

# Muslims and Multicultural Nationalism in Scotland<sup>1</sup>

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After a Scottish Parliament Election (2007) that, for the first time, put the SNP into office if not into power (the party holds only 47 of the 129 seats), it is tempting to suppose that the 2007 election result indicates a ‘Rise of Nationalism’ in Scotland. Alas, the evidence does not support that interpretation.

Much of the evidence suggests that Scots have indeed become somewhat more Nationalist and less Unionist since the 1960s – but more so in terms of voting than in anything else. It has got easier to vote Nationalist and more difficult to vote Unionist – in part because the meanings of both Nationalism and Unionism, as defined by the parties, have changed. So even if there had been no change at all in public opinion, there would probably have been a significant change in public behaviour.

The option of a Nationalist vote became more available as the SNP contested more seats and more credible in the context of a Scottish Parliament and a new proportional election system. But most importantly, a Nationalist vote became less frightening as the SNP adopted a much more moderate and inclusive definition of Nationalism. In policy and rhetoric, Nationalists have become very much less nationalist than they were in the 1960s.

The evidence suggests that the apparent ‘Rise of Nationalism’ in Scottish elections owes more to institutional changes and to the SNP’s moderate, internationalist and inclusive redefinition of Nationalism than to rising nationalist sentiment amongst the public.

We can summarise the change in sentiment amongst the public since the 1960s as follows:

- a) Their broad political culture and values remain almost indistinguishable from those in England.
- b) Their support for a Scottish Parliament – always strong – was more for devolution than independence, it increased only modestly, and it is now past its peak.
- c) Their identification with Scotland – always strong – also increased only modestly, and it is also past its peak.
- d) The greatest change has been in voting, rather than constitutional preferences, broad political values, or national identities; none of these potential causes of voting change has changed as dramatically as voting itself; behaviour has changed more than opinion.

At the same time Nationalism has been redefined since the 1960s (see Miller, 2008, for an extended argument about the redefinition of both Unionism and Nationalism in Scotland since the 1960s). We can summarise the changing nature of Nationalism as follows:

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- a) The concept of independence has been redefined. In the 1960s the SNP favoured complete independence: outside the UK and outside the EU. But after a fierce battle between rival factions within the party – which briefly included the expulsion of current leader Alex Salmond – the party now supports his oxymoronic principle of ‘independence within’ – albeit ‘independence within the EU’ rather than the Labour Party policy defined by the late Donald Dewar as ‘independence within the UK’ (otherwise known as ‘Devolution’).
- b) Second, and equally important, the concept of the nation has been redefined. The SNP has travelled all the way from a Nationalism that stressed history, people and heritage, to a new Nationalism that now stresses; the future rather than the past; the land rather than the people; and multiculturalism rather than heritage.

It is a very long way to travel. Murray Leith who has recently completed a comprehensive statistical study of the changing content of SNP manifestos over the last 35 years, has reached the conclusion that recent SNP manifestos are now only ‘half as Nationalist’ (Leith 2006: Chapter 3, section 7) as they were three decades ago. The anti-English tone of earlier manifestoes was eventually replaced by a less ethnic and more political attack on the Conservative Party for being anti-Scottish. The English themselves are no longer attacked as they had been in the 1970s (e.g. for taking student places at Scottish Universities) and negative statements about England or Anglicisation have ‘almost disappeared’. Coded phrases like ‘new Scots’, ‘new Scotland’, even the more explicit ‘multicultural society’ have crept in. (Leith 2006: Chapter 6). And words have been followed by deeds: the first Asian ever to sit in the Scottish Parliament was elected from the SNP list in 2007.

And yet, the genuinely inclusive, multicultural nationalism of SNP leader Alex Salmond may not reach down to grass-roots party members – still less to the street. Devolution was undeniably a move in a nationalist direction, even if it was intended to inoculate Scots against more extreme nationalism. Indeed, opponents had long argued that it was a step onto a ‘slippery slope’ that would encourage rather than discourage nationalism. In an increasingly self-conscious post-devolution Scotland, English immigrants might feel ill-at-ease – like the Protestants in the Irish Republic after partition (Fedorowich, 1999), or the ethnic Russians in post-Soviet Central Asia or the Baltic states (Sendich and Payin, 1994; Brubaker, 1996, 148-178) – an unwelcome ‘post-imperial’ minority.

During the 1990s SNG (Sìol Nan Gaidheal – ‘Seed of the Gael’) pledged to ‘unstintingly campaign against English imperialism’ and spawned both ‘Scottish Watch’ and the more clearly titled ‘Settler Watch’ to ‘expose and oppose’ English ‘incomers’. (Hearn, 2000, pp.65-70) And an increasingly self-conscious Scotland, increasingly focused on its own history, culture and traditions might regard other minorities as even more culturally alien than the ‘auld enemy’ – especially Muslims after ‘9/11’.

At the top, both advocates of devolution and the more independence-minded nationalists consistently proclaimed their commitment to a non-ethnic, inclusive, ‘civic’ concept of nationalism. (Henderson, 1999: 138) Labour ‘First Minister’ Jack McConnell declared Scotland needed more immigrants, asylum seekers and ethnic minorities. (McConnell, 2003) And leading nationalists have not so far attempted to increase their support by attacking minorities. When John Swinney was SNP leader he accused Labour of ‘racism’ in its ill-treatment of Muslim asylum seekers (*Herald* 8 Sept 2003), repeatedly describing it as a ‘national shame’ (*Herald* 12 Sept 2003) or a ‘national disgrace’ (*Herald* 10 Oct 2003) – despite the fact that the 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes survey showed that a large majority of Scots were in favour of detaining asylum-seekers : 62 percent in the SSAS agreed that ‘asylum seekers should be kept in detention centres while their cases were being considered’

and only 26 percent disagreed. There was no short-term political advantage in Swinney's accusation – though such statements helped to define the SNP as a civic rather than an ethnic nationalist party and in the longer-term that may help the party retain its position in the mainstream of Scottish politics rather than slipping to the extremist fringe.

That inclusive approach extended to the English as well. Current SNP leader Alex Salmond, for example, has regularly claimed to be an 'anglophile'. (Try entering 'Alex Salmond' and 'anglophile' into Google!) To take just one from his many public statements: 'I have often pronounced myself one of the most anglophile of all Scottish Members... We present our case for Scotland in a positive way. We do not spend our time being antagonistic about other nations.' (Salmond, 1997)

Kellas (1998: 65) distinguishes between 'ethnic' nationalism which he describes as 'in essence exclusive', stressing the ethnic group and common descent, and the civic nationalism of those such as Swinney and Salmond, which, he says, claims to be 'inclusive in the sense that anyone can adopt the culture and join the nation'. That distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism has been drawn so often that it has become 'almost a cliché in the literature' (Kymlicka, 2001: 243), often equated with Gellner's (1994: 99) simple but evocative distinction between 'benign' and 'nasty' nationalism.

Yet there are problems with the apparently simple civic-versus-ethnic distinction.

First, minorities may be either unwilling or even unable to 'adopt the culture' or 'join the nation'. Our own research suggests that the Muslim minority in Scotland is unwilling to adopt the culture (though willing to join the nation) while English immigrants in Scotland are psychologically unable to join the nation (though willing to adopt the culture).

Second, civic nationalism can easily degenerate into ethnic nationalism. For Gellner (1994, pp.1-2) 'nationalist sentiment' is at root a 'feeling of anger'; for Breuilly (1993, pp.5-7), although nationalism can be asserted in a 'universalist [i.e. civic] spirit' it has 'not often been so sweetly reasonable'. For Vincent (1997, p.294): 'nationalism will always resist being assimilated into liberalism...and easily collapses into...shallow expressions of blood, soil and xenophobia'; for Pulzer (1988, p.287; see also Porter, 2000) 'nationalism degenerates... often inspired in its first stage by the urge to emancipate, it finds its logical conclusion in a paroxysm of destructiveness'.

Third, and perhaps the greatest problem – so very easy to overlook but so very difficult to resolve – is that liberal notions of tolerance and equality, while welcome, may be grossly insufficient: 'one might enjoy all the rights of citizenship and be a formally equal member of the community, and yet feel an outsider who does not belong.' (Parekh, 2000: 237) Minorities seek acceptance, reassurance, respect, admiration and warmth not simply cold, liberal, equal justice.

Part of the problem is the significance of 'political symbols, images, ceremonies, collective self-understanding and views of national identity' (Parekh, 2000: 203; see also Modood and Werbner, 1997: 263) for that feeling of warmth, acceptance and belonging. An increasing emphasis on Scottish history, enthusiasm for films like 'Braveheart' (Edensor, 1997: 147), claims that the Scottish Parliament is not a new but an old parliament that merely 'adjourned on 25 March 1707' and now is 'reconvened' (*Scottish Parliament Debate*, 1999: vol.1:col.5), or even John Swinney's own call to use Scotland's 'Patron Saint' to promote the new Scotland (*Scotsman*, 19 Nov 2002), are necessarily exclusionist for those whose ethnic culture and identity makes it impossible for them to identify with historic Scotland – as distinct from contemporary Scotland.

Furthermore, even if political elites take greater care to ensure that political symbols are inclusive, and successfully avoid unfortunate lapses such as over-enthusiasm for Christian Saints or for military victories over the English, minorities can be made ‘to feel outsiders who do not belong’ by the way they are treated by ordinary people in everyday life. If minorities feel they are regarded by the general public as a burden on the country’s resources, as social untouchables, or as a disloyal element they are likely to feel excluded. Street-level prejudice can be just as alienating as elite-level discrimination.

This paper investigates street-level prejudice towards two key minorities in post-devolution Scotland: (1) Muslims and (2) English immigrants. It aims to show how far the inclusive civic nationalism of Scottish political elites reaches down to the street, how well it can cope with minorities that cannot or will not ‘adopt the culture’ or ‘join the nation’, and whether it extends equally to both of these two significant minorities.

These minorities constitute the largest ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ minorities in post-devolution Scotland. According to the 2001 Scottish Census, English immigrants constitute eight percent of Scotland’s population, rising to 12 percent across the whole of the capital city, Edinburgh; and to 18 percent across all of rural/small-town southern Scotland. By contrast (self-defined) ethnic Pakistanis, (overwhelmingly, by self-description, Muslims) constitute just over one percent of Scotland’s population but they are more ‘visible’ – by dress code as well as skin-colour. (Though English immigrants are more ‘audible’ because they, unlike the Pakistanis, do not speak with a Scottish accent!) Pakistani visibility is enhanced by their concentration in the cities, especially Glasgow and by generally increasing awareness of Muslim minorities since ‘9/11’ and the invasion of Iraq. Our own research shows that their primary identification is ‘Muslim’ rather than any territorial identity – Scottish, British, or even Pakistani.

For direct measurements of Islamophobia and Anglophobia amongst ‘ordinary’ or ‘majority’ Scots, we need to focus on something less than the entire population resident in Scotland. In particular, it would be absurd to include English immigrants themselves in any calculation of Anglophobia. They are so numerous as well as so distinctive that including English immigrants and their partners – together about 12 percent of the resident population – would grossly underestimate Anglophobia. So to measure Islamophobia and Anglophobia in Scotland we focus on the attitudes of ‘majority Scots’ – defined to exclude Muslims (only one percent of the population), English immigrants (eight percent), and those whose partners are English immigrants (another four percent). Just 1158 of the 1508 respondents in the 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes survey sample fit this tight definition of ‘majority Scots’.

The difference between ‘majority Scots’ and the population of Scotland (including English immigrants and their partners) is evident from a tabulation of ‘Moreno identities’ – that is whether they feel more Scottish or more British.

	‘Majority Scots’	Others in Scotland	All those in Scotland
	%	%	%
Scottish, not British	36	15	31
More Scottish than British	38	17	34
Equally Scottish and British	21	24	22
More British than Scottish	2	11	4
British, not Scottish	1	13	4
Other identity	1	14	4
None of these	*	5	1
Sample size (unwtd)	1158	350	1508

It should be unnecessary to point out that our analytic procedure is a methodological requirement only, driven by the need for clarity. We do not ourselves equate ‘majority Scots’ with ‘real Scots’ or ‘true Scots’ for example – though many ‘majority Scots’ do make that equation, recognising only people ‘like themselves’ as being ‘truly’ Scottish.

## Equality

‘Majority Scots’ are overwhelmingly committed to the liberal concept of ethnic equality – for English immigrants as well as Muslims. About 80 percent supported the extension of anti-discrimination laws from race and gender to apply to both religion and sub-UK origin – specifically to cover discrimination against Muslims or against English immigrants.

Majority Scots are not opposed to having both Muslim and English immigrant MSPs in the Scottish Parliament but not enthusiastic either. Over half do not think it matters – a view that is similar to that held by English immigrants themselves but is certainly not held by Muslims. Those majority Scots who do have a view divide in favour of having some Muslim MSPs by over two to one but are evenly divided about English immigrant MSPs. (At the time of the survey, there were in fact a disproportionately large number of English immigrant MSPs in the Scottish Parliament, but at that time no Muslims.)

**Table 2: Majority Scots views on anti-discrimination laws**

	Views of ‘majority Scots’	
	about Muslims	about English immigrants
	%	%
Should there be a law against Anti-Muslim/ Anti-English discrimination		
definitely should	65	64
probably should	16	15
probably should not	8	9
definitely should not	6	8
Should there be Muslim / English-born MSPs		
should be	31	22
does not matter either way	52	57
should not	14	19
Sample size (unwtd)	1158	1158

We should be concerned however with something that goes beyond liberal equalities – with recognition and respect rather than rejection and suspicion, and with warmth and acceptance rather than cold justice.

## Recognition

There are some reasons to expect that Anglophobia amongst ‘majority Scots’ might be less extensive or less virulent than Islamophobia. Muslims are not cut off from the Scottish majority but they are somewhat less closely connected by ties of friendship and far less by ties of family. Since English immigrants are far more numerous than Muslims or Pakistanis in Scotland – roughly ten times as numerous according to the 2001 Census – that alone might explain why most ‘majority Scots’ know someone who is English but only half know a Muslim.

But while twice as many ‘know’ an English person as ‘know’ a Muslim, four times as many have an English ‘friend’ as a Pakistani friend, and twenty times as many have English family connections. A remarkable 40 percent of ‘majority Scots’ (who by our strict definition

exclude those with English immigrant partners) have an English relative while only two percent have a Pakistani relative. (Amongst all those born and resident in Scotland 44 percent have either an English partner or other English relatives.)

**Table 3: Majority Scots' knowledge of minorities**

	about Muslims	about English immigrants
	%	%
know someone who is Muslim/English	49	93
Muslim/English partner	*	2
Muslim/English in family	2	40
Muslim/English friend	15	60
know someone else who is Muslim/English	32	38
know 'not very much / nothing at all' about Muslims in Scotland	86	na
Sample size (unwtd)	1158	1158

Note: Those with English immigrant partners are excluded by definition from 'majority Scots' though a few described their partner as 'English' nonetheless. Only two out of 1158 described their partner as Muslim.

But while friendship and family might tie majority Scots more closely to the English than to Muslims, their perceptions of what it takes to be a 'true Scot' tie them more closely to Scottish Muslims than to English immigrants. The criteria used to determine whether someone else is a 'true Brit' or a 'true Scot' vary from person to person, but amongst those most frequently cited are birthplace, parentage and race (McCrone et al, 1998; Paterson et al, 2001: 117-9). Majority Scots stress the importance of birthplace: 57 percent feel that to be 'truly Scottish' it is essential to be born in Scotland and only 33 percent disagree. But they put little weight on race: only 16 percent feel it is essential to be white and 69 percent disagree. Although neither ethnic Pakistanis nor English immigrants are mentioned explicitly in these questions, Pakistanis are not 'white' and English immigrants are by definition not Scottish by birth (although almost half the Pakistanis are). Since Scots put so much more stress on birthplace than on skin-colour, it follows that majority Scots could more easily recognise ethnic Pakistanis as Scots than recognise English immigrants as Scots – and we have no reason to think majority Scots would object to that inference from their answers. It was clearly implicit in these by now familiar questions. (See also Rosie and Bond, 2006, for the importance of accent which would also make it easier for Scots to recognise ethnic Pakistanis than English immigrants as truly Scottish.)

Failure to qualify as a 'true Scot' has implications in the eyes of at least some majority Scots. SNP policy is to give full citizenship and a Scottish passport to all who live in Scotland on the day of independence. But 29 percent of majority Scots would deny 'a Scottish passport and full Scottish citizenship' to those they felt were not 'truly Scottish'.

**Table 4: Majority Scots' view of what it takes to be 'truly Scottish'**

	%
To be truly Scottish it is necessary to be <u>born in Scotland</u> ...	
Agree strongly	15
Agree	42
Disagree	27
Disagree strongly	5
To be truly Scottish it is necessary to be <u>white</u> ...	
Agree strongly	4
Agree	12
Disagree	50
Disagree strongly	19
Only 'true Scots' should get a <u>Scottish passport and full Scottish citizenship</u>	29

Sample size (unwtd) 1158

Even cultural similarity might not count in favour of the English. We asked on a seven point scale whether it was ‘better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs, religions and traditions’ or ‘better for a country if there is a variety of different customs, religions and traditions’. Majority Scots come down overwhelmingly on the side of cultural diversity. Indeed, the most popular choice is the most extreme point at the ‘variety’ end of the scale and on balance 66 percent opted for cultural variety against only 16 percent for uniformity.

Table 5: Majority Scots' view of cultural variety

	%
better for the country to share the same customs, religions and traditions	6
	5
	5
(mid-point)	16
	19
	21
better for the country for there to be a variety of customs, religions and traditions	26
Sample size (unwtd)	1158

## Measuring and comparing phobias

We can measure the extent of street-level phobias by using five strictly comparable indicators of Islamophobia and Anglophobia. Since the wording of these questions is critical, we reproduce it in detail. We began:

People from lots of different backgrounds live in Scotland. I would now like to ask you some questions about two of these groups – English people and Muslims. By Muslims I mean people who follow the Islamic faith, many of whom in Scotland are Pakistani.

To measure Islamophobia we then asked respondents to place themselves on various five or seven-point scales:

M1 (Economic resentment): Muslims who come to live in Scotland (1) take jobs, housing and healthcare from other people in Scotland or (7) contribute a lot in terms of hard work & much needed skills (7-point numerical scale)

M2 (Nationalist distrust): Muslims in Scotland (1) are really committed to Scotland or (7) could never be really committed to Scotland (7-point numerical scale)

M3 (Nationalist distrust): How much do you agree or disagree: Scottish Muslims are more loyal to other Muslims around the world than they are to other people in this country. (5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree)

M4 (Fears for national identity): How much do you agree or disagree: Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came to live in Scotland. (5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree)

M5 (Social exclusion): How would you feel if a close relative of yours married or formed a long-term relationship with a Muslim? (5-point scale from very happy to very unhappy)

Interleaved between these questions were corresponding questions (E1 to E5) about English immigrants, generally substituting ‘English people’ for ‘Muslims’; in the third question substituting ‘loyal to England’ for ‘loyal to other Muslims around the world’; and in the fifth ‘...with an English person now living in Scotland’. While the question wording never uses the brief and accurate but unfamiliar phrase ‘English immigrants’, it always uses a longer

phrase to focus on English immigrants rather than the English in England. That is particularly important in E5 which emphasises forming a relationship in Scotland albeit with an English person – in order to focus on the relationship rather than on the prospect of the relative moving far away.

With these wording adjustments, the five questions provide a comparative index of Islamophobia and Anglophobia. Islamophobia or Anglophobia is indicated by feeling on balance that Muslims/English ‘take jobs, housing and health care from other people’, that they ‘could never be really committed to Britain/Scotland’, that they ‘are more loyal to other Muslims around the world/England’ than they are to ‘this country’, that ‘Scotland would begin to lose its identity’ if more came to live in Scotland, and that they would ‘feel unhappy if a close relative married or formed a long-term relationship with a Muslim/English person now living in Scotland’.

In addition we have one indicator that applies specifically to Muslims after ‘9/11’ and is not generalisable to other anti-minority phobias:

M6 (Condemnation of terrorism): How much do you agree or disagree: Muslims living in Britain have done a great deal to condemn Islamic terrorism. (5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree)

The Islamophobic side of the question in M6 is of course disagreement.

**Economic resentment:** Relatively few majority Scots actually express economic resentment of minorities taking jobs, housing and health care. Only 21 percent take a negative view of Muslims, and 13 percent a negative view of English immigrants. By contrast 50 percent take a clearly positive view of Muslims, and 60 percent a clearly positive view of English immigrants. So economic resentment is generally low, but it is particularly low with regard to English immigrants.

**Table 6: Economic resentment**

	Views of ‘majority Scots’	
	about Muslims	about English immigrants
	%	%
Muslims/ English immigrants...		
...take jobs, housing, health care	8	3
	4	3
	9	7
(mid-point)	24	23
	25	29
	16	21
...contribute a lot in terms of hard work and skills	9	10
Sample size (unwtd)	1158	1158

**Commitment and loyalty:** More doubt the minorities’ commitment to Scotland: 34 percent take a negative view of Muslims’ commitment to Scotland, and 30 percent a negative view of English immigrants’ commitment. By contrast only 30 percent take a clearly positive view of Muslims and 38 percent a clearly positive view of English immigrants’ commitment. So on balance majority Scots have a marginally positive view of English immigrants’ commitment



and a marginally negative view of Muslims' commitment. They also take a marginally – but no more than marginally – negative view of British Muslims' in regard to condemning Islamic terrorism.

Most of all however, majority Scots suspect that the minorities' primary loyalties lie outside Scotland – with 'other Muslims around the world' or with 'England': four times as many majority Scots take a negative view of the minorities loyalty to Scotland as take a positive view. And by any measure majority Scots doubt the loyalty of English immigrants more than they doubt they loyalty of Muslims.

**Table 7: Commitment and loyalty**

		Views of 'majority Scots'	
		about Muslims	about English immigrants
		%	%
Muslims/ English immigrants ...			
	...are really committed to Scotland	4	6
		11	16
		15	16
	(mid-point)	26	28
		15	14
		8	8
	...could never be really committed to Scotland	11	8
Muslims living in Britain have done a great deal to condemn Islamic terrorism			
	Agree strongly	3	
	Agree	23	
	Disagree	25	
	Disagree strongly	7	
Muslims / English more loyal to other Muslims / to England than to Scotland			
	Agree strongly	10	11
	Agree	33	51
	Disagree	11	14
	Disagree strongly	*	*
	Sample size (unwtd)	1158	1158

**Fears for national identity:** Majority Scots are apprehensive that 'Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more English /Muslim people came to live in Scotland'. But despite the huge imbalance in the numbers of English immigrants and Muslims already living in Scotland, majority Scots are rather less apprehensive about the impact on Scotland's national identity of a further influx of English immigrants than they are about an increase in the number of Muslim: 42 percent take a negative view of Muslims coming to Scotland, and 34 percent a negative view of more English immigrants. By contrast 37 percent take a positive view of Muslims coming to Scotland, and 46 percent a positive view of more English immigrants. So on balance majority Scots have a moderately positive view of further English immigration and a marginally negative view towards more Muslims coming to Scotland.

**Table 8: Fears for national identity**

		Views of 'majority Scots'	
		about Muslims	about English immigrants
		%	%
Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims / English people came to live in Scotland			
	Agree strongly	11	7
	Agree	31	27

Disagree	33	41
Disagree strongly	4	5
Sample size (unwtd)	1158	1158

**Social exclusion:** There is scant evidence of support for social exclusion in the workplace: only a mere four percent say they would be unhappy to work beside ‘a suitably qualified person from a different racial or ethnic background’. And 29 percent say they would not just be ‘happy’ but actually ‘very happy’ to do so.

**Table 9: Social exclusion – in the workplace**

		Views of ‘majority Scots’ about Muslims	
		%	
Happy or unhappy to work beside a suitably qualified person from a different racial or ethnic background?			
	Very happy	29	
	Happy	45	
	Unhappy	3	
	Very unhappy	1	
	Sample size (unwtd)	1158	

But there is much more evidence of social exclusion in regard to relationships with Muslims. Most Scots doubt the loyalty of English immigrants to Scotland and many regard them as a threat to Scotland’s own national identity. But social exclusion is not part of Anglophobia, nor indeed of sectarianism in Scotland. A mere three percent of majority Scots say they would be at all ‘unhappy’ to have a close relative form a long-term relationship with an English immigrant. That compares closely with the current state of the classic sectarian divide in Scotland: three percent of Catholics would be unhappy about acquiring a Protestant relative; and five percent of those brought up in the Church of Scotland would be unhappy about acquiring about a Catholic relative.

**Table 10: Social exclusion – in relationships**

	about Muslims	Views of ‘majority Scots’ about English			
		about English immigrants	about Catholics	about Protestants	
	%	%	%	%	
If close relative formed long-term relationship with Catholic / Protestant / Muslim / English person now living in Scotland, would feel...					
	Very happy	17	23	30	31
	Happy	28	43	35	38
	Unhappy	15	2	3	1
	Very unhappy	7	1	1	*
	Sample size (unwtd)	1158	1158	1158	1158

All of that contrasts sharply with attitudes towards relationships with Muslims: 22 percent of majority Scots would be ‘unhappy’ if a ‘close relative’ married or formed a long-term relationship with a Muslim. The degree of social exclusion should not be overstated however: 45 percent said they would be at least happy to acquire a Muslim relative, 17 percent of them ‘very happy’.

### Perceptions of conflict

Large numbers of majority Scots regard conflicts between Scots and English, Muslims and non-Muslims, or Protestants and Catholics as at least ‘fairly serious’. But by any measure,

they rate conflict with the English as far less serious than the sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants.

They are less clear in their assessment of the conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in Scotland however. Relatively few rate Muslim/non-Muslim conflict as 'very serious' but there are a significant number who simply 'do not know'. Overall they rate Muslim/non-Muslim conflict in Scotland as only marginally more serious than Catholic/Protestant conflict in Scotland.

On the other hand majority Scots are very clear that Muslim/non-Muslim conflict in England is much more serious than in Scotland; and that Muslim/non-Muslim conflict 'around the world' is far more serious still than in England. The numbers of majority Scots who rate Muslim/non-Muslim as 'very serious' rise from a mere three percent with regard to conflict within Scotland, to 12 percent with regard to conflict within England and to 28 percent with regard to conflict within the rest of the world.

Conversely the numbers who rate Muslim/non-Muslim conflict as 'not very serious' or non-existent rise decline from 50 percent with regard to conflict within Scotland, to 22 percent with regard to conflict within England, and to a mere 13 percent with regard to conflict within the rest of the world.

**Table 11: Majority Scots' perceptions of inter-ethnic conflicts**

	Between Protestants and Catholics in Scotland – apart from football and sport	Scots and the English – apart from football and sport	Between Muslims and non-Muslims		
	(excl sport)	(excl sport)	...in Scotland	...in England	...around the world
	%	%	%	%	%
Very serious	10	5	3	12	28
Fairly serious	31	20	32	43	44
Not very serious	51	66	46	21	12
No conflict	8	8	4	1	1
DK	1	1	15	22	15
Sample size (unwtd)	1158	1158	1158	1158	1158

Perceptions of conflict are not quite the same as phobias though they may be closely related either as cause or effect. But this pattern of perceptions of conflict would at least be consistent with greater Islamophobia than Anglophobia within Scotland, and with greater Islamophobia in England than in Scotland.

### Overall indices of Islamophobia and Anglophobia

Overall indices of Islamophobia and Anglophobia are crude but useful measures for comparing the two phobias, and for simplifying our discussion of how they vary across different social and political groups amongst majority Scots. To construct these summary indices we use the five fully comparable questions M1-5 and E1-5. For each question, we exclude those with no opinion or with neutral opinions and calculate the percentage who take the Islamo/Anglophobic side as a percentage of the total who take one side or the other.

That provides very simple, easily interpretable and fully comparable measures of the two phobias:

Index of Islamophobia = the average across the five questions, of the percentages who hold negative rather than positive views of Muslims

Index of Anglophobia = the average across the five questions, of the percentages who hold negative rather than positive views of English immigrant

Table 12: Comparative indices of majority Scots' Islamophobia and Anglophobia

	Of majority Scots with clear positive or negative views		Diff:
	% Islamophobic	% Anglophobic	I - A
(Economic resentment) take jobs etc from Scots	30	18	+12
(Nationalist distrust) never really committed to Scotland	53	44	+9
(Nationalist distrust) more loyal to other Muslims /England	79	81	-2
(Fears for national identity) Scotland would lose its identity if more came	52	42	+10
(Social exclusion): Unhappy if a close relative formed long-term relationship with a Muslim /English person	32	5	+27
Average	49	38	+11
Sample size (unwtd)	1158	1158	

Excluding those with no opinion or mixed opinions, an average of 49 percent across the five questions hold negative rather than positive views of Muslims (Islamophobia) and an average of 38 percent hold negative rather than positive views of English immigrants (Anglophobia). So, on these strictly comparable indicators, Islamophobia in Scotland runs just 11 percent ahead of Anglophobia. (A similar calculation using British Social Attitudes survey data on the same five questions in England shows that Islamophobia in England runs 14 percent ahead of Anglophobia in Scotland).

### How Islamophobia and Anglophobia vary

Generally narrow, limited, and parochial backgrounds are likely to foster narrow, limited, inward-looking and parochial attitudes. Too much focus on the familiar may stimulate a fear of the foreign, the different, the 'other'. Nationalism need not entail xenophobia, but it has often done so. And xenophobia tends to be indiscriminate, targeting anyone and everyone who is 'not like us'. Consequently all anti-minority-phobias may vary together and in particular the same factors that make people relatively Islamophobic are likely to make them Anglophobic.

But while the English might be judged less culturally different than Muslims from majority Scots, England has a far larger role than Pakistan or Islam in defining Scottish identity itself. So cultural parochialism – indicated by age and generation, low education and lack of minority knowledge or friendship, along with religion perhaps – might be expected to have a greater impact on Islamophobia than on Anglophobia. Yet at the same time, historical or political nationalism – indicated by exclusively Scottish identities or SNP voting – might be expected to have a greater impact on Anglophobia than on Islamophobia.

The impacts of age and generation, education, knowledge and contact with minorities are universal. There is nothing uniquely Scottish about them. We would expect to find similar patterns in many societies. But the impact of Scottish nationalism on Anglophobia and Islamophobia is uniquely Scottish and it is important for the insight it gives us into the character of both Scottish national identity and political nationalism in Scotland. It provides the critical test of the claim that 21<sup>st</sup> century Scottish nationalism – unlike many other nationalisms – is civic, inclusive, benign.

## Age and Generation

Conceptually, it is important to distinguish between the impact of age and the impact of generation (sometimes termed ‘cohort’) though in a single-wave cross-sectional survey age and generation are both measured by asking respondents how old they are. Despite the measurement problem, we can at least bear the conceptual distinction in mind and look at the shape of the relationship between years of age and phobias. If there is a steady tendency for older people to be more phobic we might speculate that this was the consequence of aging. But if there were sharp difference that coincides with significantly different periods in which different people had grown up, we might speculate that this was a consequence of the different early experiences of different cohorts or generations. Statistics alone cannot determine which is the correct explanation – the impact of aging or the impact of significantly different experiences. But we do not have to rely on statistics alone. We can, should, indeed must, bring outside knowledge to bear on the raw survey statistics.

Age and generation have very little impact on Anglophobia. Only one of the five indicators of Anglophobia – doubts about the English immigrants’ commitment to Scotland – varies consistently across the age cohorts. That contrasts with the much greater impact of age and especially of generation on Islamophobia in Scotland.

There are certainly some indisputably generation-effects. The old are far less likely than the young to claim some knowledge of Muslims or to have a Muslim friend. It is beyond reason to suppose that is because older have forgotten what they once knew about Muslims or have lost the friendships they once had with them. Instead, these patterns reflect the fact that they grew up in a society where there were far less Muslims and far less interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims: it is the imprint of history.

Overall the old are 20 percent more Islamophobic, but only six percent more Anglophobic, than the young. But the pattern is more complex than that, in two ways.

First, the old are actually less likely (15 percent less) than the young to fear that Muslims might take jobs, health care and housing from other Scots. But the old have greater doubts about Muslims’ commitment to Scotland. They are much more apprehensive (21 percent more) that Scotland would begin to lose its identity if there were an influx of Muslims; they are much more likely (24 percent more) to feel that ‘true Scots’ must be white. And by the huge margin of 48 percent the old are very much more unhappy at the thought of acquiring a Muslim relative.

Table 13: Impact of age and generation on Anglophobia & Islamophobia

	Age- 34	45- 44	45- 54	55- 64	65+	impact
	%	%	%	%	%	%
M1: Muslims take jobs, housing, healthcare from others in Scotland	37	29	26	32	22	-15
M5: Unhappy at relative forming relationship with Muslim	16	23	19	48	64	+48
Anglophobia: average E1-5	35	39	37	39	41	+6
Islamophobia: average M1-5	42	46	45	55	62	+20
Know nothing about Muslims	26	20	22	32	44	+18
Have a Muslim friend	24	18	19	8	4	+20
At least ‘fairly serious’ conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in Scotland	50	44	38	36	37	+13

Sample size (unwtd) 255 237 193 206 264

Based on the numbers who take the Islamophobic or Anglophobic side, as percentages of those who take sides

Secondly, the variation with age is not smooth and continuous. On the three indicators which display the greatest variation there is a sharp ‘step effect’ at around age 55 implying a generational effect rather than an age effect.

The overall pattern points to a cultural difference between the generations that affects cultural or racial cosmopolitanism (especially intermarriage) but is partially offset by the old feeling less fearful of competition for jobs, probably by reason of age (as they leave the job-market) rather than generation.

This tentative conclusion gains some corroboration from the pattern of age-variation in friendship, knowledge and perceived conflict. The old have much less knowledge of, or friendship with, minorities. That is especially true for friendship with Muslims. And again there is a sharp generational cleavage at age 55 – especially with respect to Muslims. But at the same time the old are less likely to perceive serious conflict with either minority – and again especially with respect to Muslims.

These patterns fit the model of a culture-based generational cleavage at age 55, offset by less fear of economic competition and less fear of conflict amongst the old, by reason of age rather than generation.

### Education

Friendship with, and knowledge of, minorities varies more sharply with education than anything else. Compared to those with no qualifications, graduates are 37 percent more likely to have an English friend and over five times more likely to have a Muslim friend (32 percent compared to only 6 percent). And those without qualifications are 25 percent more Anglophobic than university graduates as well as 34 percent more Islamophobic. Both phobias run at over twice the level amongst the unqualified as amongst graduates.

The impact is large and, with one reservation, steadily monotonic across education levels. The sole exception to monotonicity is that those with ‘higher education below degree level’ display greater levels of both Islamophobia and Anglophobia than those with Higher Grade (or equivalent) school qualifications.

And the impact is large on every individual indicator of Islamophobia and Anglophobia with one exception only: attitudes of social exclusion towards English immigrants remain very low at all levels of education. The contrast with attitudes of social exclusion towards Muslims is striking. Amongst graduates, only three percent would be unhappy to acquire an English relative and only 17 percent unhappy to acquire a Muslim relative. Amongst those with least education, the numbers unhappy to acquire an English relative remain very low (at seven percent) but the numbers unhappy to acquire a Muslim relative rise to 56 percent.

Table 14: Impact of education on Anglophobia & Islamophobia

	Degree Equiv	Higher Educ below degree	Higher Grade equiv	Standard Grades 1-3 equiv	Standard Grades 4-7 equiv	none	Impact
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Anglophobia: average E1-5	22	35	30	42	45	47	+25
Islamophobia: average M1-5	28	44	38	54	57	62	+34
Have English friend	78	71	66	66	56	41	+37
Have Muslim friend	32	21	20	12	8	6	+26

Unhappy to acquire English relative	3	2	1	6	8	7	+4
Unhappy to acquire Muslim relative	17	24	11	31	38	56	+39
Sample size (unwtd)	131	170	169	145	189	342	

Based on the numbers who take the Islamophobic or Anglophobic side, as percentages of those who take sides.

**Contacts with and knowledge of minorities:** As we might expect, having a minority friend makes a difference to the attitudes of majority Scots towards minorities. Having a Muslim friend reduces Islamophobia by 21 percent, and having an English friend reduces Anglophobia by 11 percent.

Much less obviously however, having a friend in either minority reduces phobia towards both. That is partly because those who have a friend in one minority are much more likely to also have a friend in the other: 21 percent of those with English friends also have Muslim friends; by contrast only six percent of those without English friends have Muslim friends. Conversely 85 percent of those with Muslim friends also have English friends while only 56 percent of those without Muslim friends have English friends.

Table 15: Impact of friendship on Anglophobia and Islamophobia

	Have M friend	Not	impact		Have E friend	Not	impact
	%	%	%		%	%	%
Anglophobia: average E1-5	29	40	+11		34	45	+11
Islamophobia: average M1-5	32	53	+21		44	56	+12
Sample size (unwtd)	155	1001			687	469	

Based on the numbers who take the Islamophobic or Anglophobic side, as percentages of those who take sides.

But knowledge is far more important than friendship. There are so few Muslims in Scotland that many majority Scots can be sympathetic towards such a small minority without actually having a personal friend within it. It is those who, by their own account, lack knowledge – as well as friendship – who are prey to the most intense phobias.

Most Scots know something about the English, but many – by their own account – do not know much about Muslims. Compared to those who have a Muslim friend, those who say they ‘know nothing at all’ about Muslims are 34 percent more Islamophobic. But they are also 25 percent more Islamophobic than those who, irrespective of whether they have Muslim friends, claim to know at least ‘quite a lot’ about Muslims. Most of the variation in Islamophobia occurs across levels of knowledge, not friendship or lack of friendship as such.

Significantly, the ‘know nothings’ – defined in terms of their confessed lack of knowledge about Muslims – are also 18 percent more Anglophobic than those with a Muslim friend. Only 51 percent of the (Muslim defined) ‘know-nothings’ claim to have an English friend; and the rate of English friendship rises steadily as knowledge of Muslims increases. The pattern points to general ignorance of ‘others’ having general consequences, as well as specifically Islamophobic consequences.

Table 16: Impact of knowledge on Anglophobia & Islamophobia

	Have M friend	---- Knowledge about Muslims ----			Impact
		at least quite a lot	not very much	nothing at all	
	%	%	%	%	%
Anglophobia: average E1-5	29	33	35	47	+18
Islamophobia: average M1-5	32	41	44	66	+34
Sample size (unwtd)	155	144	641	365	

Based on the numbers who take the Islamophobic or Anglophobic side, as percentages of those who take sides.

Note: Col.1 (those who have Muslim friends) is based on a different question from cols 2-4. Those with Muslim friends claim varying levels of knowledge about Muslims, though few claim to know nothing about them.

## Religion

Most majority Scots divide into just three religious categories – Presbyterians (overwhelmingly Church of Scotland), Catholics and the largest category, the irreligious. Overall, they differ very little on Anglophobia, though both Catholics (by 17 percent) and Presbyterians (by 11 percent) are more inclined than the irreligious to doubt English immigrants' commitment to Scotland. Catholics are the least likely to have an English friend, while Presbyterians are the least likely to have a Muslim friend.

But they differ more on Islamophobia – especially on whether Scotland 'would begin to lose its identity' if more Muslims came, and on social exclusion. On these two matters, Presbyterians are the most Islamophobic, Catholics less so. From the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 19<sup>th</sup> century Scotland was defined primarily by its Presbyterianism rather than by geography (see for example, Findlay, 2005). Although the simple equation of Scotland with Presbyterianism was finally destroyed by Irish Catholic immigration, Presbyterians may still retain a stronger concept of there being a unified national culture than Catholics, who necessarily had to pioneer multiculturalism in Scotland. At the same time however, on other matters – on perceptions of loyalty and commitment to contemporary Scotland, and on jobs – Catholics are the most Islamophobic, Presbyterians less so. So overall, both Catholics and Presbyterians are around 13 percent more Islamophobic than the irreligious.

But Presbyterians are 23 percent more concerned than the irreligious about the impact of Muslim immigration on Scotland's identity; and 29 percent more unhappy at the prospect of acquiring a Muslim relative. The impact of religion is thus quite powerful within certain restricted issue-domains but overall it has far less impact than education.

Table 17: Impact of religion on Majority Scots' Anglophobia & Islamophobia

	Presbyterians	Catholics	Irreligious	Impact
	%	%	%	%
Anglophobia: average E1-5	40	41	37	+4
Islamophobia: average M1-5	56	54	42	+14
Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came	65	54	42	+23
Unhappy to acquire English relative	6	3	4	+3
Unhappy to acquire Muslim relative	47	33	18	+29
Have English friend	57	51	64	+13
Have Muslim friend	9	17	18	+9
Sample size	439	131	490	

Based on the numbers who take the Islamophobic or Anglophobic side, as percentages of those who take sides.

## Social nationalism: sub-state identities

Compared to those who identify equally with Britain and Scotland, those who identify themselves as exclusively Scottish are 13 percent more Anglophobic but scarcely any more



(only four percent more) Islamophobic. The impact of national identity is relatively weak. But in contrast to the impact of education – which had significantly more impact on Islamophobia than on Anglophobia, Scottish nationalism has a greater impact on Anglophobia than on Islamophobia.

Indeed the impact of Scottish national identity – in complete contrast to the impact of low education – seems to be specifically Anglophobic, focused on the historic enemy, the ‘significant other’ that helps define Scottish identity, rather than on a minority that differs more in terms of race, religion or culture from the majority Scots. The pattern of attitudes towards social exclusion is particularly striking – especially in contrast to the impact of education on these attitudes. Unsurprisingly, the exclusively Scottish are five percent more unhappy at the prospect of acquiring an English relative – but they are actually two percent less unhappy than those who feel equally Scottish and British at the prospect of acquiring a Muslim relative. The figure of two percent is scarcely significant statistically – but that is the point: it is a case of ‘the dog that did not bark’. The impact of national identity on social exclusion is seven percent greater against the English than against Muslims – in contrast to the impact of low education on social exclusion which is 35 percent greater against Muslims than against English immigrants.

There is a further contrast of some significance for our understanding of the impact of national identity: amongst the ‘majority English’ in England (defined as majority ‘white’, non-Muslim) an exclusively English national identity increases Islamophobia in general, and social exclusion towards Muslims in particular, by 20 percent. (Hussain and Miller, 2004) Those who have discovered similar contrasts between the impact of English nationalism in England and Scottish nationalism in Scotland on attitudes towards asylum seekers, ‘ethnic minorities’, blacks or Asians have been tempted to characterise English nationalism as more ethnic or ‘nasty’, and Scottish nationalism as more civic and ‘benign’.

If we had focused only on Islamophobia, which proves to be almost uncorrelated with Scottish nationalism we would have concluded that Scottish nationalism is remarkably uncorrelated with anti-minority phobias. But it does correlate more with Anglophobia. Moreover, the existence of Anglophobia may help to explain why Scottish nationalism is so uncorrelated with Islamophobia. Muslims in Scotland may benefit from being ‘not-English’ and thus, in the eyes of majority Scots, a little bit more ‘like us’ than they would be in the absence of Anglophobia. Mostly, they do at least speak English with a Scottish accent.

**Table 18: Impact of Scottish national identity on Majority Scots’ Anglophobia & Islamophobia**

	Equally Scot & Brit	More Scottish	Exclusively Scottish	Impact
	%	%	%	%
Anglophobia: average E1-5	33	35	46	+13
Islamophobia: average M1-5	50	46	54	+4
Unhappy to acquire English relative	3	3	8	+5
Unhappy to acquire Muslim relative	38	28	36	-2
Sample size	247	431	437	

**Comparison: impact of English national identity on Majority English’s Islamophobia (in England)**

	Equally English & Brit	More English	Exclusively English	Impact
	%	%	%	%
Islamophobia: average M1-5	58	61	78	+20
Unhappy to acquire Muslim relative	47	51	67	+20
Sample size (unwtd)	277	169	166	

Based on the numbers who take the Islamophobic or Anglophobic side, as percentages of those who take sides.

### Political nationalism: partisanship

The voting choices of majority Scots at the 2001 General Election provide an indicator of political nationalism. Both Anglophobia and Islamophobia are lowest amongst Liberal Democrat voters in Scotland. But while Islamophobia is highest amongst Conservative voters, Anglophobia is highest amongst SNP voters. Anglophobia amongst SNP voters is 10 percent higher than amongst Conservatives (and 16 percent higher than amongst Liberal Democrats). Conversely Islamophobia is seven percent higher amongst Conservatives than amongst SNP voters (and 20 percent higher than amongst Liberal Democrats).

Non-voters come second only to SNP voters on Anglophobia, and second only to Conservatives on Islamophobia.

Patterns of personal friendship tell the same story: Conservatives are 11 percent more likely than SNP voters to have an English friend, but three percent less likely than SNP voters to have a Muslim friend. And Liberal Democrats are the most likely to have both English and Muslim friends. Similarly, SNP voters would be the least happy to acquire an English relative: 12 percent would be unhappy. And Conservative voters would be the least happy to acquire a Muslim relative: 47 percent would be unhappy. By contrast only 2 percent of Liberal Democrats would be unhappy to acquire an English relative and 24 percent unhappy to acquire a Muslim relative.

Many English people in Scotland vote Conservative of course, and few vote SNP. So it is important to stress that our analysis of the link between party support and Anglophobia is based – like all our other analyses of Anglophobia and Islamophobia – entirely on ‘majority Scots’ defined to exclude both English immigrants and their partners. So our finding shows that Conservatives from amongst the ‘majority Scots’ (born in Scotland and with Scottish-born partners if any) are much less Anglophobic than other majority Scots. Our findings are robust. There is no English-born contamination of the ‘Conservative voters’ whom we find so relaxed about acquiring English relatives!

**Table 19: Impact of political nationalism on Anglophobia & Islamophobia**

	Vote at 2001 General Election					Hi	Lo	SNP – CON
	CON	LAB	LibD	SNP	DNV			
Anglophobia: average E1-5	33	38	27	43	40	<b>SNP</b>	<b>LD</b>	<b>10</b>
Islamophobia: average M1-5	55	48	35	48	51	<b>CON</b>	<b>LD</b>	<b>-7</b>
Have English friend	66	53	75	55	66			
Have Muslim friend	11	11	26	14	23			
Unhappy to acquire English relative	1	4	2	12	4			
Unhappy to acquire Muslim relative	47	32	24	36	25			
Sample size (unwtd)	138	432	83	163	255			

Based on the numbers who take the Islamophobic or Anglophobic side, as percentages of those who take sides.

Note: This table like all others is based entirely on the attitudes of ‘majority Scots’ defined as Scottish born, with Scottish-born partners (if any).

### A multivariate analysis

We can usefully summarise and confirm our findings with a multivariate analysis. For that we have constructed five-point scales for each of the elements of our indices of Islamophobia and Anglophobia. Some were already five-point agree/disagree scales (agree strongly, agree, neither, disagree, disagree strongly). Others were seven-point semantic differential scales running for example from ‘Muslims are really committed to Scotland’ to ‘Muslims could never be really committed to Scotland’ with the intermediate points unlabelled. In these cases we merged the most extreme points with the adjacent categories to convert them into five-point scales. Numerical values running from minus two to plus two were assigned to each scale, with plus two being the most phobic. Those with mixed opinions, or no opinion were placed at zero, the centre-point of the scale. By averaging across the five questions we get composite Islamophobic and Anglophobic scales that also run from minus two to plus two.

Correlations between the components of each composite scale proved to be uniformly high. The individual items contributing to the Islamophobia scale correlate on average at over 0.70 with the composite Islamophobia scale; and items contributing to the Anglophobia scale correlate on average at over 0.64 with the composite Anglophobia scale.

Much more interestingly, the two composite scales correlate at 0.65 with each other. We have already seen that the categories of people which are relatively Islamophobic tend also to be relatively Anglophobic. Now we know that is true for individuals as well as categories: individual people who are relatively Islamophobic are likely to be relatively Anglophobic as well – and the correlation, at 0.65 is remarkably strong.

We use regression to see which of the influences we have considered actually explain phobias best, and which are redundant once more powerful explanations are taken into account. To do this we predict levels of Islamophobia and Anglophobia from the following:

- (1) age both as a seven-point scale from young to old; and as a dichotomous generation marker, contrasting those above and below age 55.
- (2) education as a three point scale distinguishing university-level education, lower school qualifications (or none), and those with higher school qualifications or higher education below university degree level.
- (3) minority contacts measured by three variables: a four point scale of knowledge about Muslims, and two indicators of whether or not the respondent had a Muslim friend and/or an English friend.
- (4) religion measured by three separate indicators of whether the respondent was or was not Presbyterian, Catholic, or irreligious.
- (5) national identity measured by the five-point Moreno scale that runs from exclusively Scottish to exclusively British
- (6) political nationalism measured by four separate indicators of whether or not the respondent voted Conservative, Labour or SNP in 2001 or abstained – effectively treating Liberal voters as the base against which all others are judged.

**Table 20: A multivariate analysis of Islamophobia and Anglophobia in Scotland**

	Islamophobia	Anglophobia
RSQ (x 100) =	15	17
	Beta (x 100)	Beta (x 100)
Higher education	-26	-25
Not religious	-13	*
Knows little or nothing about Muslims	11	10
Has a Muslim friend	-10	*
Has an English friend	*	-13

Strong/exclusive Scottish identity

\*

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\* blank entries, and all variables missing from the table indicate that the beta coefficient was less than 0.10; so the independent and additional impact of such variables is small (if any at all) and relatively unimportant; all beta coefficients displayed in the table are not only large enough to be politically significant, they are also statistically significant at better than the one percent error level.

The multiple regressions confirm that the most important influence on both phobias is education. But even taking that into account, other factors have their own independent and additional impact. Islamophobia is greater amongst those who know little or nothing about Islam. It is lower amongst those who have a Muslim friend, and amongst those who are irreligious. But most significant is the factor that does not exert any substantial impact on Islamophobia – ‘the dog that did not bark’: Scottish nationalism.

By contrast Scottish identity comes close to rivalling low education as an influence towards Anglophobia. Beyond that, having an English friend reduces Anglophobia by about as much as having a Muslim friend reduces Islamophobia. And lack of knowledge about Islam probably indicates a broader rejection of the ‘other’, for it has as much impact on Anglophobia as on Islamophobia.

Regression is better at demolishing hypotheses than generating them: drawing attention to other ‘dogs that did not bark’. In addition to showing that Scottish identity has no important impact on Islamophobia, it also shows (by their absence from table 20) that age and generation do not have an independent impact once education, personal contacts, and Scottish identity have been taken into account; and nor does political nationalism, once Scottish identity has been taken into account.

## Conclusions

Our comparison of Anglophobia and Islamophobia in Scotland suggests four broad conclusions.

**Less Anglophobia than Islamophobia:** Amongst majority Scots (tightly defined to exclude both English immigrants and their partners) Anglophobia runs at a lower level than Islamophobia. On five strictly comparable indicators, Anglophobia runs 11 percent behind Islamophobia – at 38 percent compared to 49 percent.

**But not much less Anglophobia:** In Scotland the level of Anglophobia, though less, is comparable with that of Islamophobia. The difference between Islamophobia in Scotland and England is greater than the difference between the levels of Anglophobia and Islamophobia within Scotland.

And the difference between Anglophobia and Islamophobia in Scotland varies sharply across our five indicators. There is a large difference in social exclusion: few (only 5 percent) ‘would feel unhappy if a close relative married or formed a long-term relationship with an English person now living in Scotland’ but far more (32 percent) if the relationship was ‘with a Muslim’.

There is less difference on economic resentment: almost a fifth (18 percent) of majority Scots feel English immigrants ‘take jobs, housing and health care from other people in Scotland’ rather than ‘contributing a lot’ to Scotland, but almost a third (30 percent) feel Muslims do that. Similarly on fears for national identity: two-fifths (42 percent) feel ‘Scotland would begin to lose its identity’ if more English immigrants came to live in Scotland and half (52 percent) if more Muslims came.

But on two indicators of nationalist distrust the differences pointed in opposite directions. On commitment to Scotland, Anglophobia is a little less than Islamophobia: 44 percent feel the English immigrants ‘could never be really committed to Scotland’ but 53 percent feel Muslims ‘could never be really committed to Scotland. Yet on loyalty, Anglophobia exceeds Islamophobia: 81 percent feel English immigrants ‘are more loyal to England’ and only 79 percent feel Muslims ‘are more loyal to other Muslims around the world’ than they are to Scotland. The difference is too small to be statistically significant but it shows beyond statistical doubt that ‘majority Scots’ do not draw any great distinction between the loyalty of English immigrants and Muslims.

**Phobias generally go together:** Anything that encourages one phobia tends to encourage the other – though not necessarily to the same degree. Having either an English friend or a Muslim friend reduces both Anglophobia and Islamophobia. Both Anglophobia and Islamophobia increase with age and generation (ie with older age and generations). Higher education appears to reduce both Anglophobia and Islamophobia. And Liberal Democrat voters are at once the least Anglophobic and the least Islamophobic.

**But narrow parochialism and nationalism have significantly different impacts on different phobias:** Narrow backgrounds and attitudes have more impact on Islamophobia, but nationalism has more impact on Anglophobia. An exclusively Scottish identity increases phobias. But in sharp contrast to low education, older generations, or lack of minority friendships – which might all be interpreted as indicators of narrow parochialism, a more Scottish nationalist identity has much more impact on Anglophobia (13 percent) than on Islamophobia (only four percent) – though Scottish nationalist identity has much less impact on Anglophobia (13 percent) than English nationalist identity has on Islamophobia (20 percent).

Similarly while SNP voters are the most Anglophobic (16 percent more so than LibDems), Conservative voters are the most Islamophobic in Scotland (12 percent more so than LibDems) – though Conservative voters in England are even more Islamophobic (14 percent more so than even those relatively Islamophobic Scottish Conservative voters).

**So is Scottish nationalism, unlike English nationalism, ‘benign’ rather than ‘nasty’** as so many writers suggest? Towards Muslims the answer must be an unequivocal ‘yes’. But towards English immigrants perhaps not. Scottish nationalism, unlike English nationalism, does not make people significantly more Islamophobic. But at street level, if not at Alex Salmond’s SNP leadership level, it does make them more Anglophobic.

There is one final caveat. All our statistical evidence suggests that education has the most powerful impact on reducing phobias, including Islamophobia. That is what Table 20 shows so clearly. And yet, our Focus Group discussions with both Muslims and English immigrants in Scotland cast some doubts on this apparently robust statistical finding. Focus Group participants suggested that the well-educated ‘talked the talk’ but did not ‘walk the walk’: ‘racism is very subtle and you get it across the board...in colleges and universities’(PK4-E); ‘the less educated are the ones that slag you in the streets, but the professionals will be the ones that do not give you the job’(PK1-B); ‘less educated people will openly curse the person...but educated people can control their tongue easier...show racism in a subtle way that you might not realize’(PK6-E); ‘teachers in the High School have this really strong, deep anti-English feeling...[which] has to be really well concealed because of their profession, but its there’(E6-E); ‘I got an interview but the minute I opened my mouth you could see the shutters come down’(E-6G) (For these and other sceptical quotes from minority Focus Groups in Scotland, see Chpts 5 and 6 of Hussain and Miller, 2006)

Our statistical evidence shows beyond doubt that Scottish discourse is significantly less Islamophobic than English. Scots in general, like the well-educated in particular are good at ‘talking the talk’. But perhaps Scots, like the well-educated in particular are just better at hiding their phobias – always exception their Anglophobia, of course!

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## Full analytic tables

**Table A1: Impact of friendship on Anglophobia & Islamophobia**

		Have M friend	Not	impact		Have E friend	Not	impact
		%	%	%		%	%	%
E1	E take jobs	13	19	<b>6</b>		15	24	<b>9</b>
E2	E not really committed to S	30	47	<b>17</b>		38	55	<b>17</b>
E3	E more loyal to own	74	83	<b>9</b>		76	89	<b>13</b>
E4	S lose identity if more E came	26	45	<b>19</b>		40	46	<b>6</b>
E5	unhappy if relative marry E	1	5	<b>4</b>		2	9	<b>7</b>
	<i>Anglophobia: average E1-5</i>	29	40	<b>11</b>		34	45	<b>11</b>
M1	M take jobs	20	32	<b>12</b>		25	36	<b>11</b>
M2	M not really committed to S	34	57	<b>23</b>		48	61	<b>13</b>
M3	M more loyal to own	65	82	<b>17</b>		74	86	<b>12</b>
M4	S lose identity if more M came	30	56	<b>26</b>		49	57	<b>8</b>
M5	unhappy if relative marry M	13	36	<b>23</b>		26	41	<b>15</b>
	<i>Islamophobia: average M1-5</i>	32	53	<b>21</b>		44	56	<b>12</b>
	Sample size (unwtd)	155	1001			687	469	

Source: SSAS 2003. DK's & undecided excluded from calculation of percentages.

**Table A2: Impact of knowledge on Anglophobia & Islamophobia**

		Have M friend	at least quite a lot	not very much	nothing at all	impact
		%	%	%	%	%
E1	E take jobs	13	14	16	25	<b>12</b>
E2	E not really committed to S	30	39	40	60	<b>30</b>
E3	E more loyal to own	74	74	79	89	<b>15</b>
E4	S lose identity if more E came	26	33	39	53	<b>27</b>
E5	unhappy if relative marry E	1	5	3	9	<b>8</b>
	<i>Anglophobia: average E1-5</i>	29	33	35	47	<b>18</b>
M1	M take jobs	20	19	24	49	<b>29</b>
M2	M not really committed to S	34	50	45	74	<b>40</b>
M3	M more loyal to own	65	74	74	90	<b>25</b>
M4	S lose identity if more M came	30	39	49	66	<b>36</b>
M5	unhappy if relative marry M	13	24	26	49	<b>36</b>
	<i>Islamophobia: average M1-5</i>	32	41	44	66	<b>34</b>
	Sample size (unwtd)	155	144	641	365	

Source: SSAS 2003. DK's & undecided excluded from calculation of percentages.

**Table A3: Impact of age and generation on Anglophobia & Islamophobia**

		Age-34	45-44	45-54	55-64	65+	impact
		%	%	%	%	%	%
E1	E take jobs	18	21	14	21	16	<b>-2</b>
E2	E not really committed to S	36	42	46	45	57	<b>19</b>
E3	E more loyal to own	84	81	79	81	82	<b>-2</b>
E4	S lose identity if more E came	35	46	43	44	43	<b>8</b>
E5	unhappy if relative marry E	4	7	3	5	5	<b>1</b>
	<i>Anglophobia: average E1-5</i>	35	39	37	39	41	<b>6</b>
M1	M take jobs	37	29	26	32	22	<b>-15</b>
M2	M not really committed to S	42	50	55	51	75	<b>33</b>
M3	M more loyal to own	72	79	75	85	84	<b>12</b>
M4	S lose identity if more M came	43	47	50	61	64	<b>21</b>
M5	unhappy if relative marry M	16	23	19	48	64	<b>48</b>
	<i>Islamophobia: average M1-5</i>	42	46	45	55	62	<b>20</b>
	Sample size (unwtd)	255	237	193	206	264	

Source: SSAS 2003. DK's & undecided excluded from calculation of percentages.

**Table A4: Impact of education on Anglophobia & Islamophobia**

		degree	higher educ below degree	A level equiv	O level equiv	CSE equiv	None	Impact
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%
E1	E take jobs	7	14	11	22	24	26	<b>19</b>
E2	E not really committed to S	21	45	28	45	52	63	<b>41</b>
E3	E more loyal to own	53	75	81	84	93	89	<b>36</b>
E4	S lose identity if more E came	26	39	30	54	48	51	<b>25</b>
E5	unhappy if relative marry E	3	2	1	6	8	7	<b>4</b>
	<i>Anglophobia: average E1-5</i>	22	35	30	42	45	47	<b>25</b>
M1	M take jobs	7	24	22	43	37	39	<b>32</b>
M2	M not really committed to S	27	49	43	55	65	67	<b>40</b>
M3	M more loyal to own	58	80	75	82	86	83	<b>25</b>
M4	S lose identity if more M came	32	44	37	61	61	67	<b>35</b>
M5	unhappy if relative marry M	17	24	11	31	38	56	<b>39</b>
	<i>Islamophobia: average M1-5</i>	28	44	38	54	57	62	<b>34</b>
	Sample size (unwtd)	131	170	169	145	189	342	

Source: SSAS 2003. DK's &amp; undecided excluded from calculation of percentages.

**Table A5: Impact of national identity on Anglophobia & Islamophobia**

		Equally Scot & Brit	More Scottish	Exclusively Scottish	impact
		%	%	%	%
E1	E take jobs	11	14	28	<b>17</b>
E2	E not really committed to S	37	37	59	<b>22</b>
E3	E more loyal to own	77	81	87	<b>10</b>
E4	S lose identity if more E came	36	42	48	<b>12</b>
E5	unhappy if relative marry E	3	3	8	<b>5</b>
	<i>Anglophobia: average E1-5</i>	33	35	46	<b>13</b>
M1	M take jobs	26	25	40	<b>14</b>
M2	M not really committed to S	54	51	56	<b>2</b>
M3	M more loyal to own	79	74	84	<b>5</b>
M4	S lose identity if more M came	53	51	56	<b>3</b>
M5	unhappy if relative marry M	38	28	36	<b>-2</b>
	<i>Islamophobia: average M1-5</i>	50	46	54	<b>4</b>
	Sample size (unwtd)	247	431	437	

**Comparison: Majority English in England**

		Equally Engl & Brit	More English	Exclusively English	impact
M1	M take jobs	43	39	66	<b>23</b>
M2	M not really committed to S	55	58	77	<b>22</b>
M3	M more loyal to own	84	87	89	<b>5</b>
M4	E lose identity if more M came	63	68	89	<b>26</b>
M5	unhappy if relative marry M	47	51	67	<b>20</b>
	<i>Islamophobia: average M1-5</i>	58	61	78	<b>20</b>
	Sample size (unwtd)	277	169	166	

Sources: BSAS &amp; SSAS 2003. DK's &amp; undecided excluded from calculation of percentages.

**Table A6: Impact of political nationalism on Anglophobia & Islamophobia**

		Vote at 2001 General Election							
		CON	LAB	LibD	SNP	DNV	Hi	Lo	SNP - CON
E1	E take jobs	18	17	11	22	18	SNP	LD	4
E2	E not really committed to S	34	47	28	47	46	SNP	LD	13
E3	E more loyal to own	76	82	62	83	88	DNV	LD	7
E4	S lose identity if more E came	37	39	33	53	45	SNP	LD	16
E5	unhappy if relative marry E	1	4	2	12	4	SNP	CON	11
	<i>Anglophobia: average E1-5</i>	33	38	27	43	40	SNP	LD	10
M1	M take jobs	24	29	11	29	39	DNV	LD	5
M2	M not really committed to S	55	53	23	46	60	DNV	LD	-9
M3	M more loyal to own	85	78	72	76	80	CON	LD	-9
M4	S lose identity if more M came	62	50	43	55	52	CON	LD	-7
M5	unhappy if relative marry M	47	32	24	36	25	CON	LD	-11
	<i>Islamophobia: average M1-5</i>	55	48	35	48	51	CON	LD	-7
	Sample size (unwtd)	138	432	83	163	255			

**Comparison: Majority English in England**

		CON	LAB	LibD	DNV	Hi	Lo
M1	M take jobs	50	46	23	53	DNV	LD
M2	M not really committed to S	67	62	41	64	CON	LD
M3	M more loyal to own	86	88	61	89	DNV	LD
M4	E lose identity if more M came	79	68	48	68	CON	LD
M5	unhappy if relative marry M	61	49	37	52	CON	LD
	<i>Islamophobia: average M1-5</i>	69	63	42	65	CON	LD
	Sample size (unwtd)	175	300	80	249		

Sources: BSAS &amp; SSAS 2003. DK's &amp; undecided excluded from calculation of percentages.

**Table A7: Impact of religion on Anglophobia & Islamophobia**

OWN CURRENT RELIGION →		CoS	Roman	No religion	Impact
		/Presbyterian	Catholic		CoS - NoRel
E1	E take jobs	14	26	20	-6
E2	E not really committed to S	49	55	38	11
E3	E more loyal to own	83	78	82	1
E4	S lose identity if more E came	49	42	40	9
E5	unhappy if relative marry E	6	3	4	2
	<i>Anglophobia: average E1-5</i>	40	41	37	3
M1	M take jobs	29	35	29	0
M2	M not really committed to S	56	61	49	7
M3	M more loyal to own	84	87	72	12
M4	S lose identity if more M came	65	54	42	23
M5	unhappy if relative marry M	47	33	18	29
	<i>Islamophobia: average M1-5</i>	56	54	42	14
	Sample size (unwtd)	439	131	490	

Source: SSAS 2003. DK's &amp; undecided excluded from calculation of percentages.