


THE NANOVIC INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES



LECTURE PAPER 13

THE FALL OF THE WALL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TWENTY YEARS LATER

WITH AN INTERVIEW BY AMBASSADOR J.D. BINDENAGEL

HORST M. TELTSCHIK

Former National Security Advisor to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

2009-2010 DISTINGUISHED EUROPEAN LECTURER



UNIVERSITY OF
NOTRE DAME

The Nanovic Institute Lecture Papers

A. James McAdams, Series Editor

Lecture Paper 13

*The Fall of the Wall and Its Implications Twenty Years Later
with an Interview by Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel*

The Fall of the Wall and Its Implications Twenty Years Later

Horst M. Teltschik, Former National Security Advisor to
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

2009-2010 Distinguished European Lecturer

with an Interview by Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel

Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel, Vice President for Community,
Government, and International Affairs at DePaul University

The Nanovic Institute for European Studies



UNIVERSITY OF
NOTRE DAME

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Horst M. Teltschik

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Welcome

Good evening – I'm Jim McAdams, director of the Nanovic Institute for European Studies.

One year ago I called Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel to seek his advice on whom the Nanovic Institute should invite to Notre Dame to commemorate the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and also, of course, the reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990. It seemed to both of us that we should invite someone with an intimate understanding of the circumstances under which this historic opening of East Germany's border took place. But it would also be important to find a speaker who would have the critical perspective to evaluate the implications of these developments for Germany and the Atlantic Alliance and for the world today. Fortunately for everyone here in the audience, we have found exactly the right person, and he's with us tonight. Dr. Horst Teltschik may be rightly considered as both the consummate insider, when one considers his role as National Security Advisor to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl during the heady days of national reunification, and simultaneously the consummate outsider in his ability after those days to interpret and analyze German foreign policy in the 21st century.

Born in 1940 in the Sudetenland, in what is currently part of the Czech Republic, our guest left with his family to Germany, first to Bayern (Bavaria), and then eventually ended up in Berlin where he studied political science and contemporary history at the Free University with the eminent scholar and historian, Richard Löwenthal, whose work many of us know. During this period Dr. Teltschik became active in Christian Democratic politics. He was at first a leader in Germany's Catholic student movement (and we know something about Catholicism at Notre Dame), and then he moved to Bonn where in 1972 he won the esteem and trust of an ambitious Christian Democratic politician named Helmut Kohl. For the next 19 years, our guest could be counted upon as one of his closest advisors. He worked in all of the areas most relevant to German foreign policy and security policy, and was director of his chief's parliamentary office. When Kohl became Federal Chancellor in 1982, Teltschik was named National Security Advisor charged with everything from the development of West Germany's ties with East Germany, the strengthening of relations with the United States, and all aspects of the Soviet-East German relationship. It was in this capacity, of

course, that our guest played the lead role in steering his country through the immensely complicated and epic-making process of unification.

When Dr. Teltschik retired from government in 1991, he became what in our perspective is the consummate outsider, the consummate observer of his country's politics, economics, and foreign policy. He first became CEO of the Bertelsmann Foundation, the largest private non-profit foundation in Germany. In 1993 he was made member of the Board of Management and chief advisor for business and political affairs on the board of BMW. He followed up this appointment when he was made president of Boeing-Germany, and today he has just stepped down as Chair from the Munich Conference on Security Policy. In all of these lofty accomplishments, I would also like to add that Dr. Teltschik has maintained a reputation for open-mindedness, generosity, and approachability. He wouldn't remember this, but in 1988 when I was an idealistic young assistant professor, my family and I were living in Bonn. One of the wonderful things in those days was that if you wanted to speak to anybody incredibly important, all you had to do was call them on the phone. For some reason, very few major politicians had an assistant, and so I think I called up and you answered the phone. I said, "Can I come see you?" and you said, "Sure – which day?" This would be very unusual in the United States. So I was kind of starry-eyed and star-struck, and I went to see Dr. Teltschik in his office in the Bundeskanzleramt in Bonn, and it was really one of the very best interviews I had during that long stay in Germany. Because I felt we could talk about things as they really were; we could talk about world politics, about Deutschland politik with East Germany, in a way that made sense to me and that really taught me something. This is not always true when you talk to politicians. Of course, Dr. Teltschik was *not* a politician.

I am honored, therefore, to introduce you to Dr. Horst Teltschik, who will share his insight tonight on the subject of the fall of the Wall and its implications for German foreign policy: an insider's perspective. Welcome to Notre Dame, Dr. Teltschik.

Introduction

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. McAdams, for your kind introduction. Being praised for such a long time as you did, feels to me like a funeral, you see? Hopefully there is somebody who will praise me then as well.

I'm delighted to be here, and of course thanks to my old friend J.D. who pushed me hard to come here. It's a real pleasure, and I'm deeply impressed with what I could see today. This is a really a marvelous university, and I think all students can be proud to be here. I think all German students would be jealous, seeing what opportunities students get here. A great, great university. I wish you all the best for the future.

It's a great honor and pleasure for me to talk to such a distinguished audience at the famous University of Notre Dame about the fall of the Wall twenty years ago, and its implications for today.

In 2009 we are celebrating not only the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Wall on November 9, 1989. We are celebrating several other events which strongly contributed to the revolution of the former GDR. On August 24, 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki from the Solidarnosc movement became the first free elected democratic prime minister of the Warsaw Pact countries. Solidarnosc, founded in 1980, was the first and most successful grass-roots movement to topple a Communist system. I was a special envoy of the German chancellor to negotiate a common declaration with the Polish government in 1989. I started my negotiations with Rakowski, the last Communist prime minister, and then I had to continued with the first democratically elected prime minister. Therefore I could closely watch the fundamental change happening in Poland, long before demonstrations started in the GDR.

This year I have also celebrated two twentieth anniversaries with the Hungarians. In May 1989 the Hungarian government had decided not to maintain the Iron Curtain for cost reasons. In June 1989 the Hungarian foreign minister Gyula Horn and his Austrian counterpart, Alois Mock, symbolically cut the barbed wire between the countries. And in August 1989, prime minister Nemeth and Gyula Horn came to Bonn to tell Chancellor Helmut Kohl that they would open the border on September 10 for all German refugees. Tens of thousands of GDR refugees were allowed to cross the border to the west. Now, we had already started to negotiate with the Hungarians in 1984. You need a little background here: In 1984, we had

just started to deploy American nuclear systems in Germany, and the Soviet government was threatening us with a Third World War. I took part in a meeting with Chancellor Kohl and Secretary General Andropov in July 1983 in Moscow, when he told the Chancellor “If you deploy American nuclear missiles in Germany, we will establish a fence of missiles against Germany.”

Because there are students here I would like to describe how such meetings went in those days. I have met lots of Soviet Secretary Generals. When I first met Brezhnev with Chancellor Kohl, he was already very sick. He could only answer questions when Gromyko, his foreign minister, wrote the answer on a paper and gave it to him – then he would answer Chancellor Kohl. He was quite sick. When we met with Andropov in the Kremlin in 1983, he supported himself with his chair because he couldn't move any more. We had to go around the table to shake hands. We discussed the situation, what he described as close to a Third World War. When he lifted his hand, it was trembling. My counterpart, a nice guy name A. M. Alexandrov-Agentov, was short-sighted and had his head lowered nearly to the paper. He was 72 years old — when he raised his hand it was trembling as well. So, here you have the world power, the Soviet Union, threatening you with a Third World War, and you realize just how sick they are. You can see it. This is not a comfortable situation. As you know, eight months later he died. We went to Andropov's funeral to make sure that he was really dead No, we did that because this was the opportunity to meet his replacement, Chernenko. So we had the meeting with Chernenko and he was really sick as well. They showed him once on TV accompanied by two men on either side who helped him stand up, because he couldn't walk by himself any more. This was to show the world, “Look! He's still alive!” A year later to *his* funeral. Then we met Gorbachev for the first time in March 1985. Suddenly there was a young and healthy Secretary General, and this was already an important improvement. I tell students this story because sometimes in politics you face situations which are not really comfortable.

Back to 1984 and our negotiations with Hungary. Their young ambassador showed up in my office in 1984 to introduce himself. He told me immediately that in Hungary everything needed to be changed. They wanted to start economic and political reforms, because they were close to being bankrupt and they needed the support of the German government. I was not sure whether he was just playing a game with me, or whether he was serious. I learned very quickly that he was serious. He took me to Hungary where I met most of the members of the government including two men who were, at

that time, working in the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party. One was Gulya Horn, who later on became the foreign minister. He was the head of the department of foreign affairs in the Central Committee. I also met Miklos Nemeth, later on the prime minister, who was the head of the department for economic affairs. And these young men told me, “We have to change things. We have to force our leadership to retire, and we will do that if Germany will support us.” And they did it. They changed their leader and Prime Minister Grosz took over. I was his first visitor from the West, together with the CEO of the German Deutsche Bank, Herrhausen. He accompanied me in negotiating a credit of 1 billion Deutschmarks for Hungary. Half a year later, the Hungarian ambassador showed up again in my office in Bonn, telling me that it made “no sense with our new prime minister — he will not be successful, we will have to change and take it over by ourselves.” And they did. These guys started the revolt, and what was really fundamental — they opened the border. In 1989 about 120,000 GDR refugees, mainly young people, families with small children, and academics, took the chance to cross the border by Austria to Hungary. Having been asked how they felt when they crossed the border, there was more or less just one answer: “Finally free. Finally free!” I think we shouldn’t forget that. They didn’t say, “Now we can buy Western products!” No, no. Freedom was the main desire of these people. As Chancellor Kohl said in the Hungarian parliament at the end of 1989, this was the first stone broken out of the Wall by the Hungarians. We were celebrating this anniversary this year as well.

On October 7, twenty years ago, the SED leadership, the Communist party of the GDR, celebrated the 40th anniversary of the foundation of the GDR. President Mikhail Gorbachev took part. On the verge of the official ceremony, including a military parade marching up with torches, the police were beating opposition demonstrators with sticks. Many were seriously wounded and hundreds were put in prison. Gorbachev’s famous statement from that day is often quoted, and J.D. did it already this afternoon: “I do believe only those are in danger who don’t respond to life.” Later the quote was changed to “Life itself punishes those who fall behind.”

On the very same day, the first mass demonstration against the GDR regime started in the city of Plauen, and on the next day in Leipzig with 70,000 people. Within a few days we witnessed peaceful demonstrations all over the country, ending with several hundred thousand people in the streets shouting “We are the people,” and fortunately adding, “No violence.” They had put candles in front of the Secret Service building. This was crucial, because GDR

officials had assembled 8,000 armed personnel, among them 80 police companies supported by armed corporate security militias, members of the Secret Service, Special Forces, and members of the army with machine guns and other weapons. One of these officers told me, he was lying behind some bushes with a machine gun and when the demonstrators came up he told his people “Don’t shoot — my son is there.” That’s love, you see. They were ready to suppress the unrest. Fortunately it did not happen. There were too many people in the streets, and regional party members, as J.D. explained to you, had intervened. There are stories that one member of the Secret Service said, “We were prepared to meet all challenges, but not candles and prayers.”

A few weeks later the slogan of the demonstrations changed to “We are one people.” And a month later the Wall came down, peacefully. Not one shot was fired. Ladies and gentlemen, we should recall everything that resulted from the events of 1989 to 1991. Germany was reunited. All neighboring countries had agreed, even Margaret Thatcher. Germany got back its full sovereignty, forty-five years after World War II. There was a final settlement for the German-Polish border. This was never a question for my chancellor and for the government, never. The only question was when and because of our legal system we couldn’t acknowledge the border until after the reunification, and not before. The Warsaw Pact peacefully disbanded; 500,000 Soviet troops left central Europe, 370,000 of them from the GDR. I had discussions with the Soviet ambassador at that time to learn how many Russians were living in the GDR. He never told me the figure. Our assessment was that, at the end, between 1 million and 1.5 millions Russians were living in the GDR. One of our main tasks was to get them out peacefully and on time. We made it. The agreement between Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl was that within four years, all troops must have left the GDR. We helped and supported them in doing that. We paid about 3 billion DM to build housing for the troops going home to the Soviet Union because the Soviets had no housing for them. We financed a training program for those officers who wanted to become business managers. Therefore we spent a hell of a lot of money to help get them out. I will never forget the ceremony when the last troops left Berlin. There was a group of Soviet soldiers singing a song in German, singing “We came to Germany as enemies. We are leaving Germany as friends.” This was really, really moving. This was in 1994.

The East-West conflict had ended, and with it the bipolar world. Europe is not divided any more. The Soviet Union broke up into 15 sovereign states. Communist ideology all but disappeared. We signed the most far-reaching arms control and arms reduction agreements – think of START, the reduction of strategic systems INF, the complete cutback of all nuclear middle range systems; CFE, reducing conventional arms — we got a global ban on chemical and biological weapons. Unbelievable, what was possible in those years. And as you know, new democracies and market economies were developing. If you listen to such a list, isn't it a miracle? Not one shot was fired. Within two years we achieved all that. A close friend in Munich, a 90-year-old Jesuit, told me all the time "Somebody helped you from above." I think it is true.

This was a peaceful revolution. It changed Germany, it changed Europe, and it changed the world. It happened because of a unique political and personal constellation – Solidarnosc in Poland, our friends Miklos Nemeth and Gyula Horn in Hungary, the courage of our common friend Mikhail Gorbachev because he didn't interfere any more as his predecessors did before in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and East Berlin. It was the people in the GDR and because of the unrestricted support of our American friends, above all from President George Bush and his great team. We are really grateful for the unreserved trust in the German government at that time, mainly Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his team, and for the great friendship. The Germans and I personally will never forget what the Americans have done for Germany and for Europe.

Let me just add something. My friend Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor to President George Bush, told me that in 1989-90 in the White House, they sometimes held their breath recognizing what Chancellor Kohl and his team were doing, and how fast we were moving ahead. But they didn't interfere, because of the mutual trust and ongoing mutual briefings. It was one of the best times in German-U.S. relations. Germany was reunited within 329 days of the Wall coming down. Nobody had expected it to happen that fast. Our assessment in November 1989, when Kohl gave his famous 10-point speech in the German parliament, developing a strategy of how we wanted to move ahead to a unified Germany, had been that it would take five to ten years to unify Germany. It took us less than one year.

Why did it happen so fast? Well, it was indeed a window of opportunity. There was no other comparable important topic on the international agenda to distract the attention of our partners away from Germany. When Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait in August 1990, the main issues between Germany and the Soviet Union were already resolved. This was fundamental, because from that moment on, the U.S. administration turned all its attention to Iraq. The coup d'état in Moscow against President Gorbachev happened in 1991, and not in 1989 or 1990 as it could have been. Together with our allies, we were frightened all the time that Gorbachev could be toppled because of the extent of changes he initiated in his own country and which were ongoing in Hungary, Poland, and the GDR. Miklosz Nemeth, the prime minister of Hungary, told me in 1989, "We are not going to ask Gorbachev whether we are allowed to move ahead with reforms or not. We'll just do it, and we'll wait and see if he'll interfere or not." And he didn't. I think this is the historic merit of Gorbachev, that he stuck to his promise from the very beginning. He had told his allies in the Warsaw Pact already at the 1988 summit that he would not interfere in their internal domestic affairs. He promised that and he did it. He didn't interfere in Poland, or in Hungary, and not least in the GDR. I think this is really what we have to praise him for.

Speed of the Unification

My friend Jim Baker gave an interview in a German newspaper saying, everything moved too fast. Shevardnadze publicly said "Everything goes too fast." Everybody was claiming it was too fast, including Margaret Thatcher. But who was pushing us? It was not our government. It was the people of the GDR. Their desire for unification had become obvious all throughout 1989. About 40,000 people had officially applied to leave the GDR in 1989. About 120,000 as I have told you came illegally to Germany via Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. And when Chancellor Kohl met the newly elected GDR leader Hans Modrow on December 19 in Dresden, thousands of people were calling for unification. It was obvious to us that Modrow would not be able to run the GDR. I took part in the meeting between Kohl and Modrow, and this guy was really unbelievable. He started to read a paper, a paper agreed on in the Politburo, as all the Communist leaders did in the past, just reading from the beginning and including everything. I thought to myself, this guy doesn't know what's going on in his own country. Close to collapse, being bankrupt, and there he is reading a paper on arms control and peace and whatever, but not how he would run the GDR! The only interest he had was

in our giving him 15 billion DM to buy goods from West Germany to supply the East Germans. After the meeting there was a private meeting between Kohl and Modrow in which I didn't take part. After I rejoined them, Modrow approached me and said, "Well, I would like to tell you – I just discussed with your chancellor that we will appoint two special envoys to negotiate this 15 billion support." He told me, "You are his special envoy." I thought, "Why should I do that?" I'm really proud there was never a meeting. And they never got 15 billion, but we got the unification.

Day by day more people from the GDR were moving to West Germany. Our projection in February 1990 was that we would get up to 1 million refugees through the end of 1990. This foreseeable burden would have been too high for both Germanies. The GDR was losing mainly young people, families with children, and academics and wouldn't survive this loss. And we were facing a lack of available housing and jobs. Therefore we had to act as fast as possible to prevent a chaotic situation on both sides. And we did, being aware that all our partners in the east and west were deeply concerned about this speed. Chancellor Kohl moved ahead, saying, "We have to harvest before the thunderstorm comes." History has proved him right.

The speed of unification also gave us an important advantage. At a meeting with Vladim Medvedev, a member of the Politburo during Gorbachev's time, I asked him about the assessments of the Soviet leadership on the various events and decisions in both German states. His answer was remarkable. He told me that the Soviet leadership was not able to review everything quickly enough. My conclusion was, "Good for us." Decisions on our side had been so quick that Moscow seemed incapable of responding in time. I'm convinced that this is true. On the other side, it was Gorbachev's great historic achievement that he broke with the past. He was ready to accept the political developments in Poland, Hungary and Germany and he did not use military force to intervene as his predecessors had done before him.

Conclusions for Germany

Two conclusions remain important for Germany, even today. First, Chancellor Kohl was surprised by President Mitterand's initial reluctance to support the process of reunification. You have to remember that Mitterand was in Bonn four or five days before the Wall came down. There was a German-French summit and Mitterand and Kohl were discussing the events going on in Poland,

Hungary, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. Kohl said, “Well François, after our meeting I would suggest that you explain to the German media the French position on the famous German question. What is the French position on the reunification of Germany?” And François did. I was really impressed at how friendly he was. He was truly in favor of our German position, of the right of self-determination and unification of Germany. Therefore we were surprised when he suddenly appeared so reluctant. Mitterrand’s main concern was that a united Germany, then stronger than France, would not continue its close partnership with France and the process of European integration. There was no question that Helmut Kohl was in favor of the integration of Europe. That was why he sent me to Paris in January 1990 to propose a new common German-French initiative for political union. This is a typical example of how politics works: my counterpart on the Elysees was really excited about my proposal, but we couldn’t agree on details. What would it mean politically? We could agree on the goal of a political Europe, and thought the content would follow. And it did, partly. Therefore, this initiative was agreed to by all member states of the European community in April at the Dublin summit, followed later by the Economic and Monetary Union and by the introduction of the Euro. Because it was mentioned this afternoon, I will tell you that my French friends still say today that Germany had to pay a price: the Euro, the monetary and economic union, and the political union. That’s crazy, because we had already discussed it beginning in the mid-’80s. My French counterpart once said, “Well we have already a common currency, the Deutschmark. But as French we can’t accept that — we need a different currency.”

The second lesson we had to learn was that a united Germany was and will be acceptable to all European countries neighboring Germany and to the U.S., only as long as we are common allies in the Atlantic alliance. A non-aligned or neutral Germany would have been and will be a nightmare for all our neighbors. Germans should never forget their history. Look at today’s Poland and the Czech Republic, how nervously they react when Germany attempts to develop a close and friendly relationship with Russia. When I was asked to meet Gorbachev privately in May 1990 in Moscow, I had to negotiate a credit of 5 billion DM for the Soviet Union. If we had not been willing to give them this credit, the world power Soviet Union would have been bankrupt at the end of June 1990. Unbelievable. Gorbachev asked me, “Well, Mr. Teltschik, we will now be friends and close partners in the future. Why do you need NATO any more?” I told him, “Mr. President, perhaps not because of the Soviet Union, but because of our neighboring countries. Think of our

neighbors: Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, etc. They cannot live with a Germany outside of the alliance. They can live with us, a bigger and stronger Germany, only if we are in a common alliance.” And this is true though many Germans don’t believe that. I find it always hard to explain this to them, because the young people in Germany say they are democrats, pacifists, good guys — why are people afraid of Germany? Well, because of our history. It’s so simple. If there’s one lesson I’ve learned in my life: people don’t forget history. If you go to countries abroad for negotiations, whether in business or politics, you have to know about the common history. That’s fundamental. Germany’s membership in NATO and the European Union is part of Germany’s *raison d’être*. Both alliances have been a prerequisite for unifying Germany. They remain a prerequisite to overcoming distrust of Germany.

Implications

We face other implications twenty years after the end of the Cold War. First, NATO had to adjust its strategy several times to the new challenges and threats we have been facing since that time. In April of this year NATO again decided to review its strategy. It is still trying to define its future, and after the war in Kosovo and now fighting a war for eight years in Afghanistan, we still don’t know whether NATO should have just a regional responsibility or, at the end, a global one. Should we enlarge NATO further, or not? Why Albania? What about Georgia and Ukraine? Should we in the long run allow Russia into NATO, as President Clinton once proposed to President Yeltsen via letter and personally? I am in favor of that in the long run. What about Japan, Australia and New Zealand or others? Some in the U.S. want to establish a special relationship between NATO and those countries.

Secondly, the European Union is still undergoing two difficult processes — the deepening of the integration and enlargement. Two key questions are not yet answered, and all politicians try hard not to talk about it, leaving it to the future. A so-called “wait and see” approach, which many politicians prefer. What should be the final status of the European Union? the United Nations of Europe? or Confederation of States? or just a free trade area, as Margaret Thatcher had preferred? How large should the European Union be at the very end? Should Turkey or Israel or others at some point become members of the European Union? Despite these questions, the EU is a unique success story, whether our American friends are willing to take us seriously or not. What

can Europe symbolize more than this European Union: peace, stability, and freedom. Nothing else.

In November 1990 there was a CSC summit in Paris.¹ All 35 presidents and heads of government signed a so-called “Charter for a New Europe.” After the end of the Cold War they wanted to start “a new era of democracy, peace and unity.” They agreed on common principles for shaping a new Europe. They developed a mechanism to avoid confrontations, to manage crises, and to settle conflicts peacefully. What a vision! What a dream! It reminded me of the famous speech of Martin Luther King, “I have a dream.” Ladies and gentlemen, I have this dream. Should a united, free and democratic Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok not be our dream? For the first time in the history of the European continent, we might have the chance to build all European peace and security. In 1990 we had the perhaps irretrievable chance to build a common European house, as Gorbachev put it; to create a community of free states founded on the rule of law and guaranteeing the security of all members. After a century of two world wars, and over 200 million people killed, what could be better for peace, freedom and security than such an all-European system? In May 1991 President Mitterand said in Aachen, “For a long time Europe has not had so many reasons for hope.” I think he was absolutely right. The Israeli prime minister Golda Meir once said, “Who has not a dream is not a realist.”

But nothing substantial has really happened since 1990. We’ve wasted twenty years. The CSC was renamed to what is now known as OSCE,² which, mainly takes care of human rights and observing elections. For Russia, OSCE is primarily an instrument used to interfere in its internal affairs. We may not care about Russian’s complaints, but what about the all-European system of peace and security? In June 2008 President Medvedev gave a speech in Berlin suggesting again a “European Security Order from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” He only mentioned a few principles, avoiding any details. A Russian official told me that otherwise, the West would have immediately thrown the proposal off the table. It’s interesting, such an answer. So far, there has been no substantial response by anyone. The first step was taken a few weeks ago by President Obama and President Medvedev. They have now agreed on a common working group to follow up on the Russian proposal. The Europeans are again in the wait-and-see position, because it’s easier to

1. The Conference of Security and Cooperation.

2. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

criticize possible outcomes, but more difficult to come up with proposals of their own.

The last implication I would like to mention is President George Bush in 1991 demanding a new world order after the end of the bipolar world. There was no response by anyone. But we have a new world order, a unipolar one with the U.S. as the only world power. But after the U.S. military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan Russia, China and India started to question a world order dominated only by the United States. And they are now demanding a multi-polar world. Now we are indeed moving in this direction, with possible poles being the United States, China, India, Japan, Brazil, Russia and hopefully, the European Union. Such a multi-polar world order reminds me of the European order in the 18th and 19th centuries, when various great powers such as France and Great Britain, on the one side, tried hard to counter-balance other great powers such as Prussia, Russia and the Austro-Hungarian empire, or vice versa. The German chancellor at that time, von Bismark, was famous for upholding this balance of power between the different poles. It resulted nevertheless in two devastating world wars.

Just one example of today's multipolar world: Look at the WTO, the World Trade Organization. Look at the negotiations where India and Brazil, and behind them China have formed an alliance against the industrialized countries, preventing any progress. There are already poles playing against other poles. A multipolar world will not naturally be a safe world. Therefore, we are all forced to play an active role and take up global responsibility in one way or another. And we should be aware that the United States and European Union are natural partners. Who else could it be today?

Looking Ahead

A lot remains to do. I didn't even mention economic globalization with all its repercussions facing this nightmare of a global financial crisis and recession. If you think back, globalization with the opening up of China and India started at the end of the 1970s, '80s and early '90s, at the same time the world order changed.

I didn't even mention arms control. For twenty years nothing moved ahead. Now, fortunately, the Americans and Russians are negotiating a follow-up treaty to the START agreement on strategic nuclear systems. Twenty years after. Nothing is going on in conventional systems and other parts (short-range missiles, etc.).

Nevertheless, mainly the Europeans and our American friends have many reasons to be grateful for what happened twenty years ago. After that peaceful revolution we got new opportunities to shape a peaceful Europe and a better world. No generation before us had similar opportunities. They didn't even dare to dream of it. But what we need now are politicians, business leaders, academics and social elites of all kinds with an historic understanding, far-sighted strategic and global thinkers, with the courage to make decisions and to act. Let's do it. Thank you.

Questions & Responses

In the political atmosphere in Germany, does the older generation have problems with the way the younger generation deals with such issues as Russia and NATO?

Fortunately, NATO is not questioned any more. Besides, the so-called Leftist party members are mainly former Communists of the fallen GDR. Quite often there's a discussion whether the East Germans are satisfied with reunification or not. There was just a poll saying two-thirds of the East Germans are satisfied. I always remind people that we had 2.1 million members of the Communist party in the GDR, and they all lost privileges. We didn't shoot them after the reunification — they are still there. They vote for this Leftist party. This party questions NATO, but nobody else in Germany does. Therefore it's not an issue. A current difficult discussion here and in Europe is Afghanistan. The people there face tremendous problems, and it's easy to say "Leave Afghanistan." But if we fail in Afghanistan, then NATO fails. It's a NATO issue, not just an American issue. My friend Henry Kissinger just published an article; if you read it you get the impression only the Americans are fighting, and only the Americans will lose or win the battle. But no — we will lose or win the battle together.

What about the EU? The European Union has critics on all sides, primarily questioning a big bureaucracy in Brussels, which is dominating domestic affairs more and more. This is not quite fair, because decisions of the EU are always compromises between 27 heads of government! Therefore, it's never a satisfying result. The politicians make decisions, then go home to their national parliaments and claim, "Well the decision taken in Brussels is not good enough, we are angry." Then they expect the people to be in favor of the EU! This can't work. During the recent elections, politicians criticized the EU. Asked why, they said, well we are close to our voters who are criticizing the EU, and we have to listen to them. But the voters are criticizing the EU because they heard it first from the politicians! It's a vicious circle.

Nevertheless the EU is a success story and we must go ahead. We can't leave it just to the politicians. Academics have to tell the students that this is a really brilliant goal, and that it's worthwhile to fight for it. Many question all the crises in the EU — well, I'm very much in favor of crisis. If you watch the history of the EU, it's a history of crisis. When I started in the government there was a fundamental crisis in 1983 in the EU, and Germany was chairing

the EU. Margaret Thatcher was fighting with Mitterand: Mitterand was deeply insulted by Margaret Thatcher and left the room. Helmut Kohl, who was the chairman, went out brought Mitterand back to the negotiating table. In any fundamental crisis of the EU, we have some courageous politicians who settle the problem and move ahead. So I'm very much in favor of crisis.

I think the EU and NATO is accepted by the elderly and the young. Here is the only problem we face with youngsters: they can travel around Europe without any border checks, with the same currency — they are used to all these advantages. It's natural. When I travel now to Poland, to Prague, to Hungary, you cross the border — there *is* no border any more. That's just unbelievable! The United States is a big continent and there are no borders here. But think of the situation if Texas were to have a border, or Indiana to Illinois, and suddenly this border is gone. Our youngsters are used to it. Therefore they don't know, they are not aware of the value of such developments, of such decisions. That's the problem.

I'm from South Korea, so when I hear about German unification it always brings to mind the relationship between North and South Korea, so I have two questions. When the Wall broke down in 1989, what were the implications of that incident to Asian countries, Asian communist countries like China, Viet Nam, or North Korea? The second question is, it seems like the situation of East Germany in 1989 is different from the current situation in North Korea. North Korea is much more isolated, and the dictatorship is really admired by the people. So do you think that reunification of North and South Korea is possible?

There would be significant repercussions on China. For China the break-up of the Soviet Union was a nightmare. China will try hard to prevent a development which might lead to a situation where China could break up. Think of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, what is going on. I just spent my holidays in May this year in Xinjiang. I drove for one week just through this province, and you could see how strategically important this province is for China. There are brilliant highways, new railways, airports. This is not because China favors improvements. No: this province is of strategic importance for China, because if this province breaks off they face a problem. They have a lot of oil and gas there, they need this province. But there is a strong minority of Uyghurs, and therefore the Chinese will do everything to keep a strong party as the main instrument to run the country, and a strong army to keep the country together. Therefore, they face a lot of difficulties to liberalize China for political reasons.

I go quite often to South Korea and always meet the Minister for Unification and always get the same questions. The ministers change every two years in South Korea, and I always get the same question, “When do you think it might happen? Reunification of Korea?” I tell them, “You never know. It could happen tomorrow, it could happen next year, it could happen in five years. Who knows?” You see? The system is bankrupt, it could collapse any day. Who knows?

Then the other question, “Did you have a plan in your desk on how to unify Germany?” My answer all the time is, “Fortunately not.” Because it would have been wrong. You can’t plan such a situation. I’m absolutely sure that you can develop a hell of a lot of plans and they will all be wrong. The only thing they could do better than we did is to think about the economic development of North Korea if unification starts, how to prevent the North Koreans from immediately moving to the south. That’s a real problem. Therefore, they need a plan to start investments to keep the people in North Korea. The other thing they could learn from us is that they need support from outside. What about the Americans? There is some anti-Americanism in Korea. I try to convince them that the main support we got was from the Americans. Two reasons: they took care of our security, and this was our first priority. We could move because we were safe, because of the alliance of the French and the Americans. I think it is necessary to tell the South Koreans that they need the Americans for security reasons, whether they like them or not.

The other consideration is China, the most influential neighboring country to North Korea. Therefore South Korea must have an interest in developing close and friendly relations with China. The better the relations are, the better for them. Otherwise China won’t support unification. As for Russian and Japan: the Six-Party talks including Russia and Japan — they are not as important. Nevertheless it’s good to have them as friends.

The last point I tried to explain to them: it’s good to develop the so-called “sunshine policy.” That means that bilaterally South and North Korea should try hard to develop small steps but nevertheless steps for cooperation, of whatever kind, to keep the people from being alienated, to keep them together. Sort of an adjusted family reunion. I think this is very important. These are lessons they could learn from us.

Will Turkey ever be part of the European Union?

Turkey has been part of NATO for many decades, and when we wrote speeches for the Chancellor explaining why NATO is necessary, we said it's not only a military organization, it's more importantly a political alliance. It's common values. Now we have the discussion on Turkey and its membership in the EU. Most of the EU members say, well, we can't bring Turkey into the EU because there are no common values. It's not an easy question, but you see we promised Turkey they could become a member of the EU by agreement. We say in politics "*pacta sunt servanda*" — if there's an agreement you have to stick to it. Secondly, serious negotiations are ongoing. It will take time to come to a final result. It might take ten years, it might take even fifty years. But who knows what will happen in ten years, what the situation will be? But it's not an easy decision. Because you see, Germany has traditionally a very close relationship with Turkey. Our German emperor built the first railway there. We have many Turks in Germany; Berlin is the third largest Turkish city. But the real problem are the cultural differences, religious differences. As long as young Turkish girls are killed in Germany by their brothers or fathers because they want to live as German girls, then you won't find a lot support for the membership. Are Turks really willing or able to integrate? Many say, not yet. We built a hell of a lot of mosques in Germany. Yet nobody's allowed to build a Christian church in Turkey. They want all rights here in Germany, but they don't accept similar rights at home. Therefore it must be reciprocal – you have to change and we have to change. This could take ten years. Why not? When I was in government I had a Swiss counterpart who told me once, well, our politics vis-à-vis the EU is, we are eager for external integration. What does that mean? It means we are able to join because we do everything necessary to be able to join, but we don't join. I tell the Turkish partners all the time, that's the right process for them. Become *able* to join the EU, then it's just a question of *when* they can join. But as long as they are not willing to adjust to the rules of the EU, it's difficult. Therefore don't talk about membership, talk first about moving in the right direction. The same holds for the Ukraine, for example. They should work hard to become able to join.

In a speech at the Brandenburg Gate by the Berlin Wall in June 1987, President Ronald Reagan challenged to Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down this wall." What was the immediate reaction to that speech?

I took part in that meeting, and I was deeply moved. I was angry at the German media and German opposition parties who were criticizing Reagan.

My position was — Look, here is our main alliance partner coming to Germany and we haven't asked him to give that speech. He stands in front of the Wall, and he tells his counterpart in Moscow to "tear down this Wall," in favor of our interests! All the while we are criticizing him. And two years later the Wall came down. But you see it is always customary for the Germans to criticize American presidents. We will see what happens with Obama in a few years.

When will Czechoslovakia give in and help with the renovation of the EU?

Well, I've known the Czech president for twenty years. People say he's a terrible, terrible guy. In one respect, I do understand the Czechs and the Poles. The national pride, the national feeling of the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians was the vehicle to emancipate themselves from the Soviet Union. They were successful in the end; suddenly they were sovereign free countries. But it was their choice to enter the EU as soon as possible. And now, having entered the EU, they learn they are dependent again, but it's not Moscow any more, now it's Brussels. And they have difficulties accepting this. This is something I really believe we have to understand, therefore I don't criticize it too much. But Klaus is really crazy because the parliament has agreed to the Lisbon Treaty — the government has agreed, but not the president. And he wants a new opt-out, of course, so he invents new obstacles. He's suddenly anxious about people like me, a former refugee (Sudeten-Deutscher), coming from the Czech Republic, going back to the Czech Republic and demanding that it give us all our property back, which is absolutely not true. Forget about him.

You said that it was a revolution without a shot. How do you feel that the insiders wanted to deal with the Pope, as far as that was concerned?

You are right. The Pope played an important role. I think it was in 1979 that the Polish Pope went back to Poland the first time and mobilized ten million people there, mainly youngsters. This was a bankrupting of the Communist party, the Communist system. If the Pope could mobilize mainly youngsters in those numbers, it was the final blow to the Communist system. He indeed played a crucial role. He supported Solidarnosc.

I tell you, I admire Lech Valensa. If you think about him, he was at school just for four years of his life. He was an electrician in the ship yards. He became the leader of this movement, Solidarnosc, and overthrew the Communist

system. Unbelievable! He's a great guy. I know him. He carries a picture of the Blessed Mother, always by his heart. He speaks very loudly, powerfully, and sometimes very crazy. I admire him.

An Interview with Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel

What were you doing in the fall of 1989?

In the fall of 1989, I was the U.S. Minister (Deputy Ambassador) in East Berlin, at the U.S. Embassy to East Germany, and as Deputy Ambassador oversaw the operations of the U.S. Embassy. I was also reporting on economic and political events, which as we all know in the fall of 1989 was a dramatic and very interesting position from which to observe the revolution closely.

Do you have any particularly vivid memories of that time, particularly of October?

In October, one of the most critical events was the 40th anniversary of the East German government, celebrating the founding of the German Democratic Republic, East Germany, in 1949. Shortly before that celebration, the East German government issued a new requirement for an exit visa for East Germans to travel to other Warsaw Pact countries (Czechoslovakia at the time, and Hungary), many of whom were fleeing the country and the East Bloc. As a result of that visa requirement, East German authorities began turning people back from the border, and eighteen East Germans came to seek asylum in the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin. In the afternoon of October 3, 18 desperate East Germans came in to the embassy with five children under the age of 5. They feared reprisals from their government. Of course, we in the U.S. Embassy could not put them back on the street, where they would be immediately arrested and detained. Instead, we began negotiations with the East German Government to gain their free passage to the West. The U.S. Ambassador, my boss, Richard Barkley, called Wolfgang Vogel, the lawyer for East Germany's leader, Mr. Honecker, with whom we had dealt with for many years for spy exchanges, including Natan Sharansky in 1985.

The negotiations began overnight with Vogel for the release of the 18 asylum-seekers, for their free passage to West Berlin. But the next morning, apparently following a report that asylum was possible, some 200 people arrived on the street outside the front door of the embassy. For us inside the embassy it was a dramatic, frightening moment, because the 200 newcomers were attempting to force their way to the door to try to join the 18 people already inside. The archway around the door was very weak and supported only by a plywood frame, which could easily collapse, which could crush the people we had taken in. It took us all day to negotiate the release for the 18 asylum-

seekers inside the Embassy. The asylum seekers were not easily convinced that Wolfgang Vogel, known for representing the dictatorial Honecker, could gain freedom for them. They also could not actually leave the embassy until the 200 East Germans on the street were cleared from the front of the embassy. A shocking moment came when a woman and her children sat down on the sidewalk and were literally picked up by the police and moved to the back of a truck, evoking images of the Nazi period transports. These images were all captured on television with the Embassy in the background. Wolfgang Vogel actually called us when he saw the television images and added the mother and children to the asylum list. At the end of the day, after these very dramatic moments, the 18 people walked free from the embassy with a pass to go to West Berlin and to freedom.

And there were more such moments at the checkpoints later in early November. Do you recall any scenes from that time?

The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, of course, was the most dramatic event. I began that evening attending a reception in West Berlin with and Wolfgang Vogel. At the end of the reception, which included the mayors of East and West Berlin and the Allied Commanders among others, Vogel asked if I would give him a ride back to East Berlin where his car was waiting. I took the opportunity to inquire about the debate that had been the focus of political attention in the fall of 1989 about the right of the East Germans to travel. The freedom to travel had failed to materialize in the East German law, despite promises to allow it. On November 6, after Honecker was deposed by the Politburo, the last effort to change the travel law, to make it more liberal, had failed dramatically after hundreds of thousands of people went to the streets to protest the change was not enough.

On our way back to his car in West Berlin, Vogel told me that the Politburo had met and had revised the travel law once again with the hope that that would ease travel for East Germans and provide a political release-valve and ease the crisis confronting the East German government. With this news, I rushed to the embassy; it was an exciting development. I had this hot news from Honecker's lawyer and wished to get the news to Washington. However, Politburo press spokesman Günter Schabowski had just given a press conference, in which he announced that East Germans were free to travel. The East German spokesman had made a comment in response to a question about the right to travel, similar to what Wolfgang Vogel had told me, except Schabowski's statement was very unclear, and it was not written.

For the next hour and a half, we tried to inform the State Department and the White House and the rest of the U.S. government in West Berlin about the unfolding events, while NBC journalist Tom Brokaw was reporting from West Berlin. Brokaw had been at the Schabowski press conference and reported that the Berlin Wall was open. We had no confirmation that the East-West border was open. During that hour and a half we had people at the Berlin checkpoints reporting on developments while we tried to find the text of what actually had been said. The East German government was in disarray; they had no idea what was being done in response to Schabowski's statement. His mumbled, perplexed and perplexing statement had created widespread confusion and speculation.

We finally obtained a text prepared by the East German Government and reported to Washington that East Germans could travel with a visa. We confirmed the White House had the Politburo announcement, and we predicted that East Germans would begin traveling to the West very soon in very large numbers. Having concluded business for the day, I drove home through East Berlin's Schoenhauserallee and crossed Bornholmerstrasse toward Pankow. On my way I saw a confrontation at the Bornholmerstrasse checkpoint. The Bornholmerstrasse checkpoint, manned by East German border guards with a shoot-to-kill order, was being challenged by East Germans yelling "Tor auf!" (Open the gate!). On the other side of the bridge, over the light-rail S-Bahn in Berlin, was a TV camera. One could see the lights. So I rushed home to watch what happened—whether the guards would kill these people, or repel them and send them home.

As soon as we arrived home, we learned from West German television that the protesters at Bornholmerstrasse were suddenly allowed through the gate to West Berlin. The border guards opened the gate and the people went through which became the message conveyed by West German, Spiegel, TV. This television event did not depict what the East German government had said—travel allowed with a visa—everyone could travel immediately. No one knew how whether the opportunity would last.

Masses of people soon ruled the streets in East Germany, and by morning they were going back and forth across the Bornholmerstrasse checkpoint and other checkpoints. The East German government sought in vain to maintain control. The government attempted to impose a visa requirement, making an announcement in a press conference, but it waived the requirement by the morning. It attempted to impose the requirement again, this time setting

the visa requirement by noon on Friday, November 10, but it failed again. It attempted to stem the tide of travelers to the West by pushing the visa requirement over the weekend to Monday but that venture failed also. In effect that wavering position ended the communists' authority to control travel altogether.

Information came out later that although the border guards at Bornholmerstrasse and other checkpoints had standing orders to shoot, but did not have orders to carry out the standing order. They did not want to shoot people, and they thought perhaps they could let people go by invalidating their ID cards, expelling them from East Germany. By this method, they had hoped to keep the number of people willing to cross the border, losing their citizenship, to a minimum. The irony is that the courageous ones who crossed arrived in the West in front of the television cameras, and the television message was that they were free. This message brought throngs of people to the border and they gained their freedom.

It all happened so astonishingly fast. Can you interpret what was going on in a general sense, what really happened to make all of that possible?

Mikhail Gorbachev, who was trying to reform Communism to save it, akin to what Roosevelt said he wanted to do for capitalism in the Great Depression, sought long-term change in the Soviet system. He started implementing this "New Thinking" (*glasnost*) in 1985 by declaring the Soviet Union committed to openness, that is, some ability to talk and be free, and to reform the economy—*perestroika*, he called it.

The Solidarity Movement in Poland was a critical component in the revolutionary process all throughout the 1980s, leading to an election in June, 1989 that brought the first non-Communist parliamentarians into government. At the same time, the Hungarians were making decisions on their own; the critical one was in March 1989 when they decided to sign the U.N. Convention on Refugees, putting them in conflict with the Warsaw Pact obligation to return fleeing East Germans to East Germany; instead they declared the fleeing East Germans refugees and set them free to leave for Austria from Hungary.

There were tremendous changes underway, but we still believed in the fall of 1989 that if the Soviet Union were to intervene militarily anywhere to protect its interests, it would be in East Germany. After all, they still had 300,000-

400,000 Soviet forces plus the East German army in East Germany, on alert, ready to act. Those were the facts. To think otherwise was political conjecture.

Speaking of the politics of all this, what are the implications of the peaceful revolution in East Germany? For East Germany itself there are obvious ones, but also for West Germany, for the larger European project?

The first issue was whether this was a reform, that is to renew the GDR, which is what the East German revolutionaries began, or whether it was truly a peaceful (as it turns out) revolution. All the available definitions under “revolution” in the German language dictionary contain references to violence, so there was a huge debate about whether there was in fact a revolution at all, which went on for another ten years. Some Germans refer to the momentous political events as only “the turn,” like turning a corner, which is a very soft depiction of what actually happened.

The East German economy, society, and government, all disappeared or were fundamentally changed. The result was that the definition of revolution, except for violence, was fulfilled. The East German experience ended with unification of West and East Germany and Berlin.

The point of the revolution is a really basic one; that is, the Germans in East Germany were seeking freedom and took a stand on the travel law. Freedom in the East was repressed for forty years, but could not be repressed any longer. The quick entry into the European Union for East Germany, an EU enlargement, became the greater message for Europe: the European Union would absorb new members. The first European Union enlargement happened on October 3, 1990, when East Germany joined the European Union. This was a signal to European Union members that the EU could provide peace and stability in Europe, and perhaps even prosperity. Maybe blooming landscapes in East Germany would not arrive in five years, but unification of Germany still provided that hope for prosperity.

What lessons if any should be drawn from those events?

The first lesson is that human desire for freedom cannot be forever repressed. But the second very, very important issue is security. In order to have freedom you have to have security. The sealing of the success of this revolution came from the decisions of the Two-Plus-Four negotiations for unification, which was not “re” unification; that would have included Poland and Kaliningrad

and other places from the borders of pre-World War II Germany. Unification of Germany came in three parts: East and West Germany and Berlin. Of course the decision for unified Germany to remain in NATO, which had provided security for Western Europe, was necessary for the security of Western Europe.

President George H.W. Bush's decision to set NATO membership as a key condition and principle for his negotiations was critical. Secretary Baker negotiated with both Shevardnadze in the Soviet Union and Minister Genscher in Germany, and he was brilliant in winning the acceptance of the Soviets for German membership in NATO. The broad consequences of this decision resulted in Germany, the German Bundeswehr, absorbing the East German army and providing stability and security for East Germany through Bundeswehr-Ost. The Soviets withdrew peacefully by 1994. Throughout the 1990s Germany has taken on very important roles in NATO with the approval of the Bundestag, first in missions flying over Hungary with AWACs (radar aircraft) and then deploying first support troops and later combat troops. By 1997 the Germans had a Bundeswehr General in the chain of command giving them political decision-making for combat troops for the first time since World War II.

Then in 1999, came the decision of the German government along with NATO and Madeline Albright, our Secretary of State at that time, to bomb Kosovo to end the ethnic cleansing by Milosevic. That use of force was very successful, and it ended the long debate in Germany about, "*Nie wieder Krieg von deutschem Boden*" or "Never again shall war emanate from German soil." War does start in other places that affect Germany. Joschka Fischer justified the bombing campaign in 1999, with the motto: "*Nie wieder Auschwitz;*" that is, that there should be intervention by the international community to protect the vulnerable where needed. That principle is now embedded in the United Nations Principle to Protect (P2P). Today the German Bundeswehr forces deployed with NATO in Afghanistan have a mandate to protect human dignity.

What lessons should students at Notre Dame draw from this? Notre Dame is very insistent that students become leaders and help change the world. Is there anything you can remember from these events that would be inspiring to the students?

Well, first of all I must say that my two children graduated from Notre Dame University, and are imbued with one of the fundamental values that we've been

talking about: respect for human dignity. Such respect is the critical element of freedom. The way to commit yourself to success in your own personal life is to commit yourself to basic and fundamental values, values that I know are taught here at Notre Dame. And the respect for human dignity is the underlying value for successful public policy. Military force is also necessary, but if you use military force without the backing of fundamental human rights and respect for human dignity, you will not succeed.

This lesson of respect for human dignity is the basic value that Notre Dame teaches and students learn whether you are in business, politics or history. It all comes back to values. You learn your basics because you are a worthy person yourself and you respect others. Success will follow.

Biography

Horst M. Teltschik



Horst Teltschik, former national security advisor for German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, graduated in political science, modern history, and international law from the Freie Universität Berlin (Free University of Berlin). Previously, he headed the division of foreign and intra-German relations, development policy and external security (foreign & security office) within the federal chancellery.

Teltschik became chief executive of the Bertelsmann foundation in 1991, one of Germany's most influential political think tanks. From 1993 to June 2000, he was in charge of public affairs and served on the management board of BMW. Teltschik continued to serve the BMW board as a representative to Central and Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Middle East until 2003 when he became president of Boeing Germany.

In addition, Teltschik lectured at the economics faculty of the Technical University of Munich from 1996 to 2007, where he was appointed honorary professor in 2003. From 1999 to 2008, he chaired the Munich Security Conference.

Today, Teltschik advises an international clientele on business and political issues. He sits on the supervisory and advisory boards of German, Swiss, and American companies as well as non-profit organizations. Teltschik has been president of the German-Israeli business association (Deutsch-Israelische Wirtschaftsvereinigung, DIW) in Munich and vice president of the Israeli-German chamber of commerce in Tel Aviv.

Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel



J.D. Bindenagel, Vice President for Community, Government, and International Affairs, manages and develops governmental and international relationships that support DePaul University's mission to prepare students to influence and shape the world in which they live. He is responsible for deepening DePaul's local, global and government relationships in Chicago, Illinois, Washington and the world through higher education policy advocacy and public support for academic programs.


Bindenagel served in the U.S. Army, the State Department and in the U.S. Embassies in East, West and united Germany in various capacities from 1972 to 2003. He was U.S. Chargé d'Affaires and deputy chief of mission in the U.S. Embassy, Bonn, Germany, from 1994 to 1997 and director for Central European Affairs in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs at the State Department from 1992 to 1994. He was U.S. deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, East Germany, at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and helped negotiate the reunification of Germany.

Due to his extensive experience as a former American ambassador and 28-year veteran of the U.S. diplomatic corps, Bindenagel was appointed by President Bill Clinton in 1999 as U.S. Ambassador and Special Envoy for Holocaust issues and negotiated agreements on compensation for World War II-era forced labor, insurance, art, and property restitution as well as Holocaust education, research and remembrance.

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