Islam and Citizenship in Germany
Jonathan Laurence

Germany’s status as home to the largest Muslim population in Western Europe after France, shows that a significant Muslim population at the heart of Europe need not produce either violent Islamist groups or destabilizing social unrest. Successive governments have either been fairly lucky or impressively far-sighted with their practice of urban planning techniques that avoided creating inner city ghettos. Furthermore, Turkish migrants and their German-born offspring have not been associated with any significant unrest or terrorism, and the 1999 citizenship law reform removed the principal obstacle to integration by automatically granting German nationality to most children born to legally resident foreigners. Politicians now acknowledge that Germany is a country of immigration, with a large and permanent Turkish and Muslim component at peace with its environment. While it is in itself an accomplishment to have avoided a worst-case scenario, however, German officials know they lost valuable time debating for decades whether the Federal Republic was an immigration country while the foreign-origin population grew into the millions.

The emergence of well-organized Muslim religious communities in Germany’s major cities – and the integration difficulties experienced among some young people of Muslim background – have renewed some of the same counterproductive debates over naturalization and citizenship for Turkish residents that took place in the 1980s and 1990s, although this time the debates focus more explicitly on Islam. The controversy, then as now, revolved around whether law-abiding citizens who espouse views contrary to the fundamental norms and values of contemporary German society should be excluded from the polity – either by denying them citizenship or by excluding them from any formal dialogue with the government. Contemporary German debates focus on how to designate appropriate interlocutors in state-Islam relations and how to inculcate Muslim leaders and religious associations with German values, or Leitkultur. German politicians tend to think that a set of “shared values” (beyond simply abiding by the constitution) should be required as the precondition for formal discussions rather than viewed as a desired goal of dialogue.

Such tensions have long characterized German policy debates: becoming German, for example, has always been tied to giving up Turkish citizenship. Likewise, granting full rights and equal administrative recognition to Muslim organizations in state-religion relations – e.g. for teaching Islam in public schools or generally being consulted by the state’s local and national religion offices – is conditioned upon religious leaders’ public repudiation of Muslims’ putative socio-cultural characteristics, such as inequitable gender relations. This theme resurfaced last year with the proposal in several German Länder to ask every naturalization candidate whose origin is in a Muslim-majority country how he or she feels about homosexuals, blacks, and a woman’s choice of careers. presumes that anyone with a Muslim background is likely to subscribe to culturally-based prejudices. The problem with formulating such demands as the price for entry into the German polity, however, is that it appears to presuppose an inherent incompatibility between Islam and the German republic which, in turn, has provoked a general defensiveness and

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cries of double standards from Turkish and Muslim organizations. How this debate develops will define the kind of environment – either mutually suspicious or integration-minded – in which the first generation of native-born Turkish Germans will grow up.

A Relative Success Story

The German Muslim population’s relative quiescence contrasts with the image of rioters in France and UK “home-grown” terrorists. For many in Germany, those cases offered evidence that mastering the local language and even acquiring citizenship were “necessary but not sufficient” conditions for actual integration. Germany’s defenders have long argued that next-door France produced generations of “français de papier” (“officially French”) without creating “français de coeur” (“wholeheartedly French”). German Länder have long practiced a stringent naturalization regime that emphasizes an individual’s identification with Germany above less subjective indicators such as length of residence or place of birth.

Additionally, German cities have long practiced urban planning techniques that now appear far-sighted. Local governments made an effort in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s to avoid creating urban ghettos: ceilings on foreigners quotas were instituted in subsidized housing, municipalities hired professional mediators to resolve cultural disputes in densely populated areas, and cities classified as having “special renewal needs” received extra money. Despite fears of spillover from French riots in fall 2005, no German cities saw anything similar; only two cars were set alight in Berlin in October-November that year. Fears of contagion and confrontation were similarly misplaced during the 2006 Mohammed caricatures affair: more journalists than demonstrators responded to a call for protest in a Berlin mosque.

Table 1: Population of Turkish Origin in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>132,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>469,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>910,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,546,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,779,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,371,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,500,000-2,600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown by recent French experiences with a large immigrant-origin minority, however, political and socio-economic inequality and discrimination are a volatile mix. The dividends of good fortune and prescience are not endless, and German politicians’ long refusal to acknowledge a diverse society has had its costs. The equity of the system is in jeopardy, as educational and employment statistics make abundantly clear. There are the makings of a parallel society or an underclass, and the streaming of immigrant-origin children in secondary schools should be reoriented and bolstered with programs that address real integration needs – from further political outreach to developing effective anti-discrimination measures.

A series of problems must still be addressed more effectively if the genuine integration that will ensure social peace and stability is to be created. Practical issues, especially education and jobs, matter most to the disadvantaged individuals among the more than two million of Turkish origin and the hundreds of thousands of others of Muslim background. The relationship between Germany’s Muslim population and the German national community was until recently conditioned by the political class’s refusal to
acknowledge that Germany is “a country of immigration” and that the Muslim population is there to stay. Conceiving Muslim residents – largely of Turkish origin – as “guest workers” rather than immigrants, the state long refused to grant them citizenship.

Turks’ own uncertainty over whether they would eventually return “home” and a tendency toward linguistic and social segregation were reinforced for two generations by German administrative practices. Now accounting for just under 3 per cent of the general population, Turks constitute the largest immigrant group – 27 per cent of the Germany’s 7.3 million foreigners – and amount to roughly three-quarters of its 3.2–3.4 million Muslims. However, use of the designation “Muslim” belies a population with many crosscutting identities and values – both among Turks and the nearly one million other Muslims not of Turkish origin. Turks in Germany are themselves divided into “subgroups [that] have little in common with each other,” along lines of ethnicity, political affiliation, class, urban-rural origin, and degree of modernity and religiosity: Kurds and Turks, Sufis and non-Sufis, Kemalists and anti-Kemalists, secularists and pious Muslims, and German citizens and non-citizens. Because the old citizenship law did not provide for the automatic acquisition of German nationality upon birth in the territory, second and third generation Turks were not automatically granted citizenship. Even as the total foreign population grew to 9 per cent in the 1990s, successive Christian Democrat (CDU)-led governments affirmed that the federal republic was “not a country of immigration.” Many of the 9 per cent would have naturalized if they lived in a country with ius soli (the right to acquire citizenship through residence) such as the US or France, especially the more than one million "native-born foreigners."vi

Since 2000, however, German outlook and policy have changed; the reality of immigration and permanent settlement is now recognized and a new willingness, in principle, to extend citizenship has developed. However, the view that integration should precede naturalization – the requirement that Turks and other Muslims should first integrate and demonstrate their “German-ness” before they may acquire that citizenship – remains a formidable brake on the process.

Because the Muslim population and its religious leadership are still overwhelmingly foreign, the German authorities can use naturalization and foreigners’ law (Ausländergesetz) to filter out what (and whom) they deem inadmissible by refusing to grant citizenship or to renew the residence permits of individuals whose views they do not share. Even those politicians who appear actively to support integration are in fact setting a very high bar, with demanding language courses and loyalty tests, not only requiring would-be naturalized Muslims to be more familiar with things German than most Germans are but also to sign up to currently fashionable ideological positions on gender relations and sexual mores, for example, as proof of Germanness as well as their modernist/democratic credentials.vii

The liberalization of citizenship law since 2000 has been accompanied by increasingly demanding conditions for full participation, from ideologically driven civic loyalty tests to intensified surveillance of Muslim associations. This apparent contradiction – paying lip service to integration while making practical aspects difficult to achieve – reflects the fundamental tension between an ethno-cultural vision of Germany that predominated until recently and a genuine, new desire to address the realities of a diverse society. The emphasis on ideological correctness, illustrated by the proposed use of demanding naturalization questionnaires requiring applicants to agree with current German public opinion on certain questions, leads the authorities to stigmatize as inherently “un-German” immigrant opinion that subscribes
even to entirely non-violent varieties of Islamist thinking. There are grounds for thinking that this very demanding conception of integration actually means something more like “assimilation,” and thus expresses an unstated (but conscious) opposition to integration in fact.

Policing Extremism

This complication arises from reunified Germany’s careful balancing of free speech and democratic order. The dual experiences of dictatorship under National Socialism from 1933 to 1945 and “Real Existing Socialism”, i.e. Communism, in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) from 1949 to 1990 continues to shape political culture and the authorities’ willingness to engage Muslim community organizations. Protecting democratic institutions is a central tenet of the constitution, and some surveillance of those on the borderline between “condoning violence” and “committing violence” is necessary. The government’s power to place right wing or left wing extremists – and sympathizers or sponsors of terrorist groups – under surveillance or even ban them outright has helped define postwar values and the appropriate limits of free speech. But given their small numbers, it is arguable that Islamists as such are not the primary challenge to Muslim integration in Germany. At the very least, local and national Verfassungsschutz surveillance is an overly blunt instrument that leads to stigmatization – the lumping together of the (many) non-violent with the (few) “potentially violent.” The safeguards against extremism – a combined policy of aggressive mosque raids and the administrative exclusion of “undesirable” (although law abiding) interlocutors – inhibits an open dialogue and gives fodder to extremists who thrive on an antagonistic relationship with the state.

Provincial and national Verfassungsschutz (protection of the constitution) offices, which monitor potentially anti-democratic or un-constitutional activities of both registered and underground civil society groups, are not well adapted to dealing with Islamist organizations (such as Milli Görü, IGMG). To be labeled an “Islamist” and placed on the constitutional observation list can, for example, lead to refusal of citizenship, public housing and even residence permits. It also entails intensive surveillance of certain organizations and their members even if those organizations are law-abiding.

Local and federal authorities have concentrated on the role of Islamism as the potential locus of anti-democratic behavior, including terrorism. In the definition of one local constitutional protection office, Islamists are those who “want God, not the people, as the highest authority, with Shari’a as the basis for this state.” In all, 28 Muslim organizations (up from 24 in 2004) – a mix of Arab, Pakistani, Turkish and Turkish-German associations – are classified as “Islamist” in the 2005 federal report on extremists (Länder-level offices also release biannual reports on these and other organizations). In order to arrive at the number of “Islamists”, authorities count those belonging (or paying dues) to these organizations – a methodology that has been surprisingly uncontroversial. The federal Verfassungsschutz estimates that roughly 1 per cent (or 32,100) of the Muslim population in Germany is Islamist. Of this group, the two largest nationalities were Turkish (27,250) and Arab (various nationalities: 3,350). The figure of 27,250 Turks, however, consists almost entirely of the 26,500 members of the Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görü (IGMG). Also included are around 1,300 Muslim Brotherhood members (half of whom are affiliated with the Islamische Gemeinschaft–Deutschland in Munich), and roughly 500 members of Tablighi Jama’a (although their annual meeting draws around 1,000 participants).
This policing of thought is experienced by Turks and other Muslims as discriminatory, hostile in spirit and frequently provocative in practice. At the same time, it complicates the business of organizing effective consultation between the authorities and Muslim religious leaders in respect of the management of Muslim religious life and practice in Germany, by inhibiting the equitable representation of the various points of view within the Muslim population. Given their small numbers, it is arguable that Islamists are not the primary challenge to Muslim integration in Germany. At the very least, Verfassungsschutz surveillance is an overly blunt instrument that leads to stigmatization and the lumping together of the many non-violent with the few potentially violent.

**The Long Arm of the Turkish State**

A further complication arises from the Turkish government’s effort to monopolize the representation of Muslims in Germany through the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DTB), an instrument of its attempt to guard against the possible growth of opposition in the Turkish diaspora. The survival of the secularist Turkish order depends in part on keeping Islamist and other minority elements in check at home and abroad. For the few first decades of the Turkish settlement in Germany, the authorities relied on the DTB for most practical matters relating to Islam such as visas for imams, permits for mosque construction and teachers for religious education in public schools.

The German state’s handling of this set of issues is complicated by the fact that the majority of Muslims in Germany are still Turkish nationals and that they were denied easy access to German citizenship for nearly forty years (1961-1999). As a result, the state has in effect outsourced management of Islam, relying on what is essentially an extension of the Turkish state, the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İleri Türk-Islam Birliği: DTB), to tend to the Turkish population’s religious needs. This arrangement was consistent with treating the Turks as resident aliens, and it helped provide services such as prayer space, imams, religious education in public schools and the like, while avoiding direct engagement with Turkish Islamists who had also settled in German cities. But it has not easily accommodated the Alevi element of the Turkish population, let alone the non-Turkish element of the Muslim population. It also has led some Sunni Turks to gravitate toward a Cologne-based dissident organization, Milli Görü (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görü, IGMG: the “Islamic Community of the National Vision”), which is rooted in long-term political opposition to the secular Turkish state and promotes a more visible, central role for religion in daily life.

Germany is home to 75 per cent of all Turkish citizens abroad, and since 1978 DTB has sent over preachers trained in state seminaries. Its first German branch was established in Berlin in 1982, and within two years, 250 organizations were gathered under its umbrella. Under a 1984 bilateral treaty, it has arranged for three to four-year German residence permits (and a Turkish-paid salary) for roughly 700 imams. It controls over 300 associations and 800-900 prayer spaces; in 2004 it financed two chairs in Islamic theology at Frankfurt’s Goethe University (the first in Germany). Imams are sent “to spread healthy religious information and encourage peaceful coexistence. This is a benefit to the country, since we cannot wait for Germany to get around to training imams”. A program with the Goethe Institute in Ankara led in 2006 to a first contingent of 50 imams who received language training before going to Germany; 100 more were planned in 2007. Similarly, DTB pays salaries for Turkish-trained teachers in Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and
Baden-Württemburg, where it handles Islamic education in public schools. The Turkish government offers its own version of Islam for its émigrés: a religious practice within the secular Turkish framework, complete with clergy who stick to sermons centrally approved and posted on an Ankara website each Friday.xxii

The privileged relationship between DTB and German governments has come into conflict with the plural nature of the German Muslim population, notably the presence of Arab Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds as well as supporters of alternative currents of Turkish Islamism. The dilemma for the German authorities is that they need Ankara’s cooperation in certain practical matters but cannot afford to yield to DTB’s monopolist pretensions without prejudice to the integration of all legitimate (constitutional) currents of religious and political opinion within the immigrant population.

**Representing Muslims**

Elaborate provisions exist for state recognition and accommodation of religious communities -- from the “church tax” to the more obscure “public corporation status” that allows publicly funded religious education and chaplains in public institutionsxxiii -- but Muslim organizations were largely excluded from this web of institutional relations for the first three generations of the contemporary Turkish settlement. German governments need Muslim interlocutors to consult on a variety of policies and practices that make up state-church relations under Article 140 of the constitution. That article, carried over from the Weimar Republic, places such relations under Länder jurisdiction, and a variety of Muslim associations have been involved in informal local consultations for several years.xxiii However, these consultations have suffered due to the tension between official Turkish Islam and Islamist activists. Either IGMG is excluded or DTB does not participate. Moreover, these councils have been ad hoc and non-binding, resembling single-issue coalitions for specific tasks such as mosque construction. Their existence is subject to the whim of local officials. An inclusive political process that affirms Muslims’ institutional equality in state-religion relations and draws on all major organizations has been missing.

Dissension among religious leaders, which local administrators fuel by favoring DTB, has led to continued de facto inequalities in exercise of religion. Muslim students’ rights to religion courses have been subordinated to bickering between federations, and local conflicts over mosque construction are still common. Competing Muslim associations hoping to provide Islamic education in more public schools have no incentive to cooperate since they too often receive their mandates by court order or administrative decree. Many mundane issues of policy and practice have been unattended to for years, such as standards for halal slaughter, appointment of Muslim representatives to public television and radio advisory councils and regulation of the amplified call to prayer. Given the visibility and sensitivity of Islam in the public realm – and the long-established Jewish, Protestant and Catholic national representative councils for state-church relations – there has been a growing desire among both German administrators and leaders of Muslim religious associations for Islam to speak in a single voice on practical religious matters at the federal level.xxiv

Criteria for participation in a formal dialogue remain controversial, dominated by fear of including Islamists, which reflects the extent to which even the most banal discussions of practical religious accommodation have been influenced by Verfassungsschutz reports. The same sort of litmus test that characterizes naturalization policies influences federal officials responsible for contacts with
religious leaders. Ex-Chancellor Schröder’s counter-terrorism adviser argued the time was not ripe to speak to the main contending Muslim federations: “The state must ensure that all participants are loyal to the constitution, but mainstream federations still include some representatives who are under observation by the Verfassungsschutz”. xxv

Similar concerns animated recent French and Italian “state-religion” consultations with Muslim religious leaders, which similarly came up against the reality of low membership within the federations that claimed to be representative of an entire community: only 10-20 per cent of Muslims actually affiliate with these organizations. Unlike the French Council for the Muslim Religion, which represents only prayer spaces, at stake in German consultations are also public education funds to pay for the teachers and curriculum that will influence hundreds of thousands of young Muslims’ first formal encounter with Islam.

### Table 2: Muslim Federations and Affiliates (2006)xxvi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federation</th>
<th>Member Organizations [and members]</th>
<th>Cultural Centers/Prayer Spaces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DTB (Cologne, 1984)</td>
<td>300 [110,000 – 150,000 members]</td>
<td>780-880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZMD: Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Eschweiler, 1994)</td>
<td>18 [12,000-20,000 members]</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIKZ: Verband islamische Kulturzentren (Cologne, 1980)</td>
<td>300 [21,000-100,000 members]</td>
<td>200-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR: Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn, 1986)</td>
<td>32 [140,000 members]</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGMG: Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görü (Kerpen, 1974) [member organization of IR]</td>
<td>16 [26,500 members]</td>
<td>400-600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGD: Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (Munich, 1958)</td>
<td>[600 members]</td>
<td>30-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AABF: Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Europa (Cologne, 1993)</td>
<td>90 [25,000 members]</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total affiliates</strong></td>
<td>350,000-600,000 members, 10-15% of all Muslims</td>
<td>c. 2,500-2,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the government’s German Islam Conference, which first met in Berlin’s Charlottenburg Castle on 27 September 2006, there is at long last a national initiative to formally recognize interlocutors for Islam. The makeup of the DIK belies the Interior Ministry’s dual agenda of recognition and religious reform. The membership of the conference consists of 15 state representatives (from the federal, Länder and municipal level) and 15 representatives of Islam in Germany. xxvii On the Muslim side, the five main federations invited to the consultation are the Islamrat, ZMD, DITIB, VIKZ and the Alevis, which together are estimated to represent as many as 15 to 20 per cent of the general Muslim population. Alongside these membership organizations are ten ministerial appointees including, in Schäuble’s words, “representatives of a modern secular Islam from business, society, science and culture.”

### Table 3: German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz)xxviii
Official Working Groups and Themes, Fall 2006 – Fall 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Group 1: The German social order and values consensus</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- e.g. Equality of man and woman; political decision-making processes; families, raising children and youth self-determination; acceptance of the diversity of democratic cultures; secularization (criteria, tendencies, international comparison)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Group 2: Religious questions in the German constitutional context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- e.g. The basic principle of state-church separation; interaction with religious symbols; mosque construction; religious education in the Länder; language courses, including pre-school; equality of boys and girls and co-education (e.g. sport and swimming classes, class trips, sex education; behavior of Muslim boys towards non-Muslim female peers); Imam training and the education of Muslim religion teachers</td>
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<tr>
<th>Working Group 3: Building bridges in the economy and the media</th>
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<tr>
<td>- e.g. youth in the job market (qualifications, etc.); hiring policies in the economy and public sector and self-employment; information policy to undo prejudices in Turkish and German media; religious and cultural identity of selected personalities and role models; forms of secular Islam</td>
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<tr>
<th>Discussion Group 4: Security and Islamism</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- e.g. questions of internal security, Islamist efforts against the free democratic basic order and preventing and exposing Islamist acts of violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The government has been praised for encouraging development of a single body to represent Muslims for religious purposes – especially in its quest to arrive at national standards for allowing religious education for Muslims in public schools. It is an open question, however, whether the DIK will become the forum for the “emancipatory march through institutions” earlier envisioned by the German-Turkish author Zafer Senocak. The main accomplishment of the DIK thus far is to have expanded the group of official interlocutors beyond (although still including) DTB. Follow-up meetings have been held in May 2007 and a major effort at self-organization of leading Muslim federations – the Coordinating Council of Muslims – took place in April 2007.

The ultimate goal of such dialogues is to render the practice of “new” religions like Islam routine while also helping disprove the oft-quoted notion that the West is hostile towards religion (and notably Islam). By doing so and thus accommodating the needs of an emergent religious community, governments can force competing tendencies – including the oft-excluded groups like Milli Görüs and the Alevis – to engage in conversation with one another, DTB and the German state. The authorities need to ensure at both federal and provincial (Länder) levels that whatever institutional arrangements are made for consulting religious leaders respect the plurality of outlooks and organizations that exist.

There is also an important distinction to be made between representation for religious purposes and for social and political purposes. The bilateral dialogues between the state and Muslim religious organizations in the German Islam Conference rightfully addresses matters of religious practice – for instance, mosque-building, halal butchers, cemeteries, and other such matters – but it should not become substitutes for other forms of political participation. The highly political character of the agendas of Working Groups 1 and 2 and Discussion Group 4 underscore this danger (see Table 3 above). There is a vital distinction between representation for religious purposes and representation for other, social and political purposes, yet it appears that the government has sought to ensure that the DIK
combines both of these, radically different, representation functions, despite the fact
that its Muslim participants will have no mandate whatever from the Muslim
populations to represent them on non-religious issues.

The DIK must avoid usurping tasks properly performed by Germany’s political
parties and thus inhibiting them from fulfilling their necessary role in the integration
process. The greatest defense against religious extremism and imported
fundamentalism is intensive interaction to enhance the mutual acquaintance of
Muslim religious associations and the state. The solution to alienation, however, is not
to encourage formation of a cohesive “faith community” in the DIK or elsewhere and
so risk ethicizing socio-economic problems.

Integration Failures

It is primarily for the political parties – not a government-sponsored religious
forum – to provide political representation for Turkish Germans on social, economic and
political issues, and they need to raise their game. They should not just represent them as
Turks or Muslims but as members of German society with a variety of interests. There
are clear signs that the parties are slowly adapting to the changing environment.
Nearly all now have a Turkish or Muslim section that seeks to recruit immigrant-
origin citizens and there is now a handful of elected officials in the Bundestag and local
government. But it is premature to judge political participation among Turkish youth,
since the first enfranchised generation has yet to come of age.

The most significant challenge will be to achieve a degree of equal
opportunity in schooling, job training and employment. This will be especially
important for the 800,000 children of Muslim background, roughly three-quarters of
whom are of school age, who will be entering the job market in the coming
decades. In seven of the 16 Länder, between one quarter and one third of all 15-
year old students are from an “immigrant background,” and in the biggest cities half
of the under-40 population will be of immigrant origin by 2010; fully 11% of all
students in the 2006/7 school year in North Rhine-Westphalia (home to the
metropolitan regions of Cologne and Bonn) are of Muslim background.

Difficulties with language and low socio-economic status are key factors in Turkish
children’s below-average educational performance and limited opportunities to attend
the best schools. The last Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) study
of 45,000 German 15-year olds found a stronger correlation of parental socio-
economic status and educational success in Germany than in any other OECD
country.

Public schools have left foreign students – especially those of Turkish origin –
in an increasingly precarious position. Everyday exclusion from the best educational
institutions stems from German language difficulties that lead to de facto differential
access to kindergarten, and from the way in which students in the German system are
streamlined for secondary education at an early age. The right to pre-school education
for a nominal fee was enshrined by law in 1996, but it is not mandatory and even the
low costs can be prohibitive for families of modest means, and there are often
insufficient openings. Whereas other industrialized nations provide six to nine
years of common public education with all students mixed together before
specialization or individualized streaming into separate schools, German schools can
provide as little as four. When a 10-12 year old finishes primary school, he or she
is recommended for one of three high school tracks, only one of which (Gymnasium)
grants the diploma necessary (Abitur) to enter university (although Hauptschul- and
Realschul-graduates can gain entry to university by way of continuing education programs).

Turkish students are twice as likely as Germans to be classified as “special education” cases, often due to language disadvantage and to be directed to a Hauptschule, the lowest of the secondary school tracks. Just over 10 per cent of students of Turkish origin attend a Gymnasium, compared to one third of German students; very few Turks go on to higher education – fewer than 25,000 of 235,989 Turkish 18- to 25-year olds living in Germany were enrolled in German universities in 2004/2005, where they were outnumbered even by Chinese students (27,000). The links between language skills, educational performance, early tracking and professional segregation as well as socio-economic integration are clear. Turkish students are more than twice as likely as Germans to leave school without a diploma. This is reflected in the training positions and apprenticeships – important for access to the high-skilled economy – available to immigrant youth. Just 25 per cent of migrant youths participate in apprenticeship programs, compared to 59 per cent of young Germans; foreigners. The overall Turkish unemployment rate (25.2 per cent) is more than twice the national average.

**Discussion of the way forward**

As it becomes clear from a detailed look at these policy debates, Germany has accepted its status as a country of immigration and now is struggling to define what kind. German leaders would be well-advised to concentrate on the practical concerns that undermine social cohesion: political alienation, overzealous policing and socio-economic inequality. Germans’ caution at embracing Turks as a minority community and insistence on rupture with the home country were often perceived as indifference; politicians’ repeated criticism of “parallel societies” did nothing to eliminate their existence. The fundamental problems of Turkish Germans and other Muslims are rooted in disenfranchisement, social discrimination and the lack of economic and political integration, not religion.

It is also conceivable that some individuals of immigrant and/or Muslim background truly do not wish to integrate. Famously, 21% of Muslims in one poll said that the Qur’an is not compatible with the German constitution and 47% of Turks said they cannot imagine becoming German. Without giving too much credence to the results of that single poll, it is a distinct possibility that respondents took to heart the decades of being told Germany is not a country of immigration and the constant badgering of moderate Islamists. German cautiousness to embrace Turks as a minority community, and officials’ insistence upon rupture with the home country was often perceived as indifference; and politicians’ repeated criticism of “parallel societies” did nothing to eliminate their existence. After all, a majority of Germans still agree with the statement, “the life of a Muslim believer is not compatible with modern, Western society”; with such “partners” for the challenges ahead, it is reasonable to ask about the integration-readiness of Germans themselves.

While German administrations are not lacking in sticks, however, there have been signs that some are getting comfortable enough with the minority population to offer some carrots. The best evidence of that are the two “summits” held in summer and fall 2006, one dedicated to “Integration” and run out of the Chancellor’s office; the latter to focus on Islam and organized by the Interior Ministry. The federal government has made steps in the right direction but must take care not to appear beholden to the veto points of conservative local politicians. These high profile meetings are necessary, but probably not a panacea. In the first place, many Länder...
level officials dispute the federal government’s jurisdiction: education, language courses and naturalization fall under the competence of the Länder. However, good cooperation at the federal level – especially with Milli Görüs – could set an example for the more reticent Länder.

As the government knows, a high profile conference or two cannot make a dent in the need for lengthy processes of mutual understanding and relationship building. The parties and other political institutions are the proper vehicles through which to launch the assault on them, which will not only contribute to keeping society internally safe and stable; it is likely also to equip Germany over the next decade to approach with greater self-confidence vital issues of foreign policy such as the EU’s ultimate relationship with Turkey and the Middle East peace process.

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1 And most – but not all – other nationalities, too. Dual nationality is regarded as an exception but it is tolerated in many cases, especially where “countries of origin do not provide for renunciation of citizenship or impose prohibitive costs on their citizens when they renounce citizenship” (Source: Albert Kraler, “The Legal Status of Immigrants” in Rainer Bauböck (ed.), Migration and Citizenship, Amsterdam Univ. Press, 2006, p.59). In 2002, for example, around 41% of newly naturalized German citizens were allowed to keep their original citizenship, down from 48.3% in 2001; exceptions have also been granted for some EU citizens who take on German citizenship, e.g. UK nationals (Source: Migration und Bevölkerung, 06/03, Juli/August 2003; Interior Ministry spokeswoman Ingrid Stumm, quoted in FAZ am Sonntag, 20 June 2003).


4 As of 31 December 2005, there were 1,764,041 Turkish citizens and 673,024 naturalized Germans of Turkish origin, “Stand der rechtlichen Gleichstellung des Islam in Deutschland,” Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage – BT-Drucksache Nr.16/2085 (29 Juni 2006)


6 Even after the citizenship law reform, Germany will still produce foreigners: half of the 100,000 children born annually to foreigners will still not be eligible for German nationality. See Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 2004.


9 Just two of these membership organizations have been formally banned: Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Kalifatstaat. However, German authorities have also banned several Hamas-related charities (Al Aqsa and Yatim Kinderhilfe), as well as a Turkish newspaper, Yeni Akit. See Verfassungsschutzbericht 2005.


11 Iranians accounted for 150, and “other nationalities” for 1,350. By comparison, foreign leftist extremists in Bavaria came to 17,290; foreign extreme nationalists at 8,430. See LfV Bayern 2004 Bericht, p.160.

12 On the arrival of the Muslim Brothers in Germany, see Ian Johnson, Wall Street Journal, 12 July, 2005; see also Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005, Vol.12, No.1.


xiv The greatest privileges are restricted to organizations recognised as a religious community or Corporation of Public Law, a distinction awarded by Länder-level governments since the Weimar constitution. Additionally, Article 7 section 3 allows for religious education in public schools as a regular course (although some Länder have modified this to include philosophy and ethics). See http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/recht/de/gg/index.htm#inhalt.

xv In Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, Berlin, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg.

xvi On the first anniversary of the September 11th attacks, then Interior Minister Otto Schily announced an inter-ministerial working group on Islam to meet periodically and resolve issues regarding Muslim religious practices. This involved the four major federations (IGMG excluded) and representatives from all ministries having anything to do with Islam, including agriculture (animal slaughter), construction (prayer space) and interior and the chancellor’s office. It aimed to deepen coordination among the individual Länder and eventually lead to a common federal policy toward Islam.

xvii Interview by the author with Dr. Guido Steinberg, former adviser, international terrorism to the federal chancellor, Berlin, 22 December 2005.

xviii The membership figures in table 2 do not always allow for direct comparisons of size and influence; IG-Deutschland’s 600 members are those listed in the organization registry, for example, whereas IGMG’s more than 26,000 are based on estimates by German security officials. Ulrich Dehn, “Neue Daten zum Islam in Deutschland”, Evangelische Zentralstelle für Weltanschauungsfragen, October 2003; Faruk Sen, “Türkische Minderheit in Deutschland”, Information zur politischen Führung, Berlin, 22 December 2005.

xix “Stand der rechtlichen Gleichstellung des Islam in Deutschland,” Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage – BT-Drucksache Nr.16/2085 (29 Juni 2006)

xx “Stand der rechtlichen Gleichstellung des Islam in Deutschland,” Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage – BT-Drucksache Nr.16/2085 (29 Juni 2006)


