the cost of diminished national sovereignty.

	<b>National Democrats (NPD)</b>	Schengen should be amended so that foreign criminals and illegal immigrants can be rejected at German borders as a temporary solution until Germany withdraws from the agreement.			Advocates a confederation of states (as opposed to a federal state) in which European institutions protect cultural traditions of Europe and its creative achievements and maintains nation states as the protector of nationality.
	<b>Republican Party (REP)</b>	Border controls should be reinforced rather than dismantled.	Opposes Turkey's membership in EU.	Issues of further European integration should be put to a referendum.	Supports the organization of Europe as a confederation of states, not as a federal state, that allows for the retention of national sovereignty and respects the principle of subsidiarity. Rejects the EU as it has evolved since Maastricht.
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>Livable Netherlands (LN)</b>			Citizens should be consulted directly by referendum on important European questions that directly affect them.	Supports the EU in decisions that cannot be made adequately by the member states (European defense, fighting crime, alien policy etc.). But "Brussels" is seen to interfere increasingly with citizens' daily lives.
	<b>Pim Fortuyn List (LPF)</b>				Generally supportive of the EU.

*Sources:*