they have related to religious groups in Ukraine. Throughout, the states that ruled Ukraine figure as arbiters and objects of religious and national movements.

With one exception, all the essays in this volume were written between 1990 and 2000, a decade during which religious life in Ukraine revived as Soviet rule crumbled and an independent state emerged. Although they do not represent everything that the authors have written about religious life in modern Ukraine, they help to explain the nature and principal characteristics of its contemporary religious developments.

This work does not discuss some important issues of relations between church, nation, and state in modern and contemporary Ukraine. Such omissions are almost inevitable in any collection of essays written at various times and on different occasions. The extensive literature cited in the footnotes should assist the reader who wishes to explore additional questions, especially those that pertain to the UGCC, which is under-represented in this volume but for which a substantial literature exists. Ten of the eleven essays were previously published; one appears here for the first time.

The authors began their research in this field at a time when the East and the West were still divided by the Iron Curtain. Frank E. Sysyn was then resident of the United States, and Serhii Plokhy was still in Ukraine. The collapse of the USSR, the rise of independent Ukraine, and growing co-operation among scholars in the West and the former Soviet bloc are among the factors that transformed the field and made the publication of this volume possible.

Both authors are now residents of Canada. They bring to the volume their own perspectives and interpretations of the history of Eastern Christianity in Ukraine. They hope that the resulting diversity of views will serve to enrich this collection and make it more interesting to the reader. They also hope that this work will shed new light on Eastern Christianity in Ukraine and further Western understanding of its history, current status, and future challenges.

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Frank E. Sysyn

The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

Few institutions lend themselves as well as the church to examination of its millennium-long history. Religious institutions and traditions change more slowly than their secular counterparts. For example, it was only in the twentieth century that the Orthodox in Ukraine first replaced the Church Slavonic language with Ukrainian in the liturgy and that the Uniates (Ukrainian Greek Catholics) introduced mandatory celibacy in some eparchies. The conservatism of the churches makes it possible to speak of millennial aspects of Ukrainian Christianity. Nevertheless, modification and change have indeed occurred at various rates in different times. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—the age of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, Cossack revolts and Polish, Muscovite and Ottoman intervention, the introduction of printing, and the formation of an Eastern Christian higher educational institution in Kyiv—were a period of especially rapid change. The great Orthodox scholar Georges Florovsky labelled this age “The Encounter with the West” and viewed it as an unstable and dangerous time, which bore only sterile progeny. Other scholars have seen it as a period of great accomplishments that arose from challenges to the Ukrainian religious genius.

* This article originally appeared in Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine, ed. Geoffrey A. Hosking (Edmonton, 1990), 1–22. It has been revised.


2. The standard positive evaluation of this period is found in vols. 1–2 of Ivan Vlasov's Kny, Narody istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, 4 vols. in 5 bks. (New York and South Bound Brook, N.J., 1955–66). Vols. 1–2 cover...
It should suffice to list a number of firsts in the early part of this period to see the beginnings of modern church life in the Kyiv Metropolitanate. In the early sixteenth century the Belarusian printer Frantsisah Skaryna published the first liturgical books on Ruthenian territories. In the 1560s the Peresopnytsia Gospel was translated into the Ruthenian vernacular. In 1562–63 Szymon Budny published the first works for Protestant believers in Ruthenian. In 1574, in Lviv, Cyrillic printing finally began in the Ukrainian territories with a primer that was the first of numerous books to teach literacy. In the late 1570s, in Ostroh, Prince Kostiantyn Ostroż’kyi established the first Orthodox higher educational institution. In 1580–81 the Ostroh circle published the first complete Slavonic Bible. In the 1580s the burghers of Lviv strengthened their communal life by organizing a brotherhood or confraternity centred at the newly rebuilt Church of the Dormition. Receiving stauropegial rights that subordinated the brotherhood directly to the patriarch of Constantinople, the brotherhood challenged the authority of the local bishop. In the 1590s Orthodox bishops began meeting regularly at synods to discuss church reforms. In 1595 the bishop of Volodymyr, Ipattii Potii, and the bishop of Lutsk, Kyrylo Terlets’kyi, travelled to Rome to negotiate a church union, which was proclaimed the next year by the metropolitan and five bishops at a synod at Brest. An opposing synod attended by two bishops met in the same city and rejected the union. In 1596 Lavrentii Zyzanii published the first Slavonic-Latin-Greek lexic. In the last years of the sixteenth century opposing sides polemicized in print in Ruthenian and Polish about the Union of Brest. Alarmed by the Orthodox counter-offensive, the Uniates began to shoring up their institution, establishing a seminary in Vilnius in 1601 and creating a Basilian monastic order along west European lines in 1613. In 1615 the burghers of Kyiv and the inhabitants of the surrounding region formed a brotherhood and later a school. Combined with the printing press at the Kyivan Cave Monastery, these institutions made Kyiv the centre of religious and cultural activities. In 1618 Meletii Smotryts’kyi published a Church Slavonic grammar that established the norms of the language. In 1632 Petro Mohyla, as metropolitan and archimandrite of the Cave Monastery, formed a collegium in Kyiv. By 1642 he had compiled a

the church’s history until the end of the seventeenth century; they have appeared in an abridged English translation as Iwan Wasowski, _Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church_, 2 vols. (New York and South Bound Brook, N.J., 1974, 1979).


that Ukrainian and Belarusian political, cultural, and religious history began to diverge more significantly. The Union of Lublin of 1569 divided most of the central and eastern Ukrainian territories, formerly part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, from the Belarusian territories and united them with the western Ukrainian lands in the Kingdom of Poland. The Cossack Host developed primarily in the Ukrainian lands and, in time, created a political and social elite that was lacking in Belarus. By the same token, economic and demographic advances supported a greater vitality in cultural and religious activities in the Ukrainian territories. In religious affairs, the Ukrainian territories became relatively more important in the life of the Kyiv Metropolitane at the end of the sixteenth century, in part because the elites in Belarus were less resistant to conversion to Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. The return of the metropolitan to their titular city of Kyiv in the 1590s symbolized this change. In the first half of the seventeenth century the religious cultures of Ukraine and Belarus diverged further because the Orthodox dominated in the Ukrainian lands, while the Uniates had more success in the Belarusian territories. Finally, the formation of an Orthodox Cossack Hetmanate stimulated a development of specific Ukrainian religious traditions in Kyiv and Left-Bank Ukraine. Despite these differences, the religious culture of the seventeenth century may be viewed as a Ruthenian inheritance from which interacting Ukrainian and Belarusian variants took shape. Therefore, the traditions outlined here are often also pertinent to Belarusian religious culture, although they have evolved differently in Belarus in the modern period.

My discussion of Ukrainian religious culture will be confined to the Eastern Christians, the adherents of the traditional Rus' church. However, the distinctiveness of the Ruthenian Eastern Christian religious culture arose in part because of religious pluralism. Jews, Muslims, Armenian Gregorians, Latin-rite Catholics, and Protestants all inhabited the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories alongside the Orthodox and, after 1596, also Uniate Ruthenian Christians. These groups both interacted with the Eastern Christians and represented "other" religious and cultural traditions. For example, the identification of Roman Catholicism as the liakh (Polish) faith in the Ukrainian lands made religious adherence coincide with cultural-national identification, and conversion implied a change in cultural affiliation. The Protestant Reformation emerged from the Western Christian community but made converts throughout Ukraine, including among the Orthodox. While the Calvinists, Antitrinitarians, and Lutherans did not constitute religious bodies that descended directly from the Rus' tradition, they were influenced by their Eastern Christian surroundings. The Counter-Reformation arose to meet the Protestant challenge, but it too directed its efforts to converting Eastern Christians. Latin-rite Catholics, Protestants, and other groups challenged and stimulated the Ruthenian Eastern Christians.3

The major significance of the period for Ukrainian and Belarusian Eastern Christians was their division in 1596 into Orthodox and Uniate believers and churches. Before the late sixteenth century, attempts at uniting Ukrainian and Belarusian believers with Rome had been episodic and had not divided the larger religious community. From 1596 Ukrainian and Belarusian believers have been permanently divided into two churches—one that rejects the church union and holds to Orthodoxy, and another that accepts the union and adheres to Catholicism. Both claim to be the true continuation of the church that was formed when Rus' was Christianized in 988.

Modern Ukrainian religious culture emerged in the Kyiv Metropolitane in the sixteenth century.7 From the conversion of


7. Fortunately, there is a bibliography for the large literature on Ukrainian church history of this period: Iysyod I. Patrylo, OSBM, Dzherela i bibliografia istorii Ukraini 10 (Rome, 1975), sec. 2, sec. 1, vol. 33 of Analecta OSBM, and his addendum in Analecta OSBM 10 (1979): 406-87. In this article only a few general works are included in the notes, as are items not included in Patrylo's bibliography, primarily because they are too recent. The basic works on Ukrainian church history are Vlasis'kyi, Narys; Atanasii Hryhorii Velykyi, OSBM, Z litopysy khryystians'koi Ukraini, vols. 4-6 (Rome, 1971-3); Michaela Harasiwycz [Mykhailo Harasewycz], Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae (Lviv, 1862); Hryhor Luzhnits'kyi, Ukraini 1-ky i Tserkova mizh
988 until the early fourteenth century, one Metropolitanate of Kyiv and all Rus' had encompassed all East Slavic territories. By the twelfth century Kyiv no longer possessed the paramount political influence in Rus', and the Mongol conquest hastened the disintegration of political unity of the vast Kyiv Metropolitanate. In the early fourteenth century Prince Iurii L'vovych, the Orthodox ruler of Galicia-Volhynia, convinced the Constantinople Patriarchate to establish a temporary Little Rus' Metropolitanate for the eparchies of Peremyshl, Halych, Volodymyr, Lutsk, Turiiv, and Kholm. More lasting was the migration of the Kyiv metropolitan in the early fourteenth century to the Suzdal Land, where they later took up residence in Moscow. Until 1458 growing centrifugal forces made the retention of a united Kyiv Metropolitanate seem difficult. The Galician or "Little Rus" Metropolitanate was temporarily revived in 1370 on the insistence of Casimir the Great, the Polish ruler who annexed Galicia to his kingdom. The grand dukes of Lithuania, whose domains reached to Kyiv by 1362, sought to have their candidates appointed metropolitan of Kyiv and reside in their state. When they could not do so, they strove to have separate metropolitanates established for their numerous Ruthenian subjects. In general, the patriarchs of Constantinople preferred to retain the unity of the Kyiv Metropolitanate and entrust its headquarters to the steadfastly Orthodox princes of Moscow rather than to the Catholic kings of Poland or to the pagan and, after 1386, Catholic rulers of Lithuania. 8

The Constantinople Patriarchate brought about the final division of the Kyiv Metropolitanate by its own wavering in adherence to Orthodoxy. Muscovy refused to accept the Union of Florence of 1439 or Isidore, the Greek metropolitan of Kyiv. Consequently, it rejected the authority of the patriarchs of Constantinople and declared autocephaly by electing its own metropolitan in 1448. In the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands that were controlled by Catholic rulers, no such rejection of Constantinople's authority or Metropolitan Isidore occurred. Therefore, in 1458, when a new metropolitan of "Kyiv and all Rus" was elected for the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, a permanent break ensued between the two parts of the Kyivan metropolitan see. The change of the title of the metropolitan in Moscow from "metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus" to "metropolitan of Moscow and all Rus" brought titulature in line with reality. Although the Union of Florence failed to take hold in both Constantinople and in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the division of the old Kyiv Metropolitanate into Ruthenian and Muscovite churches endured.

For both metropolitanates the events of the mid-fifteenth century speeded the indigenization, indeed the nationalization, of the church. In earlier centuries metropolitanates had frequently been Greeks, and in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries foreigners still figured prominently (e.g., Gregory Tsamblak and Isidore). At the same time, the cultural distinctness of Russians and Ruthenians, whose vernacular and administrative languages differed and who lived under markedly different political and social systems, made a metropolitan from Muscovy or one from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania more and more alien in the other territory. From 1448 to the declaration of Moscow as a patriarchate in 1589, all metropolitanates of Moscow were native Russians, while from 1458 to the subordination of Kyiv to Moscow in 1686 most metropolitanates of Kyiv and bishops of the Kyiv Metropolitanate were native Ruthenians. The final division of the Ruthenian and Muscovite churches and their different experiences from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries furthered the evolution of distinct religious traditions.

For the Kyiv Metropolitanate the major problems of the fifteenth century were dealing with the consequences of the Union of Florence and finding a place for itself in Catholic states. 9 As Constantinople renounced the Union of Florence, the daughter church of Kyiv reasserted its Orthodox allegiance. Nevertheless, in the first century after the fall of Constantinople the patriarchs displayed little initiative in guiding their distant daughter church, and the church became increasingly dependent on Catholic rulers and Orthodox lay lords. Throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the Polish and Lithuanian governments enacted legislation

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that placed the church and its believers in a disadvantageous position in comparison with the Catholic Church. Although the Protestant Reformation weakened the privileged position of the Catholic Church, the Protestant believers and their Catholic opponents engaged in an intellectual battle in which the Orthodox Church was unprepared to take part. Western Christian political dominance and intellectual and organizational superiority combined to challenge a Kyiv Metropolitanate that could not depend for support on Orthodox rulers, domestic or foreign, and that found its Slavonic cultural inheritance deficient in answering the new challenges. Faced with the increasing defections to the Protestants and Catholics, particularly from among the Orthodox nobles, the Kyiv Metropolitanate was endangered by dissolution in the sixteenth century. The response to the challenges brought about numerous innovations in religious culture. One of the responses, however—the acceptance of union with Rome by the metropolitan and most of the bishops—brought about an institutional division in the metropolitanate. After 1596 the Orthodox Church had to compete with a Uniate Kyiv Metropolitanate.

From 1596 to 1620 the Orthodox Church had no metropolitan and was viewed as illegal by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1620 Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem consecrated Metropolitan Iov Borets'-kyi and five bishops. The government viewed the election of Borets'kyi and his successor, Isaia Kopyns'kyi, as illegitimate. Bowing to pressure from the Orthodox nobility and the Zaporozhian Cossacks, the newly elected King Włodzislaw IV and the Polish-Lithuanian Diet recognized the Orthodox Church as legal in 1632, but assigned only half of the eparchies of the metropolitanate to the Orthodox and required the election of a new hierarchy to replace the one ordained in 1620.

From 1632 to 1647 Metropolitan Petro Mohyla strove to strengthen the Orthodox metropolitanate’s institutional structure throughout the Commonwealth, including in the eparchies assigned to the Uniates. Mohyla used his wealth and influence with the government to carry out a far-reaching programme of developing education and printing, as well as of reforming church practices. He entertained the possibility of a union with Rome on better terms than the Union of Brest, but never made a formal commitment.10

Mohyla’s successor as the Orthodox metropolitan of Kyiv, Syl'vest Kosiv (1647–57), led the church in more turbulent times. The Cossack revolt that developed into an Ukrainian uprising improved the position of the Orthodox metropolitanate on a number of occasions. In 1649 King John Casimir of Poland promised to abolish the church union, and the church gained advantages, even though the commitment was never carried out fully. In the territories controlled by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, both Latin-rite and Uniate institutions and lands were handed over to the Orthodox. There were, however, negative consequences of the revolt and the establishment of the Cossack Hetmanate for the Kyiv Metropolitanate. The Pereiaslav Agreement (1654) placed the status of the metropolitanate in question. Its leadership feared correctly that ties with Muscovy would result in Russian interference in church affairs and the eventual transfer of the metropolitanate from the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople to the patriarch of Moscow.11

Already in Metropolitan Kosiv’s time the Muscovites insisted that the metropolitan limit his traditional title of “Kyiv, Halych, and all Rus’” to “Kyiv, Halych, and all Little Rus’.” In addition, victorious Muscovite armies in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania sought to detach Belarusian areas from the Kyiv Metropolitanate and annex them to the Moscow Patriarchate. Kosiv died in April 1657, four months before Hetman Khmelnytskyi. At this critical political moment for Ukraine the clergy of the Kyiv Metropolitanate, with the authorization of the new hetman, Ivan Vyhovs’kyi, elected Dionsyi Balaban as metropolitan with the blessing of the patriarch of Constantinople. Balaban supported Vyhovs’kyi in his break with Moscow and his negotiation of the Union of Hadiach (8 September 1658), through which he sought to reintegrate the central Ukrainian lands into the Commonwealth as a Rus’ duchy, guarantee places in the Polish-Lithuanian Senate for the Orthodox metropolitan and bishops, and abolish the Union of Brest. The failures of Vyhovs’kyi and the Hadiach policy forced the metropolitan to abandon Kyiv and take up residence in the territories controlled by the

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10. Thanks to Stepan T. Golubev’s Kievski mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spadniki (Opix tserkovno-istoricheskogo issledovanija), 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1883, 1889), this is one of the best-studied periods in Ukrainian church history. See also Harvard Ukrainian Studies 8, nos. 1–2 (June 1984), a special issue on the Kyiv Mohyla Academy; in particular, see there Ihor Ševčenko, “The Many

11. For the history of the Orthodox Church in the late seventeenth century, see Natala Carynnyk-Sinclair, Die Unterstellung der Kiewer Metropole unter das Moskauer Patriarchat (Munich, 1970).
Commonwealth. Until his death in 1663, Metropolitan Balaban could not exercise control over the Ukrainian territories on the left bank of the Dniepro River. The Muscovite authorities appointed Bishop Lazar Baranovych of Chernihiv as administrator in these territories in 1659, thereby beginning the division of the Kyiv Metropolitanate along political boundaries.

Political events rapidly eroded the unity and autonomy of the Kyivan metropolitan see in the second half of the seventeenth century. In 1685–86, during the election of Metropolitan Gedeon Chetvertyns’kyi, the Muscovite government arranged, by means of pressure and bribes, the transfer of the see from the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople to that of the patriarch of Moscow. Nevertheless, the particular cultural and religious traditions of the late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century metropolitanate and the unique position of Kyiv endured well into the eighteenth century. It served as a model for twentieth-century movements supporting the formation of autonomous and autocephalous churches in Ukraine and Belarus.

The Uniate heir to the Kyivan metropolitan see was not able to win a mass following in the Ukrainian lands until the late seventeenth century, but it did produce dedicated followers and important traditions. The mediocre metropolitan Mykhailo Rahoza, who acceded to the church union, was followed by the energetic Ipatii Potii (1601–13) and Iosyf Ruts’kyi (1613–37) as metropolitanans of “Kyiv, Halych, and all Rus’”. They weathered numerous setbacks. The disappointment that two bishops and a large body of the clergy and the laity would not accede to the church union was followed by the blows of the Polish-Lithuanian Senate’s refusal to grant seats to the Uniate bishops, the Diet’s concessions of benefits to the Orthodox, the government’s unwillingness to move decisively against the “illegal” Orthodox metropolitan and hierarchy consecrated in 1620, and the recognition of the Orthodox metropolitanate as an equal competitor to the Uniate one in 1632. In the first fifty years the Uniate Church was more successful in attracting followers in the Belarusian territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania than it was in the Ukrainian territories of the Kingdom of Poland, except for the Kholm region. The great Cossack revolt of 1648 placed the very existence of the Uniate Church in doubt. Nevertheless, in the second half of the seventeenth century the Uniate Kyiv Metropolitanate began to take shape, assisted by support from Rome and some zealous Catholics in the Commonwealth. The retention of all Belarus, Galicia, and Right-Bank Ukraine by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after 1667 ensured the victory of the church union in these lands by the early eighteenth century. Reaching its greatest extent in the eighteenth century, the Uniate Church took on its own stable ecclesiastical form at the Synod of Zamość in 1720. The triumph of the Russian Empire over the Commonwealth was to devastate the Uniate Church, so that it would only survive in the Galician lands annexed by the Habsburgs, the very territories that had been so anti-Uniate before 1700. Still, the Galician metropolitan see that was established in 1807 continued the traditions of the Uniate Kyiv Metropolitanate. Despite changes in titulature and legal rights, today the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church asserts its direct claims to the heritage of the Metropolitanate of Kyiv, Halych, and All-Rus”.

The major tradition of this period, for both Orthodox and Uniates, was the emergence of new religious forms that represented an absorption and adaptation of influences from Latin Christianity, which had accompanied the control of the Ukrainian lands by Western Christian powers in the fourteenth century. At the core of Ruthenian culture was a deeply rooted Byzantine-Slavonic tradition embodied in a church that maintained an institutional structure permeating the thousands of settlements in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. As an institution of the Rus’ faith, the church functioned in a conserving role for a local culture while, at the same time, connecting it to a Byzantine past, a larger Orthodox community, and a supranational Slavonic culture. Latin Christian political domination was accompanied by the placement of the Orthodox Church in an inferior position and with restrictions on the Orthodox and their worship. Consequently the Rus’ church in Ukraine experienced the perils that religious pluralism poses for a church in a subservient position. As Latin Christian culture evolved and flourished, the Orthodox of Ukraine found themselves representatives of an increasingly isolated and inadequate cultural tradition.

This threat ultimately proved to be a stimulus that produced so many of the achievements outlined earlier. Although the Orthodox of Ukraine had faced the Western challenge without the protection of an Orthodox ruler or even the neutrality of a Muslim ruler, they were able to accommodate to Western practices and influences over

12 Although Velykyi’s Litopys is a publication of his radio lectures, it is based on his extensive study and editing of sources for the Basilian Fathers’ Analecta. Until a more scholarly history of the Greek Catholic Church is written, it remains the best comprehensive account.
a long period of time. Both the decision of Polish kings in the fourteenth century to tolerate Orthodoxy and even grant the Orthodox elite noble status and the manifest numerical and political strength of the Orthodox Ruthenians in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which negated discriminatory legislation, had permitted the Orthodox Church to adjust gradually to Western Christian rule. Even in the cities, where Orthodox Christians were subject to harsh discrimination and numerous restrictions, they were able to maintain some religious and communal institutions. By the sixteenth century religious divisions among Western Christians and the weak powers of central administration, in contrast to the extensive liberties of individual nobles, mitigated the pressures on the Orthodox.  

The process of Ruthenian contact with Western Christian culture has still to be studied satisfactorily. Complex cultural changes and adaptation occurred from the fifteenth century, when Iurii of Drohobych presumably converted and became rector of the University of Bologna, to the seventeenth century, when an Orthodox university was established in Kyiv. The Orthodox Church and the Byzantine-Slavonic-Ruthenian culture long seemed inert and unattuned to the challenges of the Latin West. Their eventual response demonstrated how serious the challenge was. In adapting the thought and forms of the Latin West, the Kyiv Metropolitiate proved that it possessed the inner resources to reform rather than disintegrate. Latin philosophical texts, Church Slavonic grammars, and Polish-language polemical works were components of this response. Although Latin accretions and internal inconsistencies were part of the religious culture of the period, Ukrainian or Ruthenian religious practice, both Orthodox and Uniate, represented more a synthesis of the long contact of the Kyiv Metropolitinate with the West than it did a collection of disparate and contradictory religious practices. From the heights of Kyivan theology to the popular Christmas carols, the Ukrainians accepted outside influences without losing their religious and cultural heritage. In Ukraine there were no religious divisions, such as the great schism in Russia, over the introduction of new forms. Even those who objected to Western influences, for example, the polemician Ivan Vyshens’kyi or the Trans-Dnipro monks, were usually too familiar with the “other” to be able to expurgate it from their own thought or to avoid it in totality. The division within the Ukrainian community arose over a more substantive issue—union with Rome and a change of faith. Although both Orthodox and Uniate Ukrainians have undergone periodic movements to diminish Latin and Western Christian influence on their religious culture, the Westernization of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is so deeply embedded in their religious tradition that it cannot be uprooted.  

Most Eastern Christians have followed the models pioneered in Ukraine. Kyivan learning served as the model for the entire eighteenth-century Russian imperial church. Ukrainian music and art, through its importation to Russia, later spread throughout the Orthodox world. Experiments in employing the vernacular in sixteenth-century Ukraine and Belarus were later to be repeated among other Orthodox peoples. Even when other Orthodox and Eastern Christian peoples did not directly import elements of the Ukrainian synthesis, they frequently underwent analogous processes later.  

The active role of the laity constitutes a second enduring tradition in Ukrainian church life. Laymen became involved in church affairs and spiritual life and new institutions emerged. The form that the Uniate Church took at the end of the seventeenth century and the remaking of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries undermined this role of the laity and lay organizations, but new circumstances have frequently caused a revival of earlier traditions and institutions. 

Laymen were essential to the administration and preservation of the Orthodox Kyiv Metropolitinate. In the sixteenth century the endangered church turned to great patrons, such as Prince Kostiantyn Ostroz’kyi, to ensure its protection. Nobles, endowed with the sweeping rights of the nobiliary Commonwealth, not only served as patrons and protectors of local churches, but also spoke in the name of the church at Diets and took part in the synods of the Orthodox Church in the early seventeenth century. Burghers had organized their own reform of church and community activities, even exercising the right to dismiss their clergymen. Zaporozhian Cossacks had not only assumed protection over the new Orthodox hierarchy, but also intervened in church councils. The urban

15. This question has been little explored in recent times, and Konstantin V. Kharlampovich’s Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuu zhizn’ (Kazan, 1914) remains the basic study in the field.
Orthodox brotherhoods, or bratsya, enrolling burghers as well as nobles and Cossacks, constituted the most creative response to religious and cultural problems in Ukraine and Belarus. They also signified how greatly Ruthenian religious culture had diverged from other Eastern Christian communities. This can be seen by the need of the Lviv burghers to explain what a church brotherhood was to seventeenth-century Russians.\textsuperscript{16}

Clergymen resented some lay interventions in religious affairs as being contrary to traditional canons and undermining the position of the clergy.\textsuperscript{17} Some were attracted to the church union as a way of restoring full clerical control of the church. The defection of the metropolitan and five bishops increased the importance of the laity, who came to realize that they, not the hierarchs, remained steadfast in preserving the church. Twenty years of church life without a complete hierarchy (1596–1620) were followed by twelve years of governance by hierarchs who often could not take up residence in their sees and depended on the Orthodox nobles, Cossacks, and burghers to support their positions against a government that viewed them as illegal. Even after 1632 Metropolitan Mohyla, who sought to reassert clerical leadership in church affairs, had to depend on the noble laity. After 1648 the higher clergymen might find the Cossacks to be troublesome protectors, but they could not deny the benefits that Cossack successes had brought for the church, and they could not avoid adaptation to a new order in which priests and Cossack administrators not only represented dual powers, but were often members of the same families.

In the early seventeenth century, the need to compete for supporters also influenced the Uniate Church to pay heed to the laity. However, as it lost the support of the great nobles, major church brotherhoods, and the Cossacks, the Uniate Church, influenced by Roman practices, reduced the role of the laity. Ultimately it turned to laymen who were not its members—Latin-rite Catholic nobles—to strengthen its position.

A third element of the religious experience of the age was the "nationalization" of the church and the articulation of a subjective

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\textsuperscript{16} On the brotherhoods, see Iaroslav D. Isaievych, Bratsya ta ikh rol' v rozvytku ukrains'koi kul'tury XVI–XVIII st. (Kyiv, 1966).

\textsuperscript{17} For an argument that the role of the laity in this period was a complete innovation resisted by the clergy, see Viacheslav Zaikin, Uchastie svetskogo elementa v tserkovnom upravlenii, vybornoe nachalo i "sohornost'" v Kievs'koj mitropolii v XVI i XVII vekakh (Warsaw, 1930).

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Ruthenian national consciousness based on the view of the church as properly a national institution.\textsuperscript{18} The church had always been the Ruthenian church, the embodiment of the conversion of the Rus' rulers and their people in the tenth century. By the sixteenth century new conditions deepened the nation-bearing character of the church. The extinction of Rus' dynasties and polities made the church the only direct institutional link to Kyivan Rus'. The assimilation of many members of the secular elite to Polish culture, accompanied by religious conversions, augmented the role of the church as a spokesman for the Ruthenian tradition. Polish penetration of Ukraine, the development of a Polish vernacular literature and concept of nation, and the depression and later persecution of Orthodoxy by Polish clerical leaders and authorities combined to intensify national-religious feeling, in which the Ruthenian people and the Ruthenian church were viewed as one. The church not only embodied the national identity; it also frequently used the Ruthenian language in administration and publications, albeit without advocating the abandonment of the Church Slavonic language. All of these factors heightened Ruthenian national feeling and the identification of the church as the superstructure of "Ruthenian nationhood." The mix of religious and national sentiment was especially apparent in the organization of church brotherhoods among the Ruthenian burghers, because these burghers, who were subject to discrimination, developed an intense ethnoreligious sentiment in an environment in which they competed with other ethnoreligious communities—Polish Catholics, Armenians, and Jews.

Even the Union of Brest, which divided the Ruthenians, worked to intensify the identification, as both sides strove that all Ruthenians should be one in faith. At the same time, however, it favoured more sophisticated thinking on Ruthenian national identity, since suddenly church and "nation" were not coterminous, and polemics had to discuss the religious divide within the Ruthenian people. The essence of the debate was the historical question of which faith Grand Prince Volodymyr the Great had accepted. In Ukraine, therefore, it inspired knowledge of the Kyivan Rus' past as the cradle of Ruthenian national and religious culture. Even the Protestants occasionally invoked Volodymyr and the conversion as a means of securing legitimacy. While each church could deny the

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\textsuperscript{18} On national consciousness in this period, see Teresa Chytrzewska-Heinelt, Сувереність народової шляхти української і козацької від шляху XVI до початку XVII століття (Warsaw, 1983).
other’s legitimacy, it could not deny that there were Ruthenians of another religious persuasion. Orthodox might still see themselves as part of a greater Orthodox world, but they clearly viewed themselves as part of a Ruthenian (or, after the mid-seventeenth century, Ukrainian or Little Rus’) division of that world, both as an ecclesiastical and a historico-linguistic community. After 1596 they also had to integrate into their worldview the adherence of fellow Ruthenians to Rome. At least the intellectuals, men such as Meletii Smotryts’kyi and Adam Kysil’, articulated these issues, and Smotryts’kyi argued that conversion did not mean a change of nationality, since blood—not religion—defined nationality. The concepts were amorphous, and the unstable political and religious situation prevented their crystallization. But Ukrainians had begun the discussions of religious, national, and cultural issues that have continued to the present. In modern times Ukrainians frequently invested the church with the national significance that it assumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially when other potential national institutions were abolished or usurped.

A fourth tradition, or rather experience, of the churches in Ukraine was that of accommodation or conflict of churches with state powers. The relations of a number of political entities (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Cossack Hetmanate, the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate, Muscovy/the Russian Empire) with the two Ruthenian churches were diverse and frequently contradictory. In general, however, the leaders of both churches of the Kyiv Metropolitanate found that their church structure and religious traditions had to be restructured in order to adjust to political rulers. Political power has determined much in Ukrainian religious history. Desire to obtain political influence and find favour with the ruler explains the Union of Brest to a considerable degree. Weak central government in the Commonwealth and successful utilization of internal centres of power (Prince Ostroz’kyi, the Zaporozhian Cossacks) and external ones (the Ottomans, Muscovy, the Eastern patriarchates) explain the reason for the survival of the Orthodox Church. Ultimately, however, that church could only ensure long-term existence by coming to terms with king and state—whether through the compromise of 1632 or the ostensible willingness to discuss a new union. In like manner, the Uniate Church survived assaults by Cossacks, nobles, and burghers because it had advocates in the government of the Commonwealth, kings, and senators, as well as Vatican nuncios, who influenced government policy.

Changes in political structures posed great problems and opportunities for the Churches of the Kyiv Metropolitanate. Had Polish control of Moscow continued or Władysław’s candidacy to the Muscovite throne succeeded during the Time of Troubles, the church union would certainly have expanded beyond the metropolitanate to the Moscow Patriarchate. In contrast, the Cossack revolts and the Khmelnyts’kyi uprising endangered the very existence of the Uniate Church. Paradoxically, the uprising posed problems for the Orthodox Church, which it actually supported. Most of the Orthodox hierarchs viewed the rebellion with discomfort, particularly after the church obtained legal recognition in 1632, and were suspicious of the Cossack leaders as new political masters. They also feared that the political division of territories of the Kyiv Metropolitanate would undermine its ecclesiastical unity and that the revolt would weaken the position of the church in the lands that remained in the Commonwealth. Metropolitan Kosiv foresaw that Khmelnyts’kyi’s turn to Muscovy and his oath of allegiance to the tsar would bring undesirable consequences for the church—above all the transfer of the Kyiv Metropolitanate from the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to that of Moscow.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, metropolitan and bishops strove for stability amidst an unstable political situation. Uniate hierarchs sought to avoid the consequences of political compromises, such as the Union of Hadiach, which were deleterious to the interests of their church. Ultimately the division of Ukraine between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy (1667, 1686) and the rise of Catholic intolerance in the Commonwealth worked to the Uniates’ advantage. By the turn of the eighteenth century the seces of Pereyaslav, Liviv, and Lutsk accepted the church union, and the real foundations of the Uniate Church were laid in the Ukrainian territories controlled by Poland.

The Orthodox clergymen and metropolitanate had greater options and more diverse constituencies. Metropolitan Kosiv sought to come to an accommodation with the Polish-Lithuanian authorities and to minimize the effect of the Pereiaslav Agreement, while Metropolitan Balaban supported Hetman Vyhovs’kyi’s policy of reintegrating

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Ukraine into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as the Duchy of Rus'. Bishops Metodii Fylymonovych and Lazar Baranovych adjusted to the influence of the Muscovite church and state in Ukraine, even at the price of undermining the unity of the Kyiv Metropolitansate. In general, all the Orthodox churchmen found that the church must eventually accommodate to political power, although the period contained many examples of attempts at avoiding this hard reality. Still, the subordination of the Kyiv Metropolitansate to Moscow in 1686, the loss of the western Ukrainian eparchies to the Uniates, and the church's anathema of its great patron, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, in 1708 revealed how political power would draw ecclesiastical boundaries and determine the role of the church.

Ultimately the failure to establish a political entity uniting the Ukrainian territories undermined the position of the local Orthodox church. In the late sixteenth century suggestions were made that the patriarch of Constantinople should migrate to the Ukrainian territories, and in the early seventeenth century various plans envisaged Kyiv as the centre of a patriarchate. Metropolitan Mohyla made Kyiv one of the major seats of the Orthodox world, and in the seventeenth century it appeared that the Kyivan metropolitans might see the prestige of their church raised by the formation of a new Orthodox state on their territory. That possibility receded rapidly after 1660.

Both the Orthodox and Uniate Churches were reorganized along the lines of dominance of Moscow-St Petersburg and Warsaw in Ukraine in the eighteenth century. By the early eighteenth century the Orthodox metropolitan residing in Kyiv had lost most of his metropolitanate's faithful, controlled by Poland, to the Uniates, while the Chernihiv Eparchy, though part of the Hetmanate, was subordinated directly to the Moscow Patriarchate. Kyiv might still be the home of great monasteries and churches, but the Kyiv Metropolitansate had been dismantled, and by the end of the eighteenth century even the particular practices of the Ukrainian church were largely abolished. In the Polish-controlled territories, the Kyiv metropolitan's Uniate competitor could only use Kyiv in his title, but not reside in the city. His large church in the Belarusian-Ukrainian territories was to a considerable degree Latinized and Polonized. The Uniate Church lost not only the upper classes to the Latin rite, but also much of its active self-identification as a Ruthenian national church that had inspired the formulators of the church union. In the eighteenth century it became the instrument for binding Ukrainians and Belarusians to the Commonwealth that some had hoped it would be in the late sixteenth century.20

A fifth tradition in Ukrainian church affairs of the period was the emergence of a religious, literary, and artistic culture that was specifically Ukrainian, rather than Ruthenian or Belarusian-Ukrainian. The centrality of the church, clergymen, and religious themes in intellectual and cultural pursuits permeated early modern Ukrainian culture. Indeed, religious culture influenced even secular cultural expression, such as administrative buildings, portraiture, or political tracts, because the clergymen and church schools controlled education. Political, economic, and social changes advanced the formation of new Ukrainian cultural models in the seventeenth century. The process, associated with the nationalism of the church as Ruthenian, had begun in the fifteenth century. By the late sixteenth century the common Belarusian-Ukrainian religious and secular culture had come to centre more and more in the Ukrainian territories as assimilation and conversion progressed more rapidly in the Belarusian territories. The political divide of the "Ruthenian" lands at the Union of Lublin (1569) advanced the differentiation of the Belarusian and Ukrainian cultures. In the early seventeenth century the political border to some degree mirrored religious divisions as the Ukrainian territories became the stronghold of Orthodoxy. More importantly, the religious institutions of Kyiv and Lviv, the nobles, burghers, and Cossacks of the Ukrainian lands, and the Cossack Hetmanate afforded new patrons and consumers of religious and secular culture.

By the second half of the seventeenth century a religious, Orthodox culture that may be called Ukrainian rather than Ruthenian had emerged. The limitation of the Kyiv metropolitan's title to "Little Rus" after the Pereiaslav Agreement and the Muscovite church's claims to control Belarus reflected the predominantly Ukrainian nature of the church. In the new political and social environment of Ukraine, new literary and artistic forms, which have been called Cossack or Ukrainian baroque, arose. Histories, such as Archimandrite Teodosii Sofonovych's Kromika, traced the history of Ukraine at the same time as the new Cossack

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20. The relations of the Orthodox and Uniate Churches with the political entities that controlled Ukraine have not been sufficiently studied. On the Hetmanate, see Mykola Chubaty, "Pro pravne stanovyshsche Tserkvy v kozatskii derzhavi," Bohoslovia 3 (1925): 19–53, 181-203.
elite provided patronage for art and music.\textsuperscript{21} By the end of the century a specifically Ukrainian cultural model had matured. Centred in Kyiv, the Cossack Hetmanate, and Sloboda Ukraine, this “national” cultural style drew on the general Ruthenian tradition and continued to influence, and be influenced by, developments in the western Ukrainian and Belarusian territories. Just as the Ukrainian church and political entities were absorbed in the Russian church and Russian Empire, so this culture was absorbed into imperial Russian culture by the end of the eighteenth century. However, the existence of a national Ukrainian culture, closely allied with the church and religious culture, provided an enduring example for relations between church and culture and for styles in Ukrainian religious art, architecture, and music for subsequent generations.

A sixth tradition of the period was the formation of two churches—Orthodox and Catholic—that share the same religious culture. Both groups not only developed out of the church of St. Volodymyr, but were formed from similar influences and conditions in the century before and after the Union of Brest. Locked in heated combat, they were always aware that they were essentially one church and one tradition, distinct not only from the Western churches, but also from other Eastern churches. The Uniate Ruthenians did not easily fit into the norms and practices of the Roman church. The Orthodox had too fully imbued the influences of the West and the political-social conditions of Ukraine to feel comfortable among other Orthodox churches. Institutions, men, books, practices, and ideas passed from one group to the other in this formative period of modern Ukrainian religious life. Catholic coreligionists have distrusted the Uniates’ Catholicism, just as other Orthodox have been suspicious of the full Orthodoxy of Ukrainian believers. They have had some cause to do so, since shared Ukrainian religious characteristics and consciousness have waxed and waned, though they have never died out. In this way they have produced a certain internal Ukrainian ecumenism, despite confessional differences.

The first century after the Union of Brest, when both churches had salient national characteristics and even consciousness, was a time when that which united the two churches seemed very real. Such characteristics, so often troubling to religiously homogeneous neighbours, give an especially modern ring to many statements of the age. Consider the declaration of Adam Kysil’ before an Orthodox synod that was composed of clergymen and laymen calling for conciliation between Orthodox and Uniates in 1629:

\textquote{Gentlemen, you are not the only ones to weep. We all weep at the sight of the rent coat and precious robe of our dear Mother the Holy Eastern Church. You, Gentlemen, bemoan, as do we all, that we are divided from our brethren, we who were in one font of the Holy Spirit six hundred years ago in the Dnipro waters of this metropolis of the Rus’ Principality. It wounds you, Gentlemen, and it wounds us all. Behold! There flourish organisms of commonwealths composed of various nations, while we of one nation, of one people, of one religion, of one worship, of one rite, are not as one. We are torn asunder, and thus we decline.}\textsuperscript{22}

Throughout this period, the struggle to re-unify the Kyiv Metropolitanate continued. Acceptance that two religious groups would arise where only one had existed came only slowly. Although subsequent divergence in religious culture and traditions has made the existence of Orthodox and Uniate believers among Ukrainians less difficult to accept, the continued instability in relations between the two groups derives in part from awareness of their common origins and shared characteristics. Consequently each group finds the existence of the other more troubling than it finds the existence of Roman Catholics, Protestants, or Greek and Russian Orthodox. Frequently, however, the two groups have found that the bond of shared religious culture and national loyalties is so strong that denominational affiliations are set aside.

A seventh tradition that arose in the period was an elevation of the Ukrainian churches to more than local significance. The Union of Brest constituted the largest lasting union of Eastern Christians with Rome and brought the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories to the attention of a wider Christian community. It served as a model for unionizing efforts among the Ukrainians of Hungary and the Armenians of the Polish Commonwealth. Clergymen who were active in promoting the church union, such as Methodi Terlets’kyi, used their experience in the Balkans. In discussions of how to gain


\textsuperscript{22} Sysyn, Between Poland and the Ukraine, 61.
acceptance of the church union, programmes for the erection of a patriarchate in Kyiv only loosely affiliated with Rome were formulated. Although these plans were never realized, they constituted a discussion of the structure of the Catholic Church that challenged the model of post-Tridentine Catholicism. The Eastern patriarchs and the Muscovite church were vitaly interested in the church in the Kyiv Metropolitanate. They sought to keep it Orthodox and to draw upon its intellectual and institutional resources. The Kyiv Collegium made Ukraine a major centre of religious and intellectual culture.

Although the Ukrainian churches have never again occupied as important a place in the Christian community as they did in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the experiments and plans of this age have inspired important modern, twentieth-century spiritual leaders and church movements. Iosyf Rut's'kyi served as a model of a Uniate hierarch with a broad vision of the relation between the Eastern and Western churches for Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi. Petro Mohyla provided an example for making Kyiv the centre of a reformed, reinvigorated, virtually independent local Orthodox church for Metropolitan Vasyli Lypkivs'kyi. Indeed, the modern religious leaders could even draw inspiration from religious figures who did not share their confessional adherence, but who had led the Ukrainian church at a time when it played a role of international importance.

The seven traditions outlined comprise only one method of assessing the significance of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in modern Ukrainian religious culture. All are not of equal importance, and each is but a means to analyze the rich Ukrainian religious experience of the early modern period. Other “traditions” can surely be added. However the components of the religious culture of the age are described, the picture will remain the same. Ukrainian religious culture underwent major changes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that have shaped the Ukrainian religious experience throughout the remainder of its first millennium, and will continue to do so well into its second.

Frank E. Sysyn

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Traditions of the Kyiv Metropolitanate*

Modern Ukrainian Orthodox churchmen and intellectuals have frequently looked to the early modern period as the model for the Ukrainian Orthodox revival. They have seen their goals of autocephaly, conciliarism, and Ukrainianization as rooted in the earlier period but undermined during the long intervening period of subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Synodal Russian Church. They have sought to bring into harmony Ukrainian ecclesiastical institutions, cultural and educational advances, and sociopolitical reforms in a manner similar to that which they perceive to have occurred in an earlier period of Ukrainian religious ferment, cultural revival, and political renaissance. They have striven to return the Orthodox Church to that which they see as its proper and positive role in Ukrainian cultural, social, and political life and have turned to the past for affirmations of specifically Ukrainian traditions.

The vision of the Orthodox Church as a repository and patron of Ukrainian spiritual, cultural, and political life has been an enduring one in the twentieth century. It is primarily associated with the Ukrainian church movement that coalesced after 1917 and with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) established in the years 1919–21, but it has also sustained Ukrainianizing groups within other Orthodox churches in Ukraine. Stalin’s brutal liquidation of the UAOC in the 1930s terminated this period of renewal. His subsequent accommodation with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) gave the newly elected Moscow patriarch a monopoly on Orthodox ecclesiastical life in Ukraine after the Second World War. Whenever conditions have permitted, however, attempts at bringing Orthodox and Ukrainian interests into a harmonious

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